Featherstone v. Southwestern Lbr. Co.

4 Citing cases

  1. Tate v. Robertson

    472 P.2d 905 (Okla. 1970)   Cited 1 times

    Respondents do contend, however, under their "PROPOSITION ONE", that the answer applicants filed (with their application to be let in to defend) did not show "a meritorious defense" to the cause, or causes, of action for partition which they (respondents) alleged as "plaintiffs" in the petition they filed at the commencement of the partition action. In support of their position, respondents cite: Crouch v. Crouch, 59 Okla. 181, 158 P. 573, Featherstone v. Southwestern Lumber Co., 116 Okla. 86, 243 P. 240, Petros v. Fox-Vliet Drug Co., 138 Okla. 253, 280 P. 812, Oklahoma R. Co. v. Holt, 161 Okla. 165, 17 P.2d 955, Harlow Publishing Co. v. Tallant, 171 Okla. 579, 43 P.2d 106, Turner v. Dexter, 172 Okla. 252, 44 P.2d 984, In re Cannon's Estate, 179 Okla. 278, 65 P.2d 192, Methvin v. Mutual Savings Loan Ass'n., 180 Okla. 80, 67 P.2d 792, and Eudaly v. Superior Oil Co., Okla., 270 P.2d 335. The opinions in most of these cases do not purport to apply to proceedings under Section 176, supra, as distinguished from the judgment vacation proceedings provided for in other sections of our Statutes, such as Title 12 O.S. 1961 § 1031[ 12-1031]. As to the answer, to be filed by parties to whom Section 176, supra, applies, said section provides merely that it shall be "a full answer".

  2. Moran v. City Nat. Bank of Lawton

    82 P.2d 682 (Okla. 1938)   Cited 5 times

    We are convinced that the defendant failed to prove a valid, meritorious defense to the action on which the judgment was rendered and that the court did not commit error in sustaining plaintiff's demurrer to the evidence. Harlow Pub. Co. v. Tallant, 171 Okla. 579, 43 P.2d 106; Featherstone v. Southwestern Lmbr. Co., 116 Okla. 86, 243 P. 240; Gavin v. Heath, 125 Okla. 118, 256 P. 745; Atchison, T. S. F. Ry. Co. v. Schultz, 24 Okla. 365, 103 P. 756; Johnson v. Bearden Plumbing Heating Co., 170 Okla. 63, 38 P.2d 500. The remaining questions presented have been considered, but we conclude that they are not germane to the controlling questions presented in the appeal.

  3. Grayson v. Stith

    72 P.2d 820 (Okla. 1937)   Cited 20 times

    In Van Noy v. Jackson (1918.) 68 Okla. 44, 171 P. 462, and in Featherstone v. Southwestern Lumber Co. (1926) 116 Okla. 86, 243 P. 240, proceedings to vacate judgments under said sections were by separate actions, and while judgments in those cases were reversed on other grounds, it was not questioned that such proceedings could be by separate action. In Roberts v. Hope (1913) 39 Okla. 173, 134 P. 434, this court held that proceedings under said sections could be instituted in the same action in which the judgment sought to be vacated was rendered, and this procedure has been followed in several cases.

  4. Gavin v. Heath

    256 P. 745 (Okla. 1926)   Cited 17 times

    ubstantiate the allegation of his intended answer to the effect that the building was fully completed in accordance with the plans and specifications and was accepted by Mary J. Gavin. Under the above-quoted statutes, the allegations of the alleged answer having been traversed, the burden was cast upon the petitioner, Heath, not only to show a state of facts which as a matter of law would constitute unavoidable casualty and misfortune, but also to show and have adjudged that that part of his intended answer which undertakes to plead an entire or partial defense to the action was in fact true, and until that was done there was nothing before the court which would warrant the vacation of the judgment, even if he had found that unavoidable casualty and misfortune caused the default to be entered. Maston v. Chandler Bldg. Loan Ass'n, 61 Okla. 230, 157 P. 366; McKee v. Howard. 38 Okla. 422, 134 P. 44; McAdams v. Latham. 21 Okla. 511, 96 P. 584; Jenkins v. Brown. 46 Okla. 132. 148 P. 697; Featherstone v. Southwestern Lumber Co., 116 Okla. 86, 243 P. 240. The trial court in entering the judgment purporting to vacate the judgment of March 1, 1924, does not even purport to adjudge that there was any defense shown to exist to the original action, and this failure of proof and failure of adjudication as to the defense was entirely counter to the provisions of section 814, C. O. S. 1921. It was a necessary prerequisite to the right of the trial court to vacate the judgment rendered at a previous term that the requirements of said section be met.