Opinion
02-CV-639S.
August 15, 2004
DECISION AND ORDER
1. On September 4, 2002, Plaintiff Pamela Fears filed her Complaint in this action alleging that she was terminated from her position of employment with Defendant Heritage Centers on account of her race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). Presently before this Court is Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is granted.
2. Unless otherwise noted, the following relevant facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff is an African-American female. She began working for Defendant on or about July 13, 1987, as a secretary for Mary Jo Malinowski, who was the Director of Human Resources. The two worked together amicably for many years.
3. On August 9, 1999, Barbara Kaczmarek became Plaintiff's direct supervisor. In addition, Cathy Glogan was hired in August of 1999 as a new employee in the Human Resources Department. On August 23, 1999, Malinowski issued a written reprimand to Plaintiff because she refused to train Glogan. Several months later, on December 7, 1999, Kaczmarek reported to Malinowski that Plaintiff refused to attend a Job Fair scheduled for January 4, 2000 from 4:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Malinowski spoke to Plaintiff about the Job Fair and Plaintiff reiterated that she would not attend. The next day, December 8, 1999, Malinowski terminated Plaintiff's employment by letter. The letter stated as follows: "Your employment with Heritage Centers is terminated effective immediately due to your continued unwillingness to perform the required essential functions of your position."
4. Plaintiff alleges that she was not terminated because of her unwillingness to perform her job duties (e.g., attend the Job Fair), but rather, was terminated because she is black. She also appears to allege that she was misadvised about a promotion and given increased job duties because she was black. Each of these claims is premised on a single, disputed event. Plaintiff alleges that in April of 1999, Malinowski called her a nigger. Plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she cannot remember the substance of the conversation, "but that `nigger' thing really stands out in my mind." Malinowski categorically denies referring to Plaintiff in this manner. This incident is the only race-related incident alleged in this case, and the only race-related incident Plaintiff relies on in support of her claim that she was fired because of her race.
In her memorandum of law, Plaintiff's counsel advises that "a very careful examination of the record is required." She then makes several passing statements (without any corresponding citation to the record) that white employees were not required to attend after-hours job fairs. However, counsel fails to identify any white employees who were similarly situated, nor does her Rule 56 Statement of Facts or Plaintiff's Affidavit even mention similarly situated white employees. If counsel is under the impression that it is this Court's obligation to mine the record in support of Plaintiff's position, she is mistaken. It is not this Court's duty or function to search the record in support of a litigant's suggested arguments. See Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford, 288 F.3d 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[Rule 56] does not impose an obligation on a district court to perform an independent review of the record to find proof of a factual dispute."); Smith v. Ward Leonard Elec. Co., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 3703, 2004 WL 1661098, at *3 n. 2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004) ("It is the job of Plaintiff's counsel, not the Court, to identify evidence sufficient to avoid summary judgment."). Accordingly, this Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to present sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment on this basis. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e) ("an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56], must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial"); Wyler v. United States, 725 F.2d 156, 160 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiff cannot rely on conclusory statements in the pleadings or unsupported allegations).
5. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides that summary judgment is warranted where the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). A "genuine issue" exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Id.
6. In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences drawn from the evidence must be "viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Addickes v. S.H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59, 90 S. Ct. 1598, 1609, 26 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1970). "Only when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir. 1991). The function of the court is not "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
7. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has explicitly cautioned district courts to use extra care when deciding whether to grant summary judgment in employment discrimination cases because "the ultimate issue to be resolved in such cases is the employer's intent, an issue not particularly suited to summary adjudication." Eastmer v. Williamsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 977 F. Supp. 207, 212 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (quoting Gallo v. Prudential Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir. 1994)). Nonetheless, "[t]he summary judgment rule would be rendered sterile . . . if the mere incantation of intent or state of mind would operate as a talisman to defeat an otherwise valid motion."Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985). Indeed, the Second Circuit has noted that "the salutary purposes of summary judgment — avoiding protracted, expensive and harassing trials — apply no less to discrimination cases than to commercial or other areas of litigation." Id.
8. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlawful for an employer to "discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 2150, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). It is now well settled that discrimination claims brought under Title VII are analyzed under the burden-shifting analysis first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-43, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2106, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
9. The burden-shifting test first requires that the plaintiff establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she is qualified for her position, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the circumstances of the adverse action give rise to an inference of discrimination. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 42 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802).
10. If the plaintiff meets this initial burden and establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination arises, and the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employment action. Texas Dep't of Comt'y Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 1094, 67 L. Ed.2d 207 (1981)). If the defendant succeeds in making this showing, "the presumption of discrimination arising with the establishment of the prima facie case drops from the picture." Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42 (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed.2d 407 (1993)).
11. Assuming that the defendant meets its burden at the second stage, the burden returns to the plaintiff to prove that the defendant's discrimination was intentional. In this regard, the plaintiff must produce "evidence that the defendant's proffered, nondiscriminatory reason is a mere pretext for actual discrimination." Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42. "In short, the question becomes whether the evidence, taken as a whole, supports a sufficient rational inference of discrimination." Id. However, "[i]t is not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must [also] believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. (quoting St. Mary's, 509 U.S. at 519).
12. For purposes of this motion, this Court will assume that Plaintiff has established a prima facie case, and that Defendant has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff's employment, to wit: Plaintiff's continued unwillingness to perform the required essential functions of her position. Proceeding directly to the ultimate question of whether Plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find racial discrimination, this Court finds that she has not.
13. In support of her race discrimination claim, Plaintiff relies exclusively on the single, isolated incident wherein Malinowski allegedly called her a nigger. Even assuming that this incident occurred, and drawing all inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff's claim still fails as a matter of law. "Verbal comments constitute evidence of discriminatory motivation when a plaintiff demonstrates that a nexus exists between the allegedly discriminatory statements and a defendant's decision to discharge the plaintiff." Schreiber v. Worldco, LLC., No. 02 Civ. 4049, 2004 WL 1535562 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2004). However, "stray remarks, even if made by a decision maker, do not constitute sufficient evidence [to support] a case of employment discrimination."Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc., 151 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 109-110 (2d Cir. 1994) and noting that a single stray remark by a decisionmaker, without more, cannot get a discrimination suit to a jury); see also Carlton v. Mystic Trans., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 136 (2d Cir. 2000) (one stray comment by itself is ordinarily insufficient proof of discrimination).
14. When determining whether a comment is a "stray remark," courts consider (1) who made the remark, whether a decision maker, supervisor or co-worker, (2) the point in time when the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue, (3) whether a reasonable person could view the remark as discriminatory, and (4) whether the remark was related to the decisionmaking process. See Schreiber, 2004 WL 1535562.
15. This case presents the classic, non-actionable "stray remark." Assuming that Malinowski, who was the decision maker, made the remark, she did so at least eight months prior to Plaintiff's termination in a context that Plaintiff cannot recall. Moreover, Plaintiff's receipt of a written reprimand for failing to train Glogan and her refusal to attend the Job Fair both occurred after Malinowski's comment. Further, it is undisputed that Malinowski's comment was not related to the decision to terminate Plaintiff's employment. Indeed, both the isolated nature of the comment and the intervening, unrelated reprimands suggest a considerable, if not total, disconnect between the comment and the termination. Accordingly, there is simply no evidence of any nexus between Malinowski's comment and Plaintiff's termination.
16. Because this single stray remark is the only evidence of racial discrimination that Plaintiff has offered, her claim fails as a matter of law. See Danzer, 151 F.3d at 56; Woroski, 31 F.3d at 109-110; see also Soliman v. Deutsche Bank AG, No. 03 Civ. 104, 2004 WL 1124689, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2004) (comments to an Egyptian American male that he was a "sand nigger," that he was like an "Arab selling in a bazaar," and that "all blacks are good for is dancing" were held to be non-actionable stray remarks, insufficient to raise an inference of discrimination); Alexander v. Turner Corp., No. 00 Civ. 4677, 2001 WL 225049, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2001) ("A single comment made in the course of ten years employment does not come close to satisfying plaintiff's burden.").
17. Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, this Court finds that there is insufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find that Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment on account of her race. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment.
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 20) is GRANTED.
FURTHER, that the Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case.
SO ORDERED.