Feagin v. Royal Ins. Co.

10 Citing cases

  1. Cook v. Canal Ins. Co.

    140 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. 1965)   Cited 3 times

    C.J.S. 55, 129, Brokers, Secs. 18, 129. As to there being sufficient evidence of willfulnessor recklessness on the part of the Respondent to sustain thepunitive damage verdict against the Respondent: 204 S.C. 547, 30 S.E.2d 589; 68 S.E.2d 874, 221 S.C. 14; 74 S.E.2d 823, 223 S.C. 160; 200 S.E. 762, 189 S.C. 218; 129 S.E.2d 842, 242 S.C. 28; 69 S.C. 160, 48 S.E. 106; 174 S.C. 517, 178 S.E. 129; 41 S.E.2d 372, 210 S.C. 1; 58 S.E.2d 734, 216 S.C. 456; 130 S.E.2d 486, 242 S.C. 221. Messrs. Wright, Scott, Blackwell Powers, of Florence, and Leatherwood, Walker, Todd Mann, of Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As to trial Judge's order, grantingjudgment non obstante veredicto in favor of Respondent,being proper: 16 Appleman on Insurance, Secs. 8728, 8726, 8722, 8727; 3 Couch on Insurance 2d Secs. 25:92, 25:96, 25:94; 79 N.E.2d 28, 400 Ill. 55; 107 N.E. 1037, 213 N.Y. 447; 215 S.C. 90, 54 S.E.2d 523; 272 N.C. 149, 5 N.E.2d 71; 172 F.2d 746; 70 F.2d 969; 187 P.2d 66; 44 C.J.S. 805, Sec. 143; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 800. As to there not being sufficient evidenceof willfulness or recklessness on the part of the Respondentto sustain the punitive damage verdict against the Respondent: 130 F.2d 72; 189 S.C. 218, 200 S.E. 762. January 18, 1965.

  2. Rowell v. Fireman's Insurance Co.

    142 S.C. 457 (S.C. 1927)   Cited 7 times
    In Rowell v. Fireman's Insurance Co., 142 S.C. 457, 141 S.E., 20, it was held: "If more than one inference can be drawn from the testimony, question of fact is made for jury" — citing Rogers v. Atlantic LifeInsurance Co., 135 S.C. 89. 133 S.E., 215, 45 A.L.R., 1172; Hollings v. Bankers Union, 63 S.C. 197, 41 S.E., 90.

    "Even though no one of the facts is sufficient in itself to warrant an inference of waiver, yet if, taken together, they tend to produce that result, then there is no error in submitting that question to the jury" (citing Cope v. InsuranceCo., 134 S.C. 532; 133 S.E., 440. Clark v. InsuranceCo., 101 S.C. 249; 85 S.E., 407). McCarty v. Piedmont Insurance Co., 81 S.C. 152; 62 S.E., 1; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.), 729, and Feagin v. Royal InsuranceCo., 122 S.C. 532; 115 S.E., 808, relied upon by the respondent, are not in point. In the McCarty case, the Court held that:

  3. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Smoak

    182 S.E.2d 749 (S.C. 1971)   Cited 15 times
    Distinguishing between insurance brokers and agents on basis of whether employed by person seeking insurance or by insurance company to solicit and write insurance

    If Martens did not fall within the class of persons acting for insurance companies, the section has no application to him. Feagon v. Royal Insurance Company, 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808 (1923). See generally, 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 143, page 805.

  4. Washington v. Nat'l Service Fire Ins. Co.

    252 S.C. 635 (S.C. 1969)   Cited 14 times
    Stating "an insurer which has denied coverage on some other basis is precluded from defending against an action on a liability policy on the ground that the insured failed to comply with its requirements as to notice and the forwarding of suit papers"

    Messrs. J. Spratt White and Donald V. Richardson of Whaley, McCutchen, Blanton Richardson, of Columbia, for Appellant, cite: As to question of agency and party actingas insured's agent: 8 S.E.2d 511, 193 S.C. 299; 185 S.E. 541, 180 S.C. 177; 137 S.E.2d 412, 244 S.C. 411; 134 S.E. 428, 136 S.C. 458. As to suit papers beingforwarded to Appellant on instructions of insured and notat discretion of insurance agent: 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808. As to a third party having no higher rights under apolicy of insurance than the insured would have: 235 S.C. 452, 112 S.E.2d 241. As to there being no provision inpolicy, issued by Appellant, extending coverage to the 1965Ford after December 20, 1965: 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297; 242 S.C. 322, 130 S.E.2d 913; 250 N.C. 45, 108 S.E.2d 49; 235 S.C. 178, 110 S.E.2d 255. As to Appellant's policy affording no coverage here, neitherunder the omnibus clause nor under the Statute: 203 Va. 337, 124 S.E.2d 203; 36 Ill. App.2d 272, 183 N.E.2d 22; (Colo.) 419 P.2d 663; 121 S.E.2d 10, 238 S.C. 533. As to there being no statutory requirementthat Appellant file a change of endorsement with the HighwayDepartment: 149 S.E.2d 647, 248 S.C. 307; (S.C. ) 158 S.E.2d 774; 258 N.C. 672, 129 S.E.2d 297. As to an insurer not being bound by a default judgmentagainst its insured where it was not notified of the action: 145 S.E.2d 523, 247 S.C. 82. As to failure to forwardSummons and Complaint to insurer relie

  5. American Cas. Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co.

    137 S.E.2d 412 (S.C. 1964)   Cited 6 times

    Messrs. deLoach deLoach, of Camden, for Respondent,Niagara Fire Insurance Company, cite: As to there beingnothing in the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Actwhich forbids the cancellation of a liability policy by aninsured, and the Assigned Risk Plan recognizes that thismay be done: 29 Am. Jur., Insurance, Sec. 404, p. 752; (Ga.) 127 S.E.2d 478. As to the trial Judge properlyholding that the facts of this case do not bring it within thepurview of Section 37-233 of the 1952 Code, as amended: 122 S.C. 532; 240 S.C. 75, 124 S.E.2d 602; 2 Am.Jur., Agency, Sec. 348, p. 271. As to trial Judge properlyconcluding that the Respondent insurance company was notestopped from denying liability: 81 S.C. 152; 96 U.S. 546; 238 S.C. 341, 120 S.E.2d 231.

  6. Bost v. Bankers Fire & Marine Insurance

    130 S.E.2d 907 (S.C. 1963)   Cited 5 times

    , 58 Am. Rep. 344; 159 S.C. 309, 156 S.E. 865; 52 S.C. 231, 29 S.E. 657; 119 S.C. 1, 111 S.E. 805; 201 S.C. 273, 22 S.E.2d 877; 130 S.C. 383, 126 S.E. 125; 207 S.C. 236, 36 S.E.2d 380; 130 S.C. 383, 126 S.E. 125; 70 S.C. 295, 49 S.E. 855; 74 S.C. 246, 54 S.E. 372; 48 S.C. 195, 26 S.E. 323; 126 S.E. 432, 131 S.C. 62; (S.C.) 164 S.E. 7; 141 S.E. 20. Messrs. Julian B. Salley, Jr., Henry Summerall, Jr., and Henderson, Salley Cushman, of Aiken, for Respondent, cite: As to the law of waiver having noapplication to this case in that the doctrine of waiverdoes not pertain to a matter of coverage as distinguishedfrom breach of condition and cannot be appliedso as to extend the contract beyond its terms: 124 S.C. 32, 117 S.E. 70; 177 F.2d 773; 233 F.2d 500; 113 A.L.R. 858. As to there being no evidence in the recordupon which a finding of waiver or estoppel could properlybe based and therefore the judgment in the respondent'sfavor notwithstanding the verdict was proper: 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808; 141 N.C. 234, 54 S.E. 271; 196 S.C. 297, 13 S.E.2d 278; 188 S.C. 484, 199 S.E. 698; 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; 238 S.C. 438, 120 S.E.2d 509; 217 S.C. 442, 60 S.E.2d 884; 10 R.C.L. 870, Sec. 13; 189 S.C. 176, 200 S.E. 765; 164 S.C. 193, 162 S.E. 95; 63 S.C. 192, 41 S.E. 90; 130 S.C. 1, 125 S.E. 285; 195 S.C. 397, 11 S.E.2d 438. April 16, 1963.

  7. Taylor v. U.S. Casualty Co.

    92 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1956)   Cited 16 times
    In Taylor v. United States Casualty Company, 229 S.C. 230, 92 S.E.2d 647, this Court did not find any error in the instruction to the effect that inability to comply with the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law, resulting from a breach of an insurance contract, is an element of damages.

    Messrs. Haynesworth, Perry, Bryant, Marion Johnstone, of Greenville, and John A. Marion, of York, cite: Asto The Hiers-Clarkson Insurance Agency not being an agentof the appellant company, but was an agent of the insured forthe purposes of obtaining insurance for him: 22 A.2d 484; 194 S.C. 533, 9 S.E.2d 222; 154 So. 84; 47 N Y S. 1107; 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808. As to if there was anyagency, it was an agency for receiving the premiums only,and as such no other acts of the Hiers-Clarkson Agencycould be imputed to the Appellant: 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147; 108 S.C. 137, 93 S.E. 711. As to there beingno breach, fraudulent or otherwise, of the insurance contract: 166 S.C. 454, 165 S.E. 203; 87 S.C. 331, 69 S.E. 660; 200 S.C. 84, 20 S.E.2d 640; 188 S.C. 1, 189 S.E. 417; 174 S.C. 177, 177 S.E. 98. As to error on partof Trial Judge in failing to charge, as a matter of law, thatthe Respondent had failed to mitigate his damages and thathe was under a duty to do so: 204 S.C. 156, 28 S.E.2d 673; 133 S.C. 55, 130 S.E.2d 119. Messrs. John M. Spratt, of York, and Hemphill Hemphill, of Chester, for Respondent, cite: As to there being sufficientevidence for the submission to the jury of the questionof the agency of Hiers-Clarkson Insurance Agency: 93 S.C. 406, 76 S.E. 1089; 189 S.C. 356, 1 S.E.2d 147. As tothere being some evidence of fraud: 183 S.C. 9, 18

  8. Sturkie v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co.

    180 S.C. 177 (S.C. 1936)   Cited 26 times
    In Sturkie v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 180 S.C. 177, 185 S.E., 541, 543, it is stated: "This court has held in numerous cases that where an insurance company refuses to collect or accept premiums, and it is clearly shown that the intention of the company is to cancel a policy which is in force, and upon which rights have accrued, such action on the part of the company will sustain a verdict for punitive damages.

    Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Mr. Robert Moorman, for appellant, cites: Agency: 114 S.C. 491; 135 S.C. 367; 55 S.C. 568; 122 S.C. 532; 129 S.C. 226; 169 S.C. 16. Nonsuit: 177 S.C. 305. Asto punitive damages for breach of contract: 166 S.C. 454; 165 S.E., 203; 70 S.C. 108; 49 S.E., 232; 169 S.C. 384; 169 S.E., 78; 174 S.C. 177; 177 S.E., 98; 101 S.C. 125; 85 S.E., 241; 70 S.C. 108; 49 S.E., 232; 3 Ann. Cas., 407; 173 S.E., 463; 126 S.C. 207; 119 S.E., 571; 176 S.C. 185; 173 S.C. 1; 174 S.E., 581. Fraud: 166 S.C. 532; 165 S.E., 190; 182 S.E., 322; 176 S.C. 494; 173 S.C. 448; 176 S.E., 340; 70 S.C. 108; 124 S.C. 8; 117 S.E., 305. Excessive damages: 131 S.C. 247; 96 S.C. 278; 86 S.C. 530; 68 S.E., 645; 167 S.C. 255; 168 S.C. 372; 169 S.C. 400; 171 S.C. 350. Messrs. T.P. Taylor, W.W. Hawes and A.F. Spigner, for respondent, cite: Punitive damages for breach of contract: 171 S.C. 350; 166 S.C. 475; 165 S.E., 188; 175 S.C. 161; 175 S.C. 182; 178 S.E., 867; 166 S.C. 475; 165 S.E., 188; 167 S.C. 309; 166 S.E., 343; 168 S.C. 372; 167 S.E., 647; 171 S.E., 350; 172 S.E., 305.

  9. Henderson v. Mass. Bonding Ins. Co.

    337 Mo. 1 (Mo. 1935)   Cited 35 times
    In Henderson v. Massachusetts Bonding Ins. Co., 337 Mo. 1, 84 S.W.2d 922, the Supreme Court held that "fireworks" were not within a policy exception from liability by reason of "explosives" kept or sold on the premises.

    s. Co., 194 Wis. 325, 216 N.W. 654; New Orleans Ins. Co. Assn. v. Griffith Shook, 66 Tex. 232, 18 S.W. 505; Atwood v. Caledonian-American Ins. Co., 206 Mass. 96, 92 N.E. 32; Sowers v. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Iowa 551, 85 N.W. 763; Orient Ins. Co. v. Prather, 62 S.W. 89; Gray v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 155 N.Y. 180, 49 N.E. 675; Athens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 132 Ga. 703, 64 S.E. 993; Walton v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 22 N.E. 443, 116 N.Y. 317; McCarty v. Piedmont Mut. Ins. Co., 81 S.C. 152, 62 S.E. 1; Healy v. Imperial Fire Ins. Co., 5 Nev. 268; Frankfurter v. Home Ins. Co., 10 Misc. 157, 31 N.Y.S. 3; Hanna v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 217 Mo. App. 261, 263 S.W. 526; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Roan, 215 S.W. 985; United Firemens Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 82 F. 406; Morris v. Orient Ins. Co., 106 Ga. 472, 33 S.E. 430; House v. Security Fire Ins. Co., 145 Iowa 462, 121 N.W. 509; Carleton v. Patrons Androscoggin Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 Me. 79, 82 A. 649; Boyle v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 250 S.W. 641; Feagin v. Royal Ins. Co., 122 S.C. 532, 115 S.E. 808; Rundell Mough v. Anchor Fire Ins. Co., 101 N.W. 517; Maupin v. Scottish Union Natl. Fire Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 557, 45 S.E. 1003; Veal v. Fire Assn. of Phila., 30 S.W.2d 715. C.O. Inman for respondents. (1) Knowledge of the character of business engaged in by the assured in its premises, and knowledge that it kept and sold fireworks each year at the Fourth of July season, which was possessed by the insurance company's agents at the time of the issuance of the policy, was knowledge to the company.

  10. Hughes v. Palatine Insurance Company

    130 S.C. 383 (S.C. 1924)   Cited 14 times

    l September, 1921. It is my further opinion that if Graham, and through him the Lancashire Company, for whom he was then acting, knew in December that the (Graham) had been informed in September that the plaintiff then had no iron safe, and that Graham had replied, "That is all right," and thereby induced the plaintiff to conclude that the absence of the safe was "all right during the continuance of the policy," to wit, from September, 1920, to September, 1921, which period covered the date of the issuance of the Lancashire policy, and also the date of the fire, then I think and hold that the issuance of the policy and the collection of the premium from the plaintiff, with this knowledge present in Graham's mind, and with this knowledge imputed by law to the Lancashire Company, constituted evidence of waiver. I am not unmindful of the doctrine enunciated by this Court in the cases of McCarty v. Insurance Co., 81 S.C. 152; 62 S.E., 1; 18 L.R.A. (N.S.), 729, and Feagin v.Insurance Co., 122 S.C. 532; 115 S.E., 808, to the effect that knowledge by an agent of the intention of the insured to violate his policy in the future will not constitute evidence of waiver; but I consider that the distinction between these decisions and the present case is obvious. Herein the agent had before December, 1920, as an accomplished fact led Hughes to suppose that for insurance purposes an iron safe would not be required for the year running from September, 1920, to September, 1921. This accomplished fact, which is relied upon as evidence of waiver, had nothing to do with future conditions or future happenings.