C.J.S. 55, 129, Brokers, Secs. 18, 129. As to there being sufficient evidence of willfulnessor recklessness on the part of the Respondent to sustain thepunitive damage verdict against the Respondent: 204 S.C. 547, 30 S.E.2d 589; 68 S.E.2d 874, 221 S.C. 14; 74 S.E.2d 823, 223 S.C. 160; 200 S.E. 762, 189 S.C. 218; 129 S.E.2d 842, 242 S.C. 28; 69 S.C. 160, 48 S.E. 106; 174 S.C. 517, 178 S.E. 129; 41 S.E.2d 372, 210 S.C. 1; 58 S.E.2d 734, 216 S.C. 456; 130 S.E.2d 486, 242 S.C. 221. Messrs. Wright, Scott, Blackwell Powers, of Florence, and Leatherwood, Walker, Todd Mann, of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to trial Judge's order, grantingjudgment non obstante veredicto in favor of Respondent,being proper: 16 Appleman on Insurance, Secs. 8728, 8726, 8722, 8727; 3 Couch on Insurance 2d Secs. 25:92, 25:96, 25:94; 79 N.E.2d 28, 400 Ill. 55; 107 N.E. 1037, 213 N.Y. 447; 215 S.C. 90, 54 S.E.2d 523; 272 N.C. 149, 5 N.E.2d 71; 172 F.2d 746; 70 F.2d 969; 187 P.2d 66; 44 C.J.S. 805, Sec. 143; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 800. As to there not being sufficient evidenceof willfulness or recklessness on the part of the Respondentto sustain the punitive damage verdict against the Respondent: 130 F.2d 72; 189 S.C. 218, 200 S.E. 762. January 18, 1965.
"Even though no one of the facts is sufficient in itself to warrant an inference of waiver, yet if, taken together, they tend to produce that result, then there is no error in submitting that question to the jury" (citing Cope v. InsuranceCo., 134 S.C. 532; 133 S.E., 440. Clark v. InsuranceCo., 101 S.C. 249; 85 S.E., 407). McCarty v. Piedmont Insurance Co., 81 S.C. 152; 62 S.E., 1; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.), 729, and Feagin v. Royal InsuranceCo., 122 S.C. 532; 115 S.E., 808, relied upon by the respondent, are not in point. In the McCarty case, the Court held that:
If Martens did not fall within the class of persons acting for insurance companies, the section has no application to him. Feagon v. Royal Insurance Company, 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808 (1923). See generally, 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 143, page 805.
Messrs. J. Spratt White and Donald V. Richardson of Whaley, McCutchen, Blanton Richardson, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to question of agency and party actingas insured's agent: 8 S.E.2d 511, 193 S.C. 299; 185 S.E. 541, 180 S.C. 177; 137 S.E.2d 412, 244 S.C. 411; 134 S.E. 428, 136 S.C. 458. As to suit papers beingforwarded to Appellant on instructions of insured and notat discretion of insurance agent: 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808. As to a third party having no higher rights under apolicy of insurance than the insured would have: 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241. As to there being no provision inpolicy, issued by Appellant, extending coverage to the 1965Ford after December 20, 1965: 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297; 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913; 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49; 235 S.C. 178, 110 S.E.2d 255. As to Appellant's policy affording no coverage here, neitherunder the omnibus clause nor under the Statute: 203 Va. 337, 124 S.E.2d 203; 36 Ill. App.2d 272, 183 N.E.2d 22; (Colo.) 419 P.2d 663; 121 S.E.2d 10, 238 S.C. 533. As to there being no statutory requirementthat Appellant file a change of endorsement with the HighwayDepartment: 149 S.E.2d 647, 248 S.C. 307; (S.C. ) 158 S.E.2d 774; 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297. As to an insurer not being bound by a default judgmentagainst its insured where it was not notified of the action: 145 S.E.2d 523, 247 S.C. 82. As to failure to forwardSummons and Complaint to insurer relie
Messrs. deLoach deLoach, of Camden, for Respondent,Niagara Fire Insurance Company, cite: As to there beingnothing in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Actwhich forbids the cancellation of a liability policy by aninsured, and the Assigned Risk Plan recognizes that thismay be done: 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 404, p. 752; (Ga.) 127 S.E.2d 478. As to the trial Judge properlyholding that the facts of this case do not bring it within thepurview of Section 37-233 of the 1952 Code, as amended: 122 S.C. 532; 240 S.C. 75, 124 S.E.2d 602; 2 Am.Jur., Agency, Sec. 348, p. 271. As to trial Judge properlyconcluding that the Respondent insurance company was notestopped from denying liability: 81 S.C. 152; 96 U.S. 546; 238 S.C. 341, 120 S.E.2d 231.
, 58 Am. Rep. 344; 159 S.C. 309, 156 S.E. 865; 52 S.C. 231, 29 S.E. 657; 119 S.C. 1, 111 S.E. 805; 201 S.C. 273, 22 S.E.2d 877; 130 S.C. 383, 126 S.E. 125; 207 S.C. 236, 36 S.E.2d 380; 130 S.C. 383, 126 S.E. 125; 70 S.C. 295, 49 S.E. 855; 74 S.C. 246, 54 S.E. 372; 48 S.C. 195, 26 S.E. 323; 126 S.E. 432, 131 S.C. 62; (S.C.) 164 S.E. 7; 141 S.E. 20. Messrs. Julian B. Salley, Jr., Henry Summerall, Jr., and Henderson, Salley Cushman, of Aiken, for Respondent, cite: As to the law of waiver having noapplication to this case in that the doctrine of waiverdoes not pertain to a matter of coverage as distinguishedfrom breach of condition and cannot be appliedso as to extend the contract beyond its terms: 124 S.C. 32, 117 S.E. 70; 177 F.2d 773; 233 F.2d 500; 113 A.L.R. 858. As to there being no evidence in the recordupon which a finding of waiver or estoppel could properlybe based and therefore the judgment in the respondent'sfavor notwithstanding the verdict was proper: 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808; 141 N.C. 234, 54 S.E. 271; 196 S.C. 297, 13 S.E.2d 278; 188 S.C. 484, 199 S.E. 698; 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509; 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884; 10 R.C.L. 870, Sec. 13; 189 S.C. 176, 200 S.E. 765; 164 S.C. 193, 162 S.E. 95; 63 S.C. 192, 41 S.E. 90; 130 S.C. 1, 125 S.E. 285; 195 S.C. 397, 11 S.E.2d 438. April 16, 1963.
Messrs. Haynesworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion Johnstone, of Greenville, and John A. Marion, of York, cite: Asto The Hiers-Clarkson Insurance Agency not being an agentof the appellant company, but was an agent of the insured forthe purposes of obtaining insurance for him: 22 A.2d 484; 194 S.C. 533, 9 S.E.2d 222; 154 So. 84; 47 N Y S. 1107; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808. As to if there was anyagency, it was an agency for receiving the premiums only,and as such no other acts of the Hiers-Clarkson Agencycould be imputed to the Appellant: 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147; 108 S.C. 137, 93 S.E. 711. As to there beingno breach, fraudulent or otherwise, of the insurance contract: 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203; 87 S.C. 331, 69 S.E. 660; 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640; 188 S.C. 1, 189 S.E. 417; 174 S.C. 177, 177 S.E. 98. As to error on partof Trial Judge in failing to charge, as a matter of law, thatthe Respondent had failed to mitigate his damages and thathe was under a duty to do so: 204 S.C. 156, 28 S.E.2d 673; 133 S.C. 55, 130 S.E.2d 119. Messrs. John M. Spratt, of York, and Hemphill Hemphill, of Chester, for Respondent, cite: As to there being sufficientevidence for the submission to the jury of the questionof the agency of Hiers-Clarkson Insurance Agency: 93 S.C. 406, 76 S.E. 1089; 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147. As tothere being some evidence of fraud: 183 S.C. 9, 18
Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Mr. Robert Moorman, for appellant, cites: Agency: 114 S.C. 491; 135 S.C. 367; 55 S.C. 568; 122 S.C. 532; 129 S.C. 226; 169 S.C. 16. Nonsuit: 177 S.C. 305. Asto punitive damages for breach of contract: 166 S.C. 454; 165 S.E., 203; 70 S.C. 108; 49 S.E., 232; 169 S.C. 384; 169 S.E., 78; 174 S.C. 177; 177 S.E., 98; 101 S.C. 125; 85 S.E., 241; 70 S.C. 108; 49 S.E., 232; 3 Ann. Cas., 407; 173 S.E., 463; 126 S.C. 207; 119 S.E., 571; 176 S.C. 185; 173 S.C. 1; 174 S.E., 581. Fraud: 166 S.C. 532; 165 S.E., 190; 182 S.E., 322; 176 S.C. 494; 173 S.C. 448; 176 S.E., 340; 70 S.C. 108; 124 S.C. 8; 117 S.E., 305. Excessive damages: 131 S.C. 247; 96 S.C. 278; 86 S.C. 530; 68 S.E., 645; 167 S.C. 255; 168 S.C. 372; 169 S.C. 400; 171 S.C. 350. Messrs. T.P. Taylor, W.W. Hawes and A.F. Spigner, for respondent, cite: Punitive damages for breach of contract: 171 S.C. 350; 166 S.C. 475; 165 S.E., 188; 175 S.C. 161; 175 S.C. 182; 178 S.E., 867; 166 S.C. 475; 165 S.E., 188; 167 S.C. 309; 166 S.E., 343; 168 S.C. 372; 167 S.E., 647; 171 S.E., 350; 172 S.E., 305.
s. Co., 194 Wis. 325, 216 N.W. 654; New Orleans Ins. Co. Assn. v. Griffith Shook, 66 Tex. 232, 18 S.W. 505; Atwood v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 206 Mass. 96, 92 N.E. 32; Sowers v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 551, 85 N.W. 763; Orient Ins. Co. v. Prather, 62 S.W. 89; Gray v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 155 N.Y. 180, 49 N.E. 675; Athens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 132 Ga. 703, 64 S.E. 993; Walton v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 N.E. 443, 116 N.Y. 317; McCarty v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; Healy v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 5 Nev. 268; Frankfurter v. Home Ins. Co., 10 Misc. 157, 31 N.Y.S. 3; Hanna v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 217 Mo. App. 261, 263 S.W. 526; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Roan, 215 S.W. 985; United Firemens Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 82 F. 406; Morris v. Orient Ins. Co., 106 Ga. 472, 33 S.E. 430; House v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 145 Iowa 462, 121 N.W. 509; Carleton v. Patrons Androscoggin Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 Me. 79, 82 A. 649; Boyle v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 250 S.W. 641; Feagin v. Royal Ins. Co., 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808; Rundell Mough v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 101 N.W. 517; Maupin v. Scottish Union Natl. Fire Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 557, 45 S.E. 1003; Veal v. Fire Assn. of Phila., 30 S.W.2d 715. C.O. Inman for respondents. (1) Knowledge of the character of business engaged in by the assured in its premises, and knowledge that it kept and sold fireworks each year at the Fourth of July season, which was possessed by the insurance company's agents at the time of the issuance of the policy, was knowledge to the company.
l September, 1921. It is my further opinion that if Graham, and through him the Lancashire Company, for whom he was then acting, knew in December that the (Graham) had been informed in September that the plaintiff then had no iron safe, and that Graham had replied, "That is all right," and thereby induced the plaintiff to conclude that the absence of the safe was "all right during the continuance of the policy," to wit, from September, 1920, to September, 1921, which period covered the date of the issuance of the Lancashire policy, and also the date of the fire, then I think and hold that the issuance of the policy and the collection of the premium from the plaintiff, with this knowledge present in Graham's mind, and with this knowledge imputed by law to the Lancashire Company, constituted evidence of waiver. I am not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated by this Court in the cases of McCarty v. Insurance Co., 81 S.C. 152; 62 S.E., 1; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.), 729, and Feagin v.Insurance Co., 122 S.C. 532; 115 S.E., 808, to the effect that knowledge by an agent of the intention of the insured to violate his policy in the future will not constitute evidence of waiver; but I consider that the distinction between these decisions and the present case is obvious. Herein the agent had before December, 1920, as an accomplished fact led Hughes to suppose that for insurance purposes an iron safe would not be required for the year running from September, 1920, to September, 1921. This accomplished fact, which is relied upon as evidence of waiver, had nothing to do with future conditions or future happenings.