FAST v. DI SALLE

4 Citing cases

  1. Lambert's Point Docks, Inc. v. Kendall

    224 F.2d 284 (Fed. Cir. 1955)

    "(f) Rates charged by any common carrier or other public utility". Under the statutory scheme, the court having an enforcement proceeding before it has the jurisdiction and the duty to determine all questions of fact or law bearing on whether the defendant therein is subject to the regulation as properly interpreted, and whether the defendant has violated the ceiling prices, if applicable. It is the special function of the Emergency Court of Appeals to pass on questions as to the validity of a price regulation or order; and it is merely as incidental to the performance of that special function that in certain situations we have occasion to interpret the meaning of the regulation or to determine whether it is applicable to a particular person or class of persons, as explained in Fast v. DiSalle, Em.App., 1951, 193 F.2d 181, 184, 185. Referring to § 204(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, 58 Stat. 639, which was the provision of that Act corresponding to § 408(d) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, we said in Conklin Pen Co. v. Bowles, Em. App., 1946, 152 F.2d 764, 766: "A case brought to this court under Section 204(e) (1) of the Act is in quite a different category [from a case brought under the protest procedure].

  2. Stanolind Oil Gas Co. v. Freehill

    205 F.2d 305 (Fed. Cir. 1953)

    Since this court has jurisdiction to determine whether proceedings before it have become moot, it has jurisdiction to construe the contract which the parties agree is decisive of that question, as an incident to the exercise of such jurisdiction. See Duncan Coffee Co. v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., Em.App., 1949, 178 F.2d 926, 929; Fast v. DiSalle, Em.App., 1951, 193 F.2d 181. The answer to complainants' argument that their rights under their contract with the Mississippi River Fuel Corporation would be affected by this court's decision is that that contract provides for payment by the Mississippi Company of the ceiling price of 10 cents per MCF during the effective period of the orders of the Office of Price Stabilization. While a price of 12 cents per MCF is specified in the contract, that price is expressly made subject to all orders fixing ceiling prices — in this case, 10 cents per MCF — and it was agreed by the parties that this price would govern, until set aside.

  3. Hibben v. Kuchaj

    117 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1953)   Cited 4 times

    It has been repeatedly held that the Emergency Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction, subject to the right of review in the Supreme Court of the United States, of questions of the validity of regulations issued under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, as amended, and that a protestant must exhaust his administrative remedies by appeal to this court. Yakus v. U.S., 321 U.S. 414, 64 S.Ct. 660, 88 L.Ed. 834; Fast v. Di Salle, Em.App., 193 F.2d 181. The courts of this circuit have uniformly declined to rule on the validity of orders issued pursuant to the emergency legislation.

  4. Heyn v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue

    46 T.C. 302 (U.S.T.C. 1966)   Cited 12 times
    Allowing the taxpayer a casualty loss deduction of $7,500 because it was clear that the taxpayer had sustained some loss as a result of the casualty even though the taxpayer had failed to clearly or precisely substantiate the amount

    XIII-2 C.B. 8; Rev. Rul. 57-524, 1957-2 C.B. 141. But cf. Jones v. Smith, 193 F.2d 181 (C.A. 10). That it might have been foreseen or that it might have been prevented by the exercise of due care by the contractor are factors which in our opinion do not require that the landslide be denied classification as a casualty.