Opinion
CV136019984S
12-04-2015
Richard Fava v. Car Place, Inc
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT #105
PETER EMMETT WIESE, JUDGE.
I
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 5, 2013, the plaintiff, Richard Fava, filed a one-count complaint against the defendant, The Car Place, Inc. The plaintiff alleges the following facts. The defendant sold the plaintiff a used motor vehicle with a defective seat belt. On May 5, 2010, the plaintiff was involved in a single-car collision and was injured. The plaintiff's injuries were caused by the defective seat belt in the motor vehicle sold by the defendant. The defendant is liable for the plaintiff's injuries pursuant to General Statutes § 52-572m et seq. because the product was defective.
On July 1, 2015, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment and a memorandum of law in support. On September 15, 2015, the plaintiff filed an objection to the motion for summary judgment along with a memorandum of law. The parties presented oral argument in support of their positions on October 5, 2015.
II
DISCUSSION
" [S]ummary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, affidavits and other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Stuart v. Freiberg, 316 Conn. 809, 820-21, 116 A.3d 1195 (2015). " The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue [of] material facts which, under applicable principles of substantive law, entitle him to a judgment as a matter of law . . . and the party opposing such a motion must provide an evidentiary foundation to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact . . . A material fact . . . [is] a fact which will make a difference in the result of the case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " Although the court must view the inferences to be drawn from the facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion . . . a party may not rely on mere speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for summary judgment . . . A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must substantiate its adverse claim by showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact together with the evidence disclosing the existence of such an issue." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Escourse v. 100 Taylor Avenue, LLC, 150 Conn.App. 819, 829-30, 92 A.3d 1025 (2014).
In its motion for summary judgment, the defendant argues that the plaintiff's complaint alleges a product liability claim under General Statutes § 52-572m et seq. The defendant contends that because the plaintiff knowingly used the product in a defective condition for four months, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment under General Statutes § 52-572l. In his objection, the plaintiff argues that the motion for summary judgment must be denied because genuine issues of material fact exists; specifically, whether the plaintiff did not knowingly and voluntarily use a defective product.
General Statutes § 52-572m(b) states, in relevant part: " 'Product liability claim' includes all claims or actions brought for personal injury, death or property damage caused by the manufacture, construction, design, formula, preparation, assembly, installation, testing, warnings, instructions, marketing, packaging or labeling of any product. 'Product liability claim' shall include, but is not limited to, all actions based on the following theories: Strict liability in tort; negligence; breach of warranty, express or implied; breach of or failure to discharge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepresentation or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent."
General Statutes § 52-572l states, in relevant part: " In causes of action based on strict tort liability, contributory negligence or comparative negligence shall not be a bar to recovery . . . Nothing in this section shall be construed as barring the defense of misuse of the product or the defense of knowingly using the product in a defective condition in an action based on strict tort liability."
In product liability cases, the plaintiff's " knowingly use of a product in a defective condition" is a permitted defense. Norrie v. Heil Co., 203 Conn. 594, 525 A.2d 1332 (1987). In Norrie, the Supreme Court found harmless error in the trial court's use of special interrogatories explaining to the jury the claim of strict product liability and the special defenses. The jury found that the plaintiff's misuse or failure to properly load the allegedly defective product was the proximate cause of his injuries, and denied recovery to the plaintiff. Id., 604-05. " This statute [§ 52-572l] . . . eliminated contributory negligence as a defense to product liability actions, while expressly allowing the defense of 'misuse of the product' and 'knowingly using the product in a defective condition.' '[K]nowingly using the product in a defective condition' has been defined narrowly. It is narrower than the common-law defense of assumption of risk, which bars recovery when a person knows or as a reasonable person should know that in pursuing a certain course he will expose himself to the risk of injury, comprehends or ought as a reasonable person to comprehend the nature and extent of the risk and voluntarily subjects himself to it . . . In other words, the risk must be assumed knowingly and voluntarily . Mere negligence will not be sufficient to deny recovery. (Citations omitted; emphasis altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 600. Although the Supreme Court found that the trial court erroneously used the language of " knew or should have known" in the jury instructions to the defense of voluntarily and knowingly encountering a risk, the court determined that the error was not harmful. Id., 602. This is in contrast to the common-law defense of assumption of risk, which bars recovery. Nally v. Charbonneau, 169 Conn. 50, 53, 362 A.2d 494 (1975) (" [h]e thus assumes the risk and cannot recover damages resulting from it"); see also Kelly v. Deere & Co., 627 F.Supp. 564, 565 (D.Conn. 1986).
" As with misuse of the product, a finding by the trier of fact that the plaintiff knowingly used the product in a defective condition does not bar recovery, but reduces recovery proportionately." R. Newman & J. Wildstein, Tort Remedies in Connecticut (1996) § 17-6(c), p. 259. " Although Connecticut's version of the UPLA does not specifically address assumption of risk, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act does . . . [T]he claimant's damages shall be reduced in accordance with the provisions of comparative responsibility, based on either the failure to observe an apparent defection condition, i.e., an obvious danger, or voluntary assumption of risk." (Footnotes omitted.) R. Yules, " Defenses in a Connecticut Product Liability Case." 57 Conn. B.J. 441, 447 (1983). See also 44 Fed. Reg. 62, 714-50 (October 31, 1979) (publication of the Model Uniform Product Liability Act).
Compare Nicholson v. United Technologies Corp., 697 F.Supp. 598 (D.Conn. 1988). " Product misuse and knowing use of a product in a dangerous condition may bar products liability claims. General Statutes § 52-572l. Product misuse has been defined as the use of a product in a manner not reasonably foreseeable to the defendant, knowingly using a product in a defective condition and including actual knowledge of a dangerous condition." (Emphasis added.) Id., 602.
In the present case, the plaintiff, during his deposition, stated that he noticed there was no seat belt after purchasing the car, four months prior to the alleged accident. The defendant contends that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily used the product in the allegedly defective condition. The defendant further argues that because the plaintiff knowingly used the product in an allegedly defective condition, he is barred, pursuant to § 52-572l, from recovery. As discussed in the preceding paragraphs, under § 52-572l, the defense of knowingly using a product in a defective condition does not bar recovery, but reduces recovery proportionately. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the parties have not alleged facts to determine the proportional reduction in recovery, if any, due to the defense of knowingly using a product in a defection condition. Because genuine issues of material fact exist as to the proportional reduction of the plaintiff's recovery, the motion for summary judgment is denied.
III
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
SO ORDERED.