We find this argument unpersuasive. This Court addressed the same issue in Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 ( 312 S.E.2d 174). We held that in the absence of any circumstances to the contrary, a presumption arises from proof of ownership or control of premises, or an automobile, that the owner or possessor is in control and possession of the contraband found therein.
Where an owner or driver of an automobile has exclusive possession of the automobile, the inference is that the owner or driver has exclusive possession of contraband found in the automobile. Farmer v. State, 152 Ga.App. 792, 794–797, 264 S.E.2d 235 (1979) (punctuation and citation omitted); Castillo, 166 Ga.App. at 821–822, 305 S.E.2d 629;Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 173, 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983); Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983). “[T]his inference has been referred to as a rebuttable presumption.”
Warren also argues that there was evidence that he had only recently purchased the car. He cites Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983), for the proposition that the presumption that a car's owner or driver possessed contraband found therein “does not apply where there is evidence in the case that the defendant has not been in possession of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 174(1), 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983). Contrary to Hinton's assertion on appeal, the combined evidence set forth above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses and to exclude every other hypothesis except for his guilt.
(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 173 (1) (312 SE2d 174) (1983). Contrary to Hinton's assertion on appeal, the combined evidence set forth above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses and to exclude every other hypothesis except for his guilt.
Warren also argues that there was evidence that he had only recently purchased the car. He cites Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 (312 SE2d 174) (1983), for the proposition that the presumption that a car's owner or driver possessed contraband found therein "does not apply where there is evidence in the case that the defendant has not been in possession of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
(Citations omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 174(1) ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983). MIKELL, Judge.
Because there was evidence other than possession of the car, it was for the jury to determine whether Susman was guilty of the possession charges.Petty v. State, 221 Ga. App. 125, 126 ( 470 S.E.2d 517) (1996); see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 (1) ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983). See Petty, supra.
And this evidence was corroborated by Gavin's testimony concerning Washington's behavior and his discovery of the cocaine only inches away from Washington. Washington also states that he was not the owner of the vehicle in which the cocaine was found. Pointing out that the owner of a vehicle is presumed to have contraband inside the vehicle under his or her control, see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 173 ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983), and arguing that Smith and the driver had equal access to the contraband, Washington maintains that the State proved only his mere presence at the crime scene. We first note that Washington's reliance on the equal access doctrine is misplaced.
And "[s]ince the verdict was not based on a presumption of possession, the . . . equal access principle was not available to rebut such presumption. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817 ( 305 S.E.2d 629; see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 174 ( 312 S.E.2d 174)[1983]." (Punctuation omitted.)