(a) Gerbert argues that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to suppress the sexually explicit images recovered from his computer.To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim based on trial counsel's failure to file or pursue a motion, the defendant must show that the motion would have been granted had the motion been filed or pursued. See, e.g., Chalk v. State , 318 Ga.App. 45, 48 (1) (c), 733 S.E.2d 351 (2012) (trial counsel's failure to file motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds); Feaster v. State , 283 Ga.App. 417, 421 (5) (a), 641 S.E.2d 635 (2007) (trial counsel's failure to pursue motion to suppress). Trial counsel testified at the motion for new trial hearing that he did not move to suppress this evidence because Gerbert abandoned the computer when he left it with a coworker and never attempted to recover it.
Consequently, the trial court was authorized to find that LaGon had failed to demonstrate that his appointed counsel was unable or unwilling to effectively represent him. See Feaster v. State, 283 Ga.App. 417, 419(2), 641 S.E.2d 635 (2007). Moreover, given the timing of LaGon's request, the trial court was authorized to find that LaGon was simply attempting to use the discharge of his appointed counsel and employment of new counsel as a dilatory tactic.
Wells, supra at 157 (1) (b).Jackson v. Virginia, supra; Wells, supra at 154 (1); Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 418-419 (1) ( 641 SE2d 635) (2007) (evidence was sufficient to prove armed robbery, where victim identified defendant as the person who showed him a gun, threatened to shoot him, and then took his belongings, even though the officer who arrested defendant shortly after the incident did not find any gun in the defendant's possession); see OCGA §§ 16-8-2 (defining theft by taking); 16-8-41 (a) (defining armed robbery). PHIPPS, Presiding Judge.
Hammonds v. State, 218 Ga. App. 423, 424 (1) ( 461 SE2d 589) (1995) (punctuation omitted); see Smith v. State, 273 Ga. 356, 358 (3) ( 541 SE2d 362) (2001) (essential aim of the Sixth Amendment is to guarantee effective assistance of counsel, not to guarantee a defendant preferred counsel or counsel with whom a "meaningful relationship" can be established). See Hammonds, supra; see also Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 419 (2) ( 641 SE2d 635) (2007) (defendant's assertions that his trial attorney was hostile and refused to follow his instructions did not amount to a showing that the attorney had been unable or unwilling to effectively represent defendant). (e) Taylor asserts that trial counsel failed to demand a speedy trial when he instructed him to do so, but he has made no effort to show a reasonable probability that his lawyer's alleged inaction changed the outcome of his trial.
Given the trial court's colloquy with Thomas at trial as well as trial counsel's testimony, discussed above, that he advised Thomas of his right to a jury trial and his right to waive the same, the trial court's finding that Thomas' jury trial waiver was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent was not clearly erroneous. Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 419-420 (3) ( 641 SE2d 635) (2007). 3. Finally, Thomas claims that the trial court should have provided him with court-appointed counsel, arguing that the trial court, in determining that Thomas was not indigent, should not have considered the income of Thomas' mother and stepfather, with whom Thomas resided. While Thomas' affidavit of indigency is not in the record, a colloquy between Thomas and the trial court during the hearing on the new trial motion indicates that the affidavit stated, among other things, that Thomas was earning approximately $428 a month and that Thomas' stepfather had a monthly income of $4,000.
Holmes v. State, 267 Ga. App. 651, 652 ( 601 SE2d 134) (2004).Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 421 (5) (a) ( 641 SE2d 635) (2007) (physical precedent only).Rucker v. State, 266 Ga. App. 293, 295 (2) ( 596 SE2d 639) (2004).
Accordingly, counsel was not deficient for failing to object to this relevant evidence. See Feaster v. State, 283 Ga. App. 417, 421 (5) (a) ( 641 SE2d 635) (2007) ("When trial counsel's failure to pursue a motion to exclude evidence is the basis for a claim of ineffective assistance, the defendant must make a strong showing that the damaging evidence would have been excluded had counsel pursued the motion.") (footnote omitted). (d) Medlin also argues that counsel was deficient because he failed to cross-examine the handler of the tracking dog and failed to adequately cross-examine the victim.