This enumeration is without merit. See Watkins v. State, 237 Ga. 678 ( 229 S.E.2d 465) (1976); Dorris v. State, 237 Ga. 837 ( 229 S.E.2d 638) (1976); Fears v.State, 236 Ga. 660 ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976); Shirley v. State, 245 Ga. 616 ( 266 S.E.2d 218) (1980). 8.

Such argument is permissible. Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976); Allen v. State, 235 Ga. 709 ( 221 S.E.2d 405) (1975); Shy v. State, 234 Ga. 816 ( 218 S.E.2d 599) (1975). The third statement is not very clear, but it appears that the district attorney was attempting to say, as the evidence showed, that Philips had testified that he had overheard Couch admit that Couch and Garcia had "jumped on a dude.

Where do we stop? The prosecution in this case got three out of four safely in evidence. Would the result be the same with two out of four, or only one out of four? I cannot honestly say that this jury was not significantly influenced by the illegal admission of this evidence of an independent crime. If you doubt that the Bacon doctrine is being eroded, read the following cases: Cf. Rosborough v. State, 209 Ga. 362 (2) ( 72 S.E.2d 717) (1954); Howard v. State, 211 Ga. 186 (3) ( 84 S.E.2d 455) (1954); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 412 (2) ( 93 S.E.2d 354) (1956); Wood v. State, 224 Ga. 121 (5) ( 160 S.E.2d 368) (1968) with Campbell v. State, 234 Ga. 130 ( 214 S.E.2d 656) (1975); Allanson v. State, 235 Ga. 584 (1) ( 221 S.E.2d 3) (1975); and Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 (1) ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976). These cases show a remarkable trend, in my judgment, towards the liberal admission into evidence of independent crimes. If this is to be the new rule, why not just say, boldly and plainly, that the barrier has been lifted and defendants will now be tried on their record irrespective of any connection with the alleged crime on trial.

In light of this evidence, and although appellant testified that he knew of no children in the apartment complex, we find no impropriety in the assistant district attorney's argument. See generally Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 (2) ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976); Stancil v. State, 157 Ga. App. 189 (4) ( 276 S.E.2d 871) (1981). In any event, a prosecutor may argue to the jury the necessity to convict a defendant for the safety of the community.

The other crimes perpetrated by him were quite similar in nature, and their relevancy to the issue of identity outweighed any prejudicial effect. Burnett v. State, 234 Ga. 741 ( 218 S.E.2d 4) (1975); Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 ( 225 S.E.2d 4) (1976). The fact that appellant was acquitted of a charge brought by one of the other victims does not require a different conclusion.

Our Supreme Court has held on numerous occasions that evidence of other similar offenses committed by the accused, sufficiently close to the same locality and time, when similar methods are employed, is admissible for the purpose of identifying the accused and for showing intent, motive, plan, scheme, bent of mind and course of conduct. Anderson v. State, 222 Ga. 561, 563 ( 150 S.E.2d 638); Atkins v. State, 236 Ga. 624, 625 ( 225 S.E.2d 7); Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 ( 225 S.E.2d 4). The court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the voluntary statement of the defendant of a similar offense against the same victim. 3. The general grounds are without merit.

1. The testimony of the victim of a rape committed 18 days later showed sufficient similarities between the two attacks to make the later one relevant as to the identity of the defendant. See Payne v. State, 233 Ga. 294, 311 (VI) ( 210 S.E.2d 775) and cits.; Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 (1) ( 225 S.E.2d 4) and cits. The fact that the two offenses were not identical, does not affect the relevancy, since aggravated assault with intent to rape is a lesser included offense of rape. As to this, compare Payne v. State, supra, which also involved similar, yet not identical, offenses. The testimony of this witness and the evidence adduced in the present case show similarity in the following respects.

If appellant had been identified as a participant in the other alleged armed robberies by some evidence other than the testimony of the one alleged accomplice, there would be no error in the admission of the testimony for the limited purpose for which it was received into evidence. See Fears v. State, 236 Ga. 660 (1976), and cits., in addition to Irving v. State, 233 Ga. 353 ( 211 S.E.2d 309) (1974); and Davis v. State, 233 Ga. 638 ( 212 S.E.2d 814) (1975). However, the only evidence identifying appellant as a participant in any of the alleged armed robberies came from the testimony of the alleged accomplice Hawkins.