Opinion
1:01CV984
May 24, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Plaintiff Robert M. Farris filed this action against his former employer, Defendant Tubular Textile, LLC ("Tubular Textile"), alleging that he was unlawfully terminated from employment. Plaintiff alleges four causes of action an has complaint: age discrimination, in violation of the Age Discrimination v. Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b), (c), and (f); breach of contract; intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress; and tortious interference with contract.
The case is presently before the court on Tubular Textile's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract. For the reasons set forth herein, Tubular Textile's motion will be granted as to each of these claims.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who is 55, was hired on August 7, 1989, by Tubular Textile to work in the company's Davidson County facility. Tubular Textile, a North Carolina corporation, is engaged in the construction and installation of textile equipment throughout the United States.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about Tuesday, November 28, 2000, he and a co-worker, Kenneth Bacchus, were called into the office of Scott Allison, Director of Engineering. Mr. Allison confronted the men with an allegation reportedly made by a technician named David Ramirez, who is a citizen of Columbia. The subsitance of Mr. Ramirez's claim was that Plaintiff and Mr. Bacchus had made an allegedly improper remark to him, to the effect that Mr. Ramirez "did not pay taxes in this country." (Compl. ¶ 10.)
It is unclear from Plaintiff's complaint whether Mr. Ramirez was also an employee of Tubular Textile or was at the facility for some other reason.
Upon hearing this allegation, Plaintiff and Mr. Bacchus vehemently denied that they had ever made such a statement. According to Plaintiff, Mr. Allison did not accept their denials and was "extremely rude and caustic" toward Plaintiff and Mr. Bacchus, continuing to "swear incessantly" at them. (Id.) At some point later that day, Plaintiff was told he was being fired. (Compl. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was never shown any evidence that Mr. Ramirez had in fact complained of such a remark. Plaintiff believes that the Ramirez story was fabricated by Tubular Textile as a pretext to justify plaintiff's termination. In support of this allegation, Plaintiff states that at some point prior to the November 28, 2000, incident, Mr. Allison had allegedly told other employees that he intended to fire Plaintiff and Mr. Bacchus as soon as they returned to North Carolina from a temporary assignment in Alabama. (Compl. ¶ 14.)
II. DISCUSSION
The Fourth Circuit has long adhered to the view that a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) should be granted only under very limited circumstances. See Rogers v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 883 F.2d 324, 325 (4th Cir. 1989). In evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must consider the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. See Buser v. Southern Food Serv., Inc., 73 F. Supp.2d 556, 559 (M.D.N.C. 1999). The motion should be granted only when "`it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts which could be proved in support of his claim.'" Rogers, 883 F.2d at 325 (quoting Johnson v. Mueller, 415 F.2d 354, 355 (4th Cir. 1969)).
A. Breach of Contract Claim
Under North Carolina law, employment is at-will. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 331, 493 S.E.2d 420, 422 (1997). Unless the employer and employee have entered into a contract specifying a definite term of employment, the employment relationship "is presumed to be terminable at the will of either party without regard to the quality of performance of either party." Id.
Plaintiff has not alleged that he had an express employment agreement with Tubular Textile that was breached when Plaintiff was terminated. Rather, he asserts that Tubular Textile breached "the expressed employment protections set forth in the Tubular Textile LLC employee handbook," by "ignor[ing] the terms and conditions as set forth in the handbook" and "intentionally revis[ing] or misrepresent[ing] the terms of the existing handbook to support their misguided claims," thereby causing severe damage to Plaintiff. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-29.) Plaintiff does not specify which terms of the employee handbook Tubular Textile failed to follow, or how these acts or omissions caused him injury.
It is well established that an employee handbook or policy manual does not create a contractual agreement between employer and employee. See Smith v. Monsanto Co., 71 N.C. App. 632, 634, 322 S.E.2d 611, 613 (1984). Such policies remain unenforceable unless they are expressly incorporated into an existing employment agreement. See Id.
In the present case, Plaintiff clearly cannot rely on the employee handbook alone to state a claim for breach of contract, even assumingarguendo that Tubular Textile failed to abide by the provisions of its employee handbook. Moreover, because no employment agreement is alleged to exist between the parties, the provisions of the employee handbook certainly could not have been incorporated by reference.
Plaintiff cannot state a claim for breach of contract due to his status as an at-will employee. Moreover, he cannot state a claim based on his employer's alleged noncompliance with the employee handbook. Therefore, Tubular Textile's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's breach of contract claim will be granted.
B. Intentional and/or Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims
To properly state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Plaintiff must allege that Defendant engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that was intended to cause, and did in fact cause, severe emotional distress. See Buser, 73 F. Supp.2d at 572. The issue of whether alleged conduct rises to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct is a question of law for the court. See Lenins v. K-Mart Comp., 98 N.C. App. 590, 599, 391 S.E.2d 843, 848 (1990). To qualify, the conduct must be "`so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.'" Buser, 73 F. Supp.2d at 572-73 (quoting Briggs v. Rosenthal, 73 N.C. App. 672, 677, 327 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1985).
In the employment context, mere "intemperate" conduct on the part of an employer even over an extended period of time is generally insufficient to establish extreme and outrageous conduct. See Id. at 573. See, e.g., Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 493, 340 S.E.2d 116, 122-23 (1986) (finding no extreme and outrageous conduct where plaintiff-waitress's supervisor screamed and shouted at her, called her names, interfered with supervision of others in plaintiff's charge, and threw menus at her, over a month-long period); See also Patel v. Scotland Memorial Hosp., 1995-1 Trade Cas. ¶ 70, 971, 1995 WL 319213, *89 (M.D.N.C. 1995) (not extreme and outrageous for employer to spread falsehoods about plaintiff's professional ability, allegedly injuring plaintiff's reputation) Even acts of discrimination are not necessarily sufficient to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Atkins v. USF Dugan, Inc., 106 F. Supp.2d 799, 810-11 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (declining to find employer's conduct extreme and outrageous where employer allegedly told plaintiff he was "too old and sick" to handle his job, subsequently terminating plaintiff in violation of state and federal law).
In light of these precedents, the court finds that Tubular Textile's actions, taken as a whole, are not sufficiently "extreme and outrageous" to satisfy the requirements for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Essentially, Plaintiff has alleged that his supervisor, on one occasion and in an "extremely rude and caustic," profanity-laden manner, falsely accused him of making an inappropriate remark to a foreign co-worker. Later that same day, Plaintiff was fired and subsequently learned that his supervisor may have been plotting his termination long before the confrontation at issue. These acts, though perhaps "intemperate" and possibly discriminatory, are not "utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Buser, 73 F. Supp.2d at 572-73. Nor do they match the level of maltreatment suffered by the employees inHogan, Patel, or Atkins, supra, all cases in which the plaintiff's claims for intentional distress were dismissed for failure to allege sufficiently extreme and outrageous conduct. Even assuming arguendo that Tubular Textile's actons are later determined to have been discriminatory, that finding would not lend legal sufficiency to Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Atkins, 106 F. Supp.2d at 810-11. Because Plaintiff has failed to point to any "extreme and outrageous" conduct on the part of Tubular Textile, the court will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Plaintiff also asserts a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. This cause of action requires that the plaintiff establish that 1) the defendant negligently engaged in conduct, 2) it was reasonably foreseeable that such conduct would cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress, and 3) the conduct did in fact cause severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. See McAllister v. Ha, 347 N.C. 638, 645, 496 S.E.2d 577, 582-83 (1998). "`Although an allegation of ordinary negligence will suffice, a plaintiff must also allege that severe emotional distress was the foreseeable and proximate result of such negligence in order to state a claim.'" Id. (quoting Johnson v. Ruark Obstetrics Gynecology Assoc., P.A., 327 N.C. 283, 395 S.E.2d 35 (1990)) The term "severe emotional distress" includes any "`severe and disabling emotional or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to do so,'" such as "`neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, [or] phobia.'" Id. (quoting Johnson, id.)
Plaintiff has alleged negligent conduct on the part of Tubular Textile by and through its agents, to wit, that they "were negligent in the retention and training of supervisory staff when they knew or should have known that their actions would cause injury to the Plaintiff." (Compl. ¶ 23.) Plaintiff also alleges that representatives of Defendant failed to determine the factual basis of Mr. Ramirez' s alleged complaint before firing Plaintiff. (Id.) Plaintiff has alleged both negligent conduct and the foreseeability of harm ("[Defendant] knew or should have known that [its] actions would cause injury to the Plaintiff"), which the court finds sufficient to meet the first element of Plaintiff's claim. However, Plaintiff has failed to establish the second and third elements of his claim: namely, the foreseeability and actual existence of the requisite degree of harm, i.e., severe emotional distress. See McAllister, 347 N.C. at 645, 496 S.E.2d at 582-83. Nowhere in his complaint does Plaintiff allege that he is suffering from any mental or emotional disorder or condition. The only mention of any emotional or mental affliction is found in Plaintiff's claim of damages within his first cause of action, age discrimination, in which he states "Plaintiff has suffered loss of income from continuing employment, pension entitlements, mental anguish, pain and suffering in an amount exceeding $300,000.00." (Compl. ¶ 20) (emphasis added).
The allegations relating to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim are incorporated by reference into each of Plaintiff's state law claims.
This boilerplate language fails to allege with any specificity any actual emotional or mental condition or disorder suffered by Plaintiff as a result of Tubular Textile's actions. It cannot constitute "severe emotional distress" as required under McAllister, supra. Therefore, because Plaintiff has failed to allege severe emotional distress of any kind, the court finds that he has failed to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Tubular Textile's motion to dismiss this claim will be granted.
C. Tortious Interference with Contract Claim
Plaintiff's final cause of action is for tortious interference with contract. This claim is designed to remedy a defendant's deliberate interference with performance of a contract existing between a plaintiff and a third party. The elements of the claim are as follows: 1) a valid contract exists between the plaintiff and a third party, such that the plaintiff holds a contractual right against the third party; 2) the defendant knows of the contract; 3) the defendant intentionally induces the third party's nonperformance of the contract; 4) without justification; 5) resulting in actual damage to the plaintiff. See Embree Constr, Group, Inc. v. Rafcor, Inc., 330 N.C. 481, 498, 411 S.E.2d 916, 924 (1992).
This cause of action appears utterly inapposite to the facts at bar. First, as previously discussed, no contract exists between Plaintiff and Defendant, and Plaintiff's complaint did not allege the existence of any contract between Plaintiff and a third party. Plaintiff was an at-will employee of Defendant and could be terminated at any time for any reason or for no reason at all. Second, Plaintiff has made no allegation that Defendant has induced any party to violate any agreement with Plaintiff, whether contractual or not; Plaintiff merely states that "[t]he misconduct of Defendant, through its employees, has caused serious injury to the Plaintiff," and that Defendant's actions were "totally unjustified." (Compl. ¶¶ 32-33.) Indeed, the reference to the lack of justification appears to be the only recognizable trace of a properly-pleaded tortious interference claim.
Plaintiff has failed to establish the existence of any contract between himself and a third party that could constitute the basis of a valid tortious interference claim. The court, finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for tortious interference, will grant Defendant's motion to dismiss as to this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for breach of contract, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress, or tortious interference with contract. Therefore, Defendant Tubular Textile's motion to dismiss will be granted as to each of these claims.
IT IS ORDERED that Defendant Tubular Textile's motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims for breach of contract, intentional and/or negligent infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with contract is granted.