Opinion
Case No. 2D17-3612
08-21-2020
Delorean FEASTER, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Rocco J. Carbone, III, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow; and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Cynthia Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Rocco J. Carbone, III, Special Assistant Public Defender, Bartow; and Steven L. Bolotin, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Jonathan P. Hurley, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa; and Cynthia Richards, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa (substituted as counsel of record), for Appellee.
PER CURIAM. This matter is before us on remand from the Florida Supreme Court for reconsideration based on its decision in Love v. State, 286 So. 3d 177 (Fla. 2019). Delorean Feaster was convicted of aggravated battery, § 784.045(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2015), following a jury trial and sentenced to sixty-two months in prison. Prior to trial, Mr. Feaster filed a motion to dismiss the information charging him with aggravated battery based on section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2015), Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied the motion after applying the statutory burden of proof in effect at that time. Mr. Feaster appealed, and this court reversed Mr. Feaster's judgment and sentence and remanded for a new immunity hearing under the amended Stand Your Ground law in light of our holding in Martin v. State, 43 Fla. L. Weekly D1016, D1018, ––– So.3d ––––, ––––, 2018 WL 2074171 (Fla. 2d DCA May 4, 2018), disapproved of by Love, 286 So. 3d at 190. On remand, we now conclude that Mr. Feaster is not entitled to a new immunity hearing because his immunity hearing occurred before the amended statute's effective date. See Love, 286 So. 3d at 188 ("[ Section 776.032(4) ] applies to those immunity hearings, including in pending cases, that take place on or after the statute's effective date."). Accordingly, we affirm Mr. Feaster's judgment and sentence.
Affirmed.
VILLANTI, LUCAS, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.