Opinion
HHDCV145037904S
05-13-2016
Christopher Farrow v. State of Connecticut Department of Corrections
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTION TO DISMISS (#102)
Sheila A. Huddleston, Judge.
The plaintiff, Christopher Farrow, an incarcerated inmate, brought this action because of an injury he sustained when he was asked by a correctional officer to help move another inmate's possessions and, in so doing, sustained a laceration to his finger on a locker clasp. He claims that the clasp had been cut to prevent inmates from locking the lockers, leaving a jagged edge that posed a safety hazard. The summons named as defendant the " State of Connecticut Department of Corrections (Commissioner) James Dzurenda." The complaint, however, did not identify any actions by Dzurenda personally. It alleged that a correctional officer named Payne had directed the plaintiff to help move another inmate's belongings. It alleged that the defective clasps existed throughout the whole New Haven correctional facility and further alleged that the " State of Connecticut D.O.C." was solely responsible for the conditions. It did not request any specific relief.
The defendant moved to dismiss the action on the ground of sovereign immunity. Reasonably construing the complaint as a personal injury action for damages, the defendant argued that the plaintiff was required to submit his claim to the Claims Commissioner pursuant to General Statutes § 4-160(a). The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion, arguing that his complaint stated a claim against the Commissioner of Correction, not the state itself, and that it was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiff thereafter moved for permission to amend his complaint to state claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to seek declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages. The motion and objection were argued on February 8, 2016.
Applicable Legal Principles
" A motion to dismiss tests . . . whether, on the face of the record, the court is without jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Chief Information Officer v. Computers Plus Center, Inc., 310 Conn. 60, 79, 74 A.3d 1242 (2013). " [S]overeign immunity relates to a court's subject matter jurisdiction . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " The principle that the state cannot be sued without its consent, or sovereign immunity, is well established under our case law . . . It has deep roots in this state and our legal system in general, finding its origin in ancient common law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. " Sovereign immunity rests on the principle and on the hazard that the subjection of the state and federal governments to private litigation might constitute a serious interference with the performance of their functions and with their control over their respective instrumentalities, funds and property." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 328, 709 A.2d 1089 (1998).
" The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a rule of common law that operates as a strong presumption in favor of the state's immunity from liability or suit . . . [T]his court has recognized the well established principle that statutes in derogation of sovereign immunity should be strictly construed . . . [When] there is any doubt about their meaning or intent they are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in sovereign immunity . . . When the legislature intends to waive immunity from suit or liability, it expresses that intent by using explicit statutory language . . . Accordingly, in an action seeking damages against the state, a plaintiff seeking to circumvent the doctrine of sovereign immunity must show that . . . the legislature, either expressly or by force of a necessary implication, statutorily waived the state's sovereign immunity . . ." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hicks v. State, 297 Conn. 798, 801-02, 1 A.3d 39 (2010).
The Supreme Court has stated that a plaintiff seeking " monetary damages against the state must first obtain authorization from the claims commissioner." Miller v. Egan, 265 Conn. 301, 317, 828 A.2d 549 (2003). With certain exceptions, the Claims Commissioner is authorized to " hear and determine all claims against the state . . ." General Statutes § 4-142. General Statutes § 4-147 provides, in relevant part, that " [a]ny person wishing to present a claim against the state shall file with the Office of the Claims Commissioner a notice of claim . . . containing . . . a concise statement of the basis of the claim, including the date, time, place and circumstances of the act or event complained of . . ."
General Statutes § 4-142 provides as follows: " There shall be a Claims Commissioner who shall hear and determine all claims against the state except: (1) Claims for the periodic payment of disability, pension, retirement or other employment benefits; (2) claims upon which suit otherwise is authorized by law including suits to recover similar relief arising from the same set of facts; (3) claims for which an administrative hearing procedure otherwise is established by law; (4) requests by political subdivisions of the state for the payment of grants in lieu of taxes; and (5) claims for the refund of taxes."
On its face, the plaintiff's complaint seeks a judgment against the state on the basis of a personal injury the plaintiff sustained in a correctional facility. Although the plaintiff named the Commissioner of Correction as the defendant, the Commissioner is plainly sued in his official capacity only.
" [T]he fact that the state is not named as a defendant does not conclusively establish that the action is not within the principle which prohibits actions against the sovereign without its consent." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 568, 362 A.2d 871 (1975). To determine whether a suit against a state officer is, in effect, one against the state that cannot be maintained without its consent, a court must consider whether " (1) a state official has been sued; (2) the suit concerns some matter in which that official represents the state; (3) the state is the real party against whom relief is sought; and (4) the judgment, though nominally against the official, will operate to control the activities of the state or subject it to liability." Id.
Here, all of the Spring factors are met. The defendant was, at the time relevant to the complaint, the state's Commissioner of Correction and was sued as such. The suit concerns matters relating to the operation of a state correctional institution. That the state is the real party in interest against whom relief is sought can be seen in the plaintiff's statement that the state's " D.O.C." was responsible for the conditions that caused his injury. Moreover, a judgment, though nominally against the Commissioner, would subject the state to liability pursuant to General Statutes § 4-165.
General Statutes § 4-165(a) provides in relevant part that: " No state officer . . . shall be personally liable for damage or injury, not wanton, reckless or malicious, caused in the discharge of his or her duties or within the scope of his or her employment. Any person having a complaint for such damage or injury shall present it as a claim against the state under the provisions of this chapter."
Further confirmation that the plaintiff sued the defendant in his official capacity can be found in the manner in which the defendant was served with process. The marshal's return indicates that service was made by serving a paralegal at 24 Wolcott Hill Road, Wethersfield, Connecticut, which the court notes to be the address of the Department of Correction. That the defendant was not served in hand or at his abode indicates that he was not served in his individual capacity. See Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dubois, 154 Conn.App. 448, 459 n.12, 107 A.3d 995 (2014).
Finally, there are no allegations directed at any actions by the defendant individually; rather, the complaint alleges that the " State of Connecticut D.O.C." is solely responsible for the condition of the jagged locker clasps. Because the plaintiff does not allege that he presented his claim to the Claims Commissioner and was granted permission to sue, the action is barred by sovereign immunity and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it.
The plaintiff argues, however, that his complaint arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and involves the violation of his constitutional rights. The court disagrees. The operative complaint does not mention either § 1983 or any constitutional basis for the plaintiff's claims. Moreover, because the defendant's motion to dismiss raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction and was filed before the plaintiff requested leave to amend his complaint, the court is precluded from considering the plaintiff's request to amend before ruling on the motion to dismiss. " Once a party has raised an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the court must immediately act on it before proceeding to any other action in the case." Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Dubois, supra, 154 Conn.App. 455 n.7. In Cumberland Farms, the Appellate Court reversed the decision of a trial court which had treated a state trooper's motion to dismiss as a motion to strike, thereby allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to replead. The Appellate Court reasoned that " the plaintiff could not state a cause of action against the defendant . . . because to do so would require allowing the plaintiff to add individual capacity claims against a defendant who was present in the case in his official capacity only." Id., 460.
CONCLUSION
Because the plaintiff brought this action against a state official in his official capacity without first presenting his claim to the Claims Commissioner and receiving permission to sue, the action is barred by sovereign immunity. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss is granted.