Opinion
03-30-2016
Denise F. FEASTER, respondent, v. CABLEVISION SYSTEMS, appellant, et al., defendant.
Nicholas Goodman & Associates, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Carter A. Reich, H. Nicholas Goodman, and Brent M. Reitter of counsel), for appellant. Subin & Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Robert J. Eisen and Brian Isaac of counsel), for respondent.
Nicholas Goodman & Associates, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Carter A. Reich, H. Nicholas Goodman, and Brent M. Reitter of counsel), for appellant.
Subin & Associates, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Robert J. Eisen and Brian Isaac of counsel), for respondent.
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Cablevision Systems appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated November 10, 2014, which denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The Supreme Court properly denied the motion of the defendant Cablevision Systems (hereinafter the defendant) for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident. The defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendant's motion papers failed to adequately address the plaintiff's allegation that she sustained a medically determined injury or impairment of a nonpermanent nature which prevented her from performing substantially all of the material acts which constituted her usual and customary daily activities for not less than 90 days during the 180 days immediately following the subject accident (see Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ; Rouach v. Betts, 71 A.D.3d 977, 897 N.Y.S.2d 242 ).
In light of the defendant's failure to meet its prima facie burden, it is unnecessary to determine whether the papers submitted by the plaintiff in opposition were sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact (see Che Hong Kim v. Kossoff, 90 A.D.3d at 969, 934 N.Y.S.2d 867 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
MASTRO, J.P., HALL, MILLER and LaSALLE, JJ., concur.