The payment given definitely was not in respect to any past factors. In Fazio v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489, headnote 2 of 63 A.2d states: "Under unemployment compensation law provision whereby employee does not become unemployed with respect to any week unless he has performed no services during particular week and no remuneration was paid or payable to him with respect to such week, a voluntary dismissal payment constitutes remuneration and employee who receives it does not become unemployed until the end of the period for which it was paid."
In Busch v. Reserve Mining Co., 415 N.W.2d 892 (Minn.Ct.App. 1987), the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the employer's agreement with the employee's union which obligated the employer to make a special pension payment "for the first three full calendar months following the month in which retirement occurs" was specific enough to allow allocation of the lump-sum payment for the purposes of offsetting the employee's receipt of weekly unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 894; see also Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 63 A.2d 489, 491 (Pa. Super.Ct. 1949) ("a voluntary dismissal payment is `remuneration,' and the employee who receives it does not become unemployed until the end of the period for which it was paid"), superseded by statute as stated in Hock v. Commonwealth Unemployment Bd. of Review, 413 A.2d 444 (Pa.Commw. Ct. 1980). In so ruling, the Busch court distinguished a prior decision by the Supreme Court of Minnesota which had held that the severance payment could be used to offset the employee's unemployment compensation benefits for only the week in which the payment was actually received.
Several unemployment departments or commissions have recently rendered similar decisions. Appeals Tribunal, Minnesota, March 25, 1955, Cudahy Packing Co.; Illinois, 1955, Wilson Company; the South Carolina Commission, December 18, 1958, Southern Bell Telephone Telegraph Company; Maryland, Appeals Division, Swift Company v. Booth, April 2, 1959. Cases holding employees disqualified under the facts are: Oklahoma Board of Review, decision No. 175-BR-58, October 14, 1958, Prentiss-Hall, Inc., Okla. 29, 543; In re Phillips, 234 N.C. 453 ( 67 S.E.2d 362); Brannigan v. Administrator, 139 Conn. 572 ( 95 A.2d 798); Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9 ( 63 A.2d 489), in which case the employee received a check marked "Salary for February and March"; Kalen v. Director of the Division of Employment Security, 334 Mass. 503 ( 136 N.E.2d 257), (in which case 332 Mass. 78, 123 N.E.2d 229, was distinguished as being one where the employer placed money for employees in an irrevocable trust fund. We can see no difference in principle between such a case and one where the employer is irrevocably obligated to make the payment even if the employee dies); Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. Review Board, 123 Ind. 508 ( 112 N.E.2d 299); Bradshaw v. California Employment Stabilization Commission, 46 Cal.2d 608 ( 297 P.2d 970). The lists of cases are not intended to be exhaustive.
We believe that the interpretation being adopted in this opinion is consistent with the purposes sought to be achieved by the enactment of the Unemployment Compensation Law. This Act was designed to alleviate the rigors of unemployment and most specifically to assuage the distress of the individual unemployed worker. Majoris v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 192 Pa. Super. 269, 162 A.2d 86 (1960); Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489 (1949); Glen Alden Coal Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 160 Pa. Super. 379, 51 A.2d 518 (1947); Miller v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 152 Pa. Super. 315, 31 A.2d 740 (1943); Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review v. Buss, 26 Pa. Commw. 160, 362 A.2d 1113 (1976); Graham v. Com., Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 14 Pa. Commw. 445, 322 A.2d 807 (1974). The Act is remedial in nature and thus should be liberally and broadly construed.
In arriving at our determination of these appeals, we are aided considerably by the guidelines set forth in the Legislature's declaration of public policy found in ยง 3 of the Act. That section is not merely a perfunctory preface but is, rather, the keystone upon which the entire Act rests and the basis upon which the individual sections of the Act must be interpreted and construed. Barclay White Co. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 356 Pa. 43, 50 A.2d 336 (1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761, 68 S.Ct. 63; Harris Unemployment Compensation Case, 185 Pa. Super. 235, 138 A.2d 207 (1958); Fazio Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489 (1949); Michalsky Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Super. 436, 62 A.2d 113 (1948). More particularly, the relationship between ยง 3 and ยง 402(b)(1) is close and complementary, calling for the construction of ยง 402(b)(1) in the light of the fuller, more comprehensive, and more explicit language of ยง 3. Dept. of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 148 Pa. Super. 246, 24 A.2d 667 (1942), allocatur refused, 148 Pa. Super. xxiii; Labor and Industry Dept. v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 133 Pa. Super. 518, 3 A.2d 211 (1938), allocatur refused, 133 Pa. Super. xxxiii.
Section 4(u) of the Act has as its purpose the prevention of payment of benefits during periods of idleness where the claimant has received money which relates thereto. Fazio Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489. This claimant received wages for the weeks he worked, two weeks vacation pay, and unemployment compensation for the remainder, for a total of fifty-two weeks. The purpose of the law would be subverted if claimant's position were upheld.
The divergent conclusions are in part due to statutory differences. Our conclusion that claimants are disqualified for benefits until the moneys paid by Swift have been exhausted by weeks elapsed at the employees' weekly wage rate is supported by Globe-Democrat Pub. Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra (Mo.); Schenley Distillers v. Review Board of Ind. Emp. S.D., 112 N.E.2d 299 (Ind.); Santus v. Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 110 A.2d 874 (Pa.); General Electric Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of R., 110 A.2d 258 (Pa.); Wheatland Tube Co. v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 142 A.2d 772 (Pa.); Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 63 A.2d 489 (Pa.); Krupa v. Western Union Tel. Co., 103 N.E.2d 784 (Ohio); Kalen v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 136 N.E.2d 257 (Mass.); Cerce v. Director of Division of Employment Security, 128 N.E.2d 793 (Mass.); Bradshaw v. California Employment Stab. Com'n., 297 P.2d 970 (Cal.). Contrary conclusions were reached in Kroger Company v. Blumenthal, 148 N.E. 734 (Ill.); Dubois v. Maine Employment Security Commission, 114 A.2d 359 (Me.); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Texas Employment Com'n., 243 S.W.2d 217; Ackerson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 48 N.W.2d 338, 25 A.L.R.2d 1063 (Minn.)
In some of them the problem has been resolved by an express provision of statute or regulation. ( Kalen v. Director of Employment Security, 334 Mass. 503, 136 N.E.2d 257; Globe-Democrat Publishing Co. v. Industrial Com. of Missouri, 301 S.W.2d (Mo.App.) 846; Santus v. Unemployment Comp. Board, 177 Pa. Super. 496, 110 A.2d 874.) In others the applicable statutory provision has differed so substantially from ours that the decisions do not assist us here. Brannigan v. Administrator Unemployment Comp. 139 Conn. 572, 95 A.2d 798; Fazio v. Unemployment Comp. Board, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489; Schenley Distillers, Inc. v. Review Board, 123 Ind. App. 508, 112 N.E.2d 299. Several cases, however, have involved the construction of statutes whose relevant provisions are identical with ours or very similar to them.
Such dismissal payments are quite distinguishable from either conventional pension payments or "Retirement Separation Pay" such as we are here considering. The Commission cites the case of Fazio v. Unemployment Com. Bd. of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489. In this case, however, the employer dismissed the employee and, although not legally required to do so, gave him a check for his pay for the two months following the separation.
Suffice to say that it is the declared public policy of our state, as shown by the legislative declaration of public policy in the act (ยง 268.03), that benefits are intended to extend to those who are unemployed through no fault of their own. Fazio v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 164 Pa. Super. 9, 63 A.2d 489, which is relied upon by relator, is distinguishable on its facts from the case now before us. In that case claimant, who had been employed for ten years as superintendent of the company, was released on February 3, 1947, because of a change in management.