Opinion
06-21-00148-CR
04-04-2022
CHRISTOPHER LANCE FEARS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 4th District Court Rusk County, Texas Trial Court No. CR20-064
Before Morriss, C.J., Stevens and Carter, [*] JJ.
ORDER
On March 17, 2022, this Court sent Christopher Lance Fears, through his appointed counsel, a jurisdictional defect letter noting that, under the facts and circumstances of this case, it appeared that the State and Fears had entered into a charge-bargain plea agreement, rendering the case a "plea bargain case" for purposes of Rule 25.2(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). On March 23, 2022, Fears, again through counsel, filed a response to our jurisdictional defect letter. Much of Fears's argument in his jurisdictional response centered on the fact that Fears elected jury-assessed punishment in the trial court. However, Fears failed to demonstrate how that election had any bearing on the fact that he and the State had entered into a charge-bargain plea agreement under which the range of punishment to which he was exposed was capped.
The pertinent questions, then, are (1) whether Fears raised any matters by written motion that were ruled on before trial and that he now seeks to raise on appeal, see Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(A), or (2) whether the trial court meant to grant its permission for Fears to appeal from the proceedings in this case, see Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2)(B). While there were some minor written motions that were filed and ruled on before trial, they are unlikely to prove fruitful for Fears on appeal. Thus, the pivotal issue appears to be whether the trial court granted Fears permission to appeal. In his response, Fears highlighted a portion of the reporter's record in which the trial court informed Fears that he had a right to appeal the punishment portion of the trial, but not the guilt/innocence portion. In his response to our jurisdictional defect letter, Fears states, "From this it appears that the trial court was explicitly granting the right of appeal of the punishment phase to Appellant - without any qualification." While Fears's conclusion is by no means the sole and inevitable conclusion to be drawn from these statements, he has at least raised enough of an issue to warrant abatement of this matter to the trial court for a hearing involving all relevant parties to determine whether the trial court at any time granted or currently desires to grant Fears permission to appeal in this matter. Without such a grant of permission, it appears that the case remains a charge-bargain plea agreement case in which Fears has no right of appeal. Under either circumstance, the current certification of the defendant's right of appeal does not appear to be correct.
We order the trial court to conduct a hearing within fifteen days of the date of this order and to enter findings on the pertinent issues detailed above. The trial court's findings concerning the above matters and a revised certification of the defendant's right of appeal shall be provided in a supplemental clerk's record. The supplemental clerk's record and the reporter's record of the hearing shall be prepared and filed in this Court within ten days of the date of the hearing.
All appellate timetables are stayed pending further notice of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED. --------- Notes: * Jack Carter, Justice, Retired, Sitting by Assignment