Opinion
2021-02034 Index 520997/20
03-16-2022
Clinton Faulkner, respondent, v. Best Trails and Travel Corp., appellant, et al., defendant.
Smith Mazure, P.C., New York, NY (Louise M. Cherkis of counsel), for appellant. Schmelkin Associates, P.C., New York, NY (Joel Schmelkin of counsel), for respondent.
Smith Mazure, P.C., New York, NY (Louise M. Cherkis of counsel), for appellant.
Schmelkin Associates, P.C., New York, NY (Joel Schmelkin of counsel), for respondent.
BETSY BARROS, J.P. REINALDO E. RIVERA, PAUL WOOTEN, DEBORAH A. DOWLING, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant Best Trails and Travel Corp. appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Mark Partnow, J.), dated March 11, 2021. The order denied that defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 503, 510, and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Ulster County.
ORDERED that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, the motion of the defendant Best Trails and Travel Corp. pursuant to CPLR 503, 510, and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Ulster County is granted, and the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Kings County, is directed to deliver to the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Ulster County, all papers filed in the action and certified copies of all minutes and entries (see CPLR 511[d]).
The plaintiff, a resident of New Jersey, commenced this action in Kings County to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained as a passenger in a bus owned and operated by the defendant Best Trails and Travel Corp. (hereinafter the defendant) in an accident in Ulster County. The summons stated that the plaintiff designated Kings County as the venue based upon the defendant's principal place of business. The complaint did not allege the location of the defendant's principal place of business. The defendant moved pursuant to CPLR 503, 510, and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Ulster County, where the subject accident occurred, arguing that Kings County was not a proper venue because neither party was a resident of Kings County at the time of the commencement of the action. In the order appealed from, dated March 11, 2021, the Supreme Court denied the motion. The defendant appeals.
CPLR 503(a) provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]xcept where otherwise prescribed by law, the place of trial shall be in the county in which one of the parties resided when it was commenced; [or] the county in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred." "The sole residence of a domestic corporation for venue purposes is the county designated in its certificate of incorporation, despite its maintenance of an office or facility in another county" (Green v Duga, 200 A.D.3d 861, 862; see CPLR 503[c]; Drayer-Arnow v Ambrosio & Co., Inc., 181 A.D.3d 651, 652; O.K. v Y.M. & Y.W.H.A. of Williamsburg, Inc., 175 A.D.3d 540; Kidd v 22-11 Realty, LLC, 142 A.D.3d 488, 489; Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 136 A.D.3d 762, 763).
To prevail on a motion pursuant to CPLR 510(1) to change venue, a defendant must show that the plaintiff's choice of venue is improper and that the defendant's choice of venue is proper (see CPLR 511[b]; Green v Duga, 200 A.D.3d at 862; Drayer-Arnow v Ambrosio & Co., Inc., 181 A.D.3d at 652; O.K. v Y.M. & Y.W.H.A. of Williamsburg, Inc., 175 A.D.3d at 540-541; Kidd v 22-11 Realty, LLC, 142 A.D.3d at 489; Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 136 A.D.3d at 763; Gonzalez v Sun Moon Enters. Corp., 53 A.D.3d 526, 526). If the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff is required to establish, in opposition, via documentary evidence, that the venue selected was proper (see Green v Duga, 200 A.D.3d at 862; Drayer-Arnow v Ambrosio & Co., Inc., 181 A.D.3d at 652; O.K. v Y.M. & Y.W.H.A. of Williamsburg, Inc., 175 A.D.3d at 541; Deas v Ahmed, 120 A.D.3d 750, 751; Chehab v Roitman, 120 A.D.3d 736, 737).
Here, it is undisputed that the plaintiff is a resident of New Jersey and that the accident occurred in Ulster County. In support of the motion, the defendant submitted its certificate of incorporation, establishing that its principal office was located in Richmond County. Thus, the defendant met its initial burden of demonstrating that the plaintiff's choice of venue in Kings County was improper and that the defendant's choice of venue in Ulster County was proper (see Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 136 A.D.3d at 763; Bakht v Southridge Coop. Section 4, Inc., 70 A.D.3d 988). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to establish that the defendant's certificate of incorporation had been amended to designate a principal office located in Kings County (see Matoszko v Kielmanowicz, 136 A.D.3d at 763; see also Green v Duga, 200 A.D.3d at 862; Kidd v 22-11 Realty, LLC, 142 A.D.3d at 489), or that the venue selected was otherwise proper. Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion, a computer printout from the website of the New York State Department of State, Division of Corporations, submitted by the plaintiff, did not conclusively establish that Kings County is a proper venue for this action. The printout was not certified or authenticated, and it was not supported by a factual foundation sufficient to demonstrate its admissibility as a business record (see Werner v City of New York, 135 A.D.3d 740, 741; Dyer v 930 Flushing, LLC, 118 A.D.3d 742, 742-743).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion pursuant to CPLR 503, 510, and 511 to change the venue of the action from Kings County to Ulster County.
BARROS, J.P., RIVERA, WOOTEN and DOWLING, JJ., concur.