Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2686-11T1
12-21-2012
JASON S. FAZIO, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DANIELLE M. APISA, Defendant-Appellant.
Kristin S. Pallonetti argued the cause for appellant (Law Office of Steven P. Monaghan, L.L.C., attorneys; Steven P. Monaghan and Ms. Pallonetti, on the brief). Andrea Beth White argued the cause for respondent (Tonneman, Vuotto, Enis & White, L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. White, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Yannotti and Harris.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part,
Monmouth County, Docket No. FM-13-1256-09.
Kristin S. Pallonetti argued the cause for
appellant (Law Office of Steven P. Monaghan,
L.L.C., attorneys; Steven P. Monaghan and
Ms. Pallonetti, on the brief).
Andrea Beth White argued the cause for
respondent (Tonneman, Vuotto, Enis & White,
L.L.C., attorneys; Ms. White, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Danielle M. Apisa appeals from multiple provisions of a December 6, 2011 order entered in the Family Part, as well as from a January 20, 2012 order granting partial reconsideration to plaintiff Jason S. Fazio, and a January 26, 2012 order denying Apisa's entire application for reconsideration. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I.
Fazio and Apisa were married in July 2000. Two children were born during the marriage. Although not lengthy it ended in a particularly acrimonious divorce, and the aftermath is no less rancorous.
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Dual Final Judgment on October 27, 2010, which incorporated (1) their Property Settlement and Support Agreement, (2) an arbitration decision addressing a myriad of unsettleable issues, and (3) a May 10, 2010 consent order resolving custody and parenting time matters.
The consent order declared that the parties "shall have joint legal custody," of the children, but Apisa was designated the "primary residential parent." The order required parental consultation regarding the children's summer camp selection, illnesses and operations, health, and welfare. The order also provided that each parent "shall be entitled to complete detailed information from any pediatrician, general physician, dentist, consultant or specialist attending their children[.]" Furthermore, the order also set forth a detailed visitation program, describing in minute detail the parenting time afforded the parties.
On January 10, 2011, Fazio — a seventeen-year veteran of the Asbury Park fire department — suffered life-threatening injuries while fighting a fire. Fazio was hospitalized for months, while he underwent around-the-clock care, treatment, and rehabilitation. Understandably, his recovery led to a significant interruption in parenting time with his children.
By April 2011, Fazio's physicians cleared him for limited parenting time but the parties could not initially agree about the appropriate means to facilitate visitation. However, on April 28, 2011, Fazio and Apisa entered into a consent order, whereby Fazio was permitted daily telephone contact with his then eight- and six-year-old sons. Additionally, Apisa agreed to bring the children to visit Fazio at the hospital each Saturday morning for a three-hour parenting session.
As Fazio's condition improved, and his doctors authorized him to venture outside the hospital, he sought to take his sons to a family reunion party in June. Unable to obtain Apisa's consent, Fazio applied to the Family Part for emergent relief, which was granted on June 3, 2011. The court's order compelled Apisa to drop off the children at Fazio's sister's home for a three-hour stay at the party. The order further indicated that "[a]ny future requests to amend parenting time for a 'day pass' or otherwise shall be addressed through the filing of a motion." Additionally, Apisa's request for Fazio's medical records or a signed HIPAA release was deferred; the order specifically indicated that such a request "shall be addressed through the filing of a motion."
The parties have not provided us with a transcript of the proceedings conducted in the Family Part on June 3, 2011. Therefore, we do not know whether the court based its decision exclusively on certifications and exhibits, or if it considered any testimony by the parties.
HIPAA is the acronym for the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. 42 U.S.C.A. §1320.
The parties then agreed to utilize mediation with Dr. Mark White in an effort to resolve their continuing parenting disputes. Dr. White was given access to three of Fazio's key medical providers — his neurologist, ophthalmologist, and general treating physician (Angelo A. Chinnici, M.D.) — and tried to obtain the consent of both sides to an agreed-upon plan for the future. Ultimately, this attempt at mediation failed.
Tensions between the parties continued regarding the amount of parenting time Fazio was given with his children, as well as Apisa's relentless insistence that she be provided with Fazio's full medical records. Formal motion practice to resolve the numerous disputes commenced in earnest in October 2011.
In that month, Apisa filed a thirteen-part motion demanding, among other things, Fazio's medical records from the date of the accident to the present; reimbursement for $334.74 representing unreimbursed medical expenses for one child; reimbursement for fifty-nine percent of the children's camp expenses, retroactive and vacation pay-out information so spousal and child support could be calculated, and counsel fees. In her supporting certification, Apisa claimed that her reluctance to allow the children to see their father stemmed from his medical condition post-fire. However, the record reveals that there were disagreements regarding Fazio's parenting time even before he suffered the fire-induced injuries.
Fazio filed opposition to Apisa's demands together with a cross-motion seeking an order "denying [Apisa's] motion in its entirety," and demanding counsel fees. Before this first round of motions was resolved, Fazio filed his own nineteen-part motion for a change in residential custody and parenting time. Fazio requested, among other things, that the court transfer residential custody of the children to him or enforce the May 10, 2010 consent order. Fazio also sought a declaration that Apisa had violated his rights pursuant to Rule 1:10-3 for a multiplicity of violations of the consent order. Additionally, Fazio sought an award of attorney's fees.
Not content with the welter of charges and countercharges, Apisa added an eleven-part cross-motion to the already saturated motion record. On November 17, 2011, her filing sought Fazio's medical records again, as well as injecting new demands relating to the fundraisers held to help pay for Fazio's medical expenses and seeking the establishment of trust funds for the children from the proceeds of the fundraising events. Apisa also demanded that Fazio's parenting time be supervised, and sought a plenary hearing with regard to custody and parenting time issues.
Oral argument on all of the motions was held on December 2, 2011. Although the parties were present and sworn in, they made no oral statements to the court on the record. Apisa's counsel focused his argument on Fazio's medical records, arguing that Fazio was still not medically capable of parenting, and that the June 3, 2011 order supplanted the May 10, 2010 consent order. Counsel also claimed that the money raised during fundraising events should be diverted to the children because "some of the fund-raising literature that's been posted on the social media web sites . . . discusses how it is . . . to provide support for the [seventeen]-year veteran of the fire department, and a dad to the two boys."
Fazio's attorney countered that the June 3, 2011 emergent order was never intended to supersede the comprehensive terms of the May 10, 2010 consent order, and Apisa deliberately attempted to obstruct Fazio's parenting time. Counsel claimed that Apisa's demand for medical records was intrusive and characterized Apisa's attempt to secure the money from the fundraising efforts as "overreaching" because there was "nothing in the fundraisers that talks about accounts established for the children. Nothing."
The court orally decided the competing motions and issued its memorializing order on December 6, 2011. Apisa's request for contribution toward the children's summer camp and medical expenses was granted. In addition, it granted Apisa's request for information on Fazio's retroactive and vacation pay and ordered the parties to exchange W-2s and tax returns on a yearly basis. The balance of Apisa's requests was denied.
On the other hand, the court granted in part and denied in part Fazio's application. His request for residential custody was denied. While the court denied Fazio's request that Apisa be found in violation of litigant's rights for failing to comply with the entirety of the parenting schedule set forth in the May 10, 2010 consent order, the court did find Apisa in violation of litigant's rights for violations of specific provisions set forth in paragraphs four and sixteen of that consent order. Fazio was also awarded $4500 in counsel fees.
Paragraph 4 of the consent order states:
Consultation. The parties shall consult with each other with respect to the children's education, religious training, summer camp selection, illnesses and operations (except emergencies, if not feasible), health, welfare and other matters of similar importance affecting the children, whose well-being, education and development shall be at all times the paramount consideration of the husband and wife. All major decisions concerning the children's health, education, safety and welfare shall be joint decisions. The parties shall make every reasonable effort to have all important decisions affecting the children made with the consent of both parents, but neither party shall make any commitment obligating the other financially for the children.
At the conclusion of the court's oral determinations, it stated that it wanted to make its decision "crystal clear":
I find that [Apisa's] position with regard to Mr. Fazio and dealing with issues of parenting time has been disingenuous. Yes, I'm well aware of Mr. Fazio's injuries and I'm not, I want no one to interpret the fact that . . . there's some sort of sympathy towards Mr. Fazio. I could see he has suffered a great deal of injury.
However, I just find [Apisa] to take an unreasonable position with, regarding the parenting time. It was clear to me when the parties were before me on an order to show cause over the summer dealing with Mr. Fazio requesting parenting time for a family reunion and [Apisa] was at that time . . . taking an unreasonable position. And I find that her position regarding parenting time has been unreasonable.
. . . .
Three hours a week which was argued during this motion that [Fazio] sees his children is unreasonable. . . . My intent is to thoroughly integrate the plaintiff into the lives of these children and to lead a normal functioning relationship.
There's no need for [Apisa] to monitor the phone conversations through speaker phone. I just find that [Apisa] is trying to control the situation when it doesn't need controlling.
I feel very strongly on this and that is the reason for me to grant the attorneys' fees.
Both parties filed motions for reconsideration, which were heard in January 2012. The court listened to both counsels' oral argument, but also sporadically questioned each of the parties — both of whom had been administered an oath — throughout the fifty-minute motion session. The court issued an oral decision on January 20, 2012, which granted Fazio some relief, but denied Apisa's motion in all respects. Relevant to this appeal are the following findings regarding Apisa's application:
Now, the bigger issue that I guess deals with, well, not the bigger issue, is an issue, a disturbing issue is the relief[] being sought by [Apisa]. I don't believe [Apisa] is coming before this Court with clean hands. I don't find her to be forthright. I find that she is acting in bad faith and is somewhat being a stone wall
to all this. She raises issues such as . . . children not being fed or not having their homework done by [Fazio] and that she shouldn't be required to have the children's cell phones[;] these parties live in the same town. They live in Ocean Township. They live in the same town.
. . . .
I find that [Apisa], the explanations that [she] gave me under oath today and the explanations argued by her counsel just don't have any credibility with me. I feel that [Apisa] is deliberately trying to make life difficult for [Fazio] to see these children.
Why this is, I don't know but from the inception of the case, from the time that I first got this case, which back when the order to show cause was filed in the summertime whereby she was opposed to [Fazio] having any meaningful parenting time with the children at a family reunion, unless certain conditions were met . . . which she masked . . . for the safety and wellbeing of the children when the children, she knew the children were going to be [at] a family reunion with friends and family, it just, I found mindboggling that she would take this position. And I find her position when the motion was originally argued in December regarding parenting time for [Fazio] and now to be unreasonable, far fetched and I'm not going to tolerate it.
I find that she's trying to keep these children away from Mr. Fazio.
. . . .
I find that she's being completely unreasonable.
On the same date it delivered the oral decision, the court entered an order vacating its previous determinations regarding discovery of Fazio's retroactive and vacation pay and the exchange of W-2s and tax returns on a yearly basis. On January 26, 2012, the court issued an amended order denying all requests for relief not specifically addressed in the January 20, 2012 order. This appeal followed.
II.
We start with first principles. "[A] family court's factual findings are entitled to considerable deference." D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245 (2012) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). Thus, the scope of appellate review is limited. Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974). "'[F]actual findings and legal conclusions of the [family court] judge [are not disturbed] unless . . . they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence to offend the interests of justice.'" Ibid. (quoting Fagliarone v. Twp. of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221 (1963)). "Family Part judges are frequently called upon to make difficult and sensitive decisions regarding the safety and well-being of children. Because of their special expertise in family matters, [appellate courts] do not second- guess their findings and the exercise of their sound discretion." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 111 (App. Div. 2007).
Additionally,
we accord great deference to discretionary decisions of Family Part judges. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127 (App. Div. 2009) (citing Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super. 17, 21 (App. Div. 2006)). "'[J]udicial discretion connotes conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action; it takes into account the law and the particular circumstances of the case before the court.'" Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 111 (App. Div. 2007) (quoting Higgins v. Polk, 14 N.J. 490, 493 (1954)). An abuse of discretion "arises when a decision is 'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
[Milne v. Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197-198 (App. Div. 2012).]
On the other hand, we will not defer to a family court's decision where the court abused its discretion. See, e.g., State ex rel. J.A., 195 N.J. 324, 340 (2008). Also, a judge's legal decisions are subject to our plenary review. Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 194 (App. Div. 2007) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
A.
Apisa repeatedly sought Fazio's medical records from the date of the fire through to the time of her motions. In order to be successful in her request for Fazio's medical records, Apisa needed to satisfy the three-prong test set forth in Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276 (1997) (where the court extended the three-prong test for piercing the attorney-client privilege outlined in In re Kozlov, 79 N.J. 232 (1979) to apply to psychologist-patient relationship). The Kinsella Court was faced with a custody dispute by divorcing spouses where the wife sought the husband-patient's psychologist records, claiming they were necessary for the court to determine custody. Id. at 292. The Court ultimately held that if a less intrusive means for obtaining the same information were available, that method would be preferable to disclosure of a patient's records. Id. at 306-07.
While this case does not involve a psychologist-patient privilege, it does involve physician-patient privilege, which is analogous. See N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-22.2; N.J.R.E. 506.
Apisa argued that she should have been provided with substantive information regarding her ex-husband's medical condition. In this case, the court found that Fazio had provided the requested information through less intrusive means. It stated that it was "thoroughly convinced that there is a less intrusive way to obtain this information and that the letters of Dr. Chinnici and follow up letters from Mr. Fazio's treating physician saying that . . . he is able to care for his children" were sufficient. In addition, the court noted that they "are the healthcare professionals [and it did not] see any need for Ms. Apisa to have this information when there is a less intrusive way to obtain the end result."
Furthermore, Dr. White, the mediator who met with the parties in late spring 2011, had free access to Fazio's ophthalmologist, general internist, and neurologist. Apisa was not satisfied by the assurances of either Dr. White or the letters from Fazio's physicians. However, Apisa is neither a healthcare provider nor a medical doctor. In addition, Apisa did not request that the records be turned over to her own expert — just that the medical records be given to her. In light of this, the court stated that Apisa's position was unreasonable because Fazio "has been thoroughly checked out by the letter from Dr. Chinnici."
Nothing in the record suggests that the court's disposition of what was essentially a discovery issue was anything other than an exercise of principled discretion. Deferring to the factual findings regarding the sufficiency of the "less intrusive means," which facts are supported by evidence in the record, we conclude that Apisa received all that she was due regarding Fazio's medical information. The court reasonably exercised its judicial discretion and we will not alter its decision in this regard.
B.
Similarly, we affirm the Family Part's denial of Apisa's request for an accounting of the proceeds derived from the fundraising efforts conducted on Fazio's behalf. Our review of the record reveals that there is nothing — beyond wishful thinking — to indicate that accounts were opened in the children's names or for their benefit. Of the flyers provided in the record, three make mention of the children. One says just that Fazio is "a dad to two boys." The second says that the fundraising efforts will be "providing much-needed help that Jason, his wife and two children will require." The last one asks for donations to "help Jason and his sons." All of the flyers are clear that the money being raised was going to defray the medical expenses related to Fazio's recovery.
Indeed, all of the information provided to us indicates that the proceeds were to be directed to the "APFF Jason Fazio Fund."
The Family Part's decision was not an abuse of discretion. There is no reason for Apisa to receive an accounting or any other information about the results of the fundraising at this time.
The court noted that under different circumstances it might have reached a contrary result: "You know, child support, if support [or] arrearages were an issue, yes[;] but . . . this was a fundraising event for Mr. Fazio and it is, I don't believe there there's any reason for [Apisa] to have this information for support because it's not specifically for support of the children."
C.
We next turn to Apisa's claim that the family court erred when it found that she had violated Fazio's rights by failing to comply with paragraphs four and sixteen of the May 10, 2010 consent order.
Rule 1:10-3 governs applications for enforcement of litigants' rights. "[B]efore relief can be afforded, the court must be satisfied that the party had the capacity to comply with the order and was willfully contumacious." Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 4.3 on R. 1:10-3 (2013). Thus, to find a violation of litigant's rights, the court must be satisfied that the offending party's actions were willful and unjustified. See P.T. v. M.S., 325 N.J. Super. 193 (App. Div. 1999) (holding it was in error to find ex-wife in contempt without finding that her failure to comply was willful and unjustified). Here, the court was explicit in its finding that Apisa was both willfully trying to keep the children from their father and that she lacked credibility. The problem is that the court lacked a proper evidential foundation to make those findings.
In his motion submissions, Fazio asserted that Apisa failed to keep him abreast of issues concerning the children's medical care, camp, extra-curricular activities, and schooling. He also asserted that Apisa thwarted his ability to speak with his sons by telephone. Apisa forcefully disputed Fazio's contentions. Most of the issues between Apisa and Fazio amounted to a he-said-she-said scenario.
Following the December 2, 2011 hearing on the competing motions, the court found that Apisa had violated Fazio's rights by not consulting Fazio about the children's medical needs and other activities, and by thwarting the children's ability to speak with their father on the telephone free of Apisa's interference. At that time, not a spoken word by either party had been uttered in the presence of the court. It was not until one month later, at the motion for reconsideration in January 2012, when both Apisa and Fazio talked directly to the court and answered its questions. Neither party was subjected to direct or cross-examination at any time, and any effort to rehabilitate them as witnesses was impossible.
Plenary hearings are granted when there are material facts in dispute. See Pacifico v. Pacifico, 190 N.J. 258, 267 (2007).
When faced with evidence of disputed material facts, a judge must permit a plenary hearing in order to reach a resolution. Tretola v. Tretola, 389 N.J. Super. 15, 20 (App. Div. 2006). Similarly, "disputes implicating the welfare of a child and involving conflicting contentions and opinions of lay and expert affiants must be submitted to a plenary hearing." Fusco v. Fusco, 186 N.J. Super. 321, 329 (App. Div. 1982).
[Milne, supra, 428 N.J. Super. at 201-02.]
Notwithstanding both parties' modest financial condition and Fazio's ongoing medical recovery, we are convinced that a testimonial exploration is required in order to allow the Family Part to exercise principled discretion in determining whether to deploy Rule 1:10-3's powerful remedies. The paper record of the multiple motions, even supplemented by the on-the-record interchanges with the court and the parties in January 2012, is insufficient by itself for the court to have resolved the myriad factual disputes relating to the May 10, 2010 consent order, much less make authoritative credibility determinations. A plenary hearing on those issues was required.
Family Part judges may enforce litigants' rights pursuant to Rule 5:3-7(a), which provides an array of remedies for violating "an order respecting custody or parenting time." "Once the court determines the non-compliant party was able to comply with the order and unable to show the failure was excusable, it may impose appropriate sanctions." Milne, supra, 428 N.J. Super. at 198. Monetary sanctions "must be fashioned in an amount sufficient to sting and force compliance, but must not be so excessive as to constitute ruinous punishment." E. Brunswick Bd. of Educ. v. E. Brunswick Educ. Ass'n, 235 N.J. Super. 417, 422 (App. Div. 1989). On remand, we expect that these principles will be applied.
D.
This brings us to Apisa's claim that the award of $4500 in counsel fees was improper, or at least was rendered without an explication of the factors enumerated in Rule 5:3-5(c). The record is unclear whether the court awarded counsel fees as part of an ordinary reallocation analysis pursuant to Rules 4:42-9 and 5:3-5(c), or as a sanction under Rules 1:10-3 and 5:3-7. What is perfectly clear, however, are the court's conclusions concerning Apisa:
I find that she's trying to keep these children away from Mr. Fazio.
. . . .
I find that she's being completely unreasonable.
Ordinarily,
[a]ll applications for counsel fees in family actions must address the factors set forth in RPC 1.5(a). R. 4:42-9(b). These include the reasonableness of the fees charged given the task and the skill level of the attorney. RPC 1:5(a). The Chancery Court also should consider the following factors in an award of fees:
(1) the financial circumstances of the parties; (2) the ability of the parties to pay their own fees or to contribute to the fees of the other party; (3) the reasonableness and good faith of the positions advanced by the parties both during and prior to trial; (4) the extent of the fees incurred by both parties; (5) any fees previously awarded; (6) the amount of fees previously paid to counsel by each party; (7) the results obtained; (8) the degree to which fees were incurred to enforce existing orders or to compel discovery; and (9) any other factor bearing on the fairness of an award.In addition, the party requesting the fee award must be in financial need and the party paying the fees must have the financial ability to pay, and if those two factors have been established, the party requesting the fees must have acted in good faith in the litigation. Guglielmo v. Guglielmo, [] 253 N.J. Super. [531], 545 [(App. Div. 1992)].
[R. 5:3-5(c).]
[J.E.V. v. K.V., 426 N.J. Super. 475, 493 (App. Div. 2012).]
Notwithstanding our deferential approach to the review of reallocations of matrimonial counsel fees, see Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super. 298, 317 (App. Div. 2008), we are unable to sustain the Family Part's single-factor approach because its rationale neither applied Rule 5:3-5(c) nor explained whether the award was intended as a sanction. Accordingly, we vacate the counsel fee award and remand for further proceedings. On remand, the Family Part is free to reconsider its reallocation and render an appropriate counsel fee award, if any, after reviewing all of the appropriate factors required by our jurisprudence, not just the single factor of unreasonableness.
E.
Lastly, we turn to Apisa's claim that the matter should be remanded to a different judge in the Family Part. We are constrained to direct that the matter be reassigned. In fairness to the motion judge, and the parties as well, we think it a difficult and uncomfortable task for that judge to now revisit and re-evaluate the remanded issues after having made "crystal clear" findings about those issues and the parties involved. Although this circumstance does not necessarily mandate recusal, in many other similar circumstances we have directed, in the interest of justice, that a different judge — unfettered by what occurred in the past — resolve the dispute.
Where a Family Part judge "may have a commitment to its findings, we believe it is best that the case be reconsidered by a new fact-finder." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. A.W., 103 N.J. 591, 617 (1986), (citing with approval In re Guardianship of R., 155 N.J. Super. 186, 195 (App. Div. 1977), where we required that the case be assigned to a new judge because "[t]he judge who heard the matter below has already engaged in weighing the evidence and has rendered a conclusion on the credibility of the Division's witnesses"); see also State v. Henderson, 397 N.J. Super. 398, 416-17 (App. Div. 2008), aff'd in part, modified in part on other grounds, 208 N.J. 208 (2011); State v. Gomez, 341 N.J. Super. 560, 579 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 86 (2001).
Here, without the benefit of a testimonial hearing, the Family Part judge not only made credibility findings, but found that Apisa did not come
before this Court with clean hands. I don't find her to be forthright. I find that she is acting in bad faith and is somewhat being a stone wall to all this[.]He stated, "I feel very strongly on this," and held that Apisa's behavior was "unreasonable" in almost every regard. Accordingly, upon remand, this matter must be assigned to another Family Part judge for expeditious proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
To the extent that we have not addressed the other specific arguments raised by Apisa, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Paragraph 16 of the consent order states:
The parties shall utilize telephone, email, webcam or other technologies to facilitate the children's contact with the nonresidential parent of the moment.