Fears v. State

36 Citing cases

  1. Benson v. State

    322 S.E.2d 339 (Ga. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 11 times

    We find this argument unpersuasive. This Court addressed the same issue in Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 ( 312 S.E.2d 174). We held that in the absence of any circumstances to the contrary, a presumption arises from proof of ownership or control of premises, or an automobile, that the owner or possessor is in control and possession of the contraband found therein.

  2. Reyes v. State

    322 Ga. App. 496 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 12 times

    Where an owner or driver of an automobile has exclusive possession of the automobile, the inference is that the owner or driver has exclusive possession of contraband found in the automobile. Farmer v. State, 152 Ga.App. 792, 794–797, 264 S.E.2d 235 (1979) (punctuation and citation omitted); Castillo, 166 Ga.App. at 821–822, 305 S.E.2d 629;Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 173, 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983); Ledesma v. State, 251 Ga. 487, 306 S.E.2d 629 (1983). “[T]his inference has been referred to as a rebuttable presumption.”

  3. Warren v. State

    314 Ga. App. 477 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion for mistrial, where the witness did not answer the question and, upon objection, the prosecutor withdrew the question and the trial court instructed the jury to disregard it

    Warren also argues that there was evidence that he had only recently purchased the car. He cites Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983), for the proposition that the presumption that a car's owner or driver possessed contraband found therein “does not apply where there is evidence in the case that the defendant has not been in possession of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

  4. Hinton v. State

    740 S.E.2d 394 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga.App. 172, 174(1), 312 S.E.2d 174 (1983). Contrary to Hinton's assertion on appeal, the combined evidence set forth above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses and to exclude every other hypothesis except for his guilt.

  5. Hinton v. State

    A12A2216 (Ga. Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2013)

    (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 173 (1) (312 SE2d 174) (1983). Contrary to Hinton's assertion on appeal, the combined evidence set forth above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the charged offenses and to exclude every other hypothesis except for his guilt.

  6. Warren v. State

    A11A2361 (Ga. Ct. App. Feb. 16, 2012)

    Warren also argues that there was evidence that he had only recently purchased the car. He cites Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 (312 SE2d 174) (1983), for the proposition that the presumption that a car's owner or driver possessed contraband found therein "does not apply where there is evidence in the case that the defendant has not been in possession of the vehicle for a period of time prior to the discovery of the contraband." (Citation and punctuation omitted.)

  7. Davis v. State

    581 S.E.2d 380 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003)   Cited 3 times

    (Citations omitted.) Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 174(1) ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983). MIKELL, Judge.

  8. Susman v. State

    567 S.E.2d 736 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 6 times

    Because there was evidence other than possession of the car, it was for the jury to determine whether Susman was guilty of the possession charges.Petty v. State, 221 Ga. App. 125, 126 ( 470 S.E.2d 517) (1996); see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172 (1) ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983). See Petty, supra.

  9. Washington v. State

    253 Ga. App. 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 9 times

    And this evidence was corroborated by Gavin's testimony concerning Washington's behavior and his discovery of the cocaine only inches away from Washington. Washington also states that he was not the owner of the vehicle in which the cocaine was found. Pointing out that the owner of a vehicle is presumed to have contraband inside the vehicle under his or her control, see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 173 ( 312 S.E.2d 174) (1983), and arguing that Smith and the driver had equal access to the contraband, Washington maintains that the State proved only his mere presence at the crime scene. We first note that Washington's reliance on the equal access doctrine is misplaced.

  10. Williams v. State

    247 Ga. App. 88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000)   Cited 4 times

    And "[s]ince the verdict was not based on a presumption of possession, the . . . equal access principle was not available to rebut such presumption. Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817 ( 305 S.E.2d 629; see Fears v. State, 169 Ga. App. 172, 174 ( 312 S.E.2d 174)[1983]." (Punctuation omitted.)