February 4, 1982. [Original Opinion as Modified by Denial of Petition for Rehearing, see 657 F.2d 1214.] [2] ON DENIAL OF PETITION FOR REHEARING [3] MARKEY, Chief Judge, with whom RICH, Judge, joins, dissenting.
Plaintiff has further requested that if the statute of limitations is found to be a bar to this action, the Court should find that the faulty notice operated to toll it. Plaintiff's Opposition Brief at 7. In Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 1, 657 F.2d 1214 (1981), cited by plaintiff, the Court stated that a statute of limitations may be "tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose" even where there is no tolling provision in the statute itself. Id. at 8, 657 F.2d at 1219 (citations omitted).
(emphasis supplied). Plaintiff relies on the court's holding in Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1214 (CCPA 1981), modified, 667 F.2d 1017 (1982), and claims that under the ruling of this case, the limitations period of ninety days should be tolled from May 25, 1990, the date of liquidation, until May 30, 1990, the date Sea-Land received the letter from Customs because it was the final agency action. In Farrell Lines, plaintiff filed a supplemental petition, and it was held that the ninety-day period of limitations for filing a protest of liquidation was tolled from the date the shipbuilder filed the supplemental petition until notice was given of the petition's denial.
Customs Regulation 19 C.F.R. ยง 4.14 provides the avenue through which a party may seek remission or refund of duties for vessel repairs. See Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 1, 4-5, C.A.D. 1268, 657 F.2d 1214, 1217 (1981). Under the regulation, a party may file an application for relief within sixty days of arrival of the vessel, for either remission of duties or for the treatment of an item or a repair expense as dutiable under ยง 1466(a).
See, e.g., United States v. Dalm 494 U.S. 596, 608, 110 S.Ct. 1361, 108 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990); United States v. Mottaz, 476 U.S. 834, 841, 106 S.Ct. 2224, 90 L.Ed.2d 841 (1986); Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 287, 103 S.Ct. 1811, 75 L.Ed.2d 840 (1983); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586, 61 S.Ct. 767, 85 L.Ed. 1058 (1941); Boe, 64 C.C.P.A. 11, 15-16, 543 F.2d 151, 154-55; John S. Phipps v. United States, 22 C.C.P.A. 595, 602 (1935) ("Whatever may be our views as to the equities of the case before us, our jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Customs Court is limited by statutory provisions, and such provisions must be observed."). The decision in Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. 1, 657 F.2d 1214 (1981), is the only noteworthy exception and the validity of its holding is, at best, unclear. In Farrell Lines, the plaintiff sought remission of duties that Customs assessed on repairs made on an American vessel while it was overseas.
One of the predecessors to our Court of Appeals recognized the necessity of focusing on Congressional intent in this area, and allowed tolling with respect to an administrative review period. Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 CCPA 1, 6, 657 F.2d 1214, 1218 (1981). The discussion which follows demonstrates that tolling would be inconsistent with Congressional intent, whether or not the administrative limitations period impacts on sovereign immunity or jurisdiction.
The subsequent inclusion of those entries on a document entitled "amended protest" was sufficient to inform the Customs Service of plaintiff's objection to classification. United States v. Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co., Inc., 26 CCPA 267 C.A.D. 26 (1938); American Export Lines v. United States, 85 Cust.Ct. 20, C.D. 4864 (1980), aff'd 69 CCPA 1, C.A.D. 1268, 657 F.2d 1214 (1981). The administrative treatment of the twenty-one entries raises an issue of classification and an issue with respect to the assessment of duties on the one entry which was unarguably protested in a timely manner.
In Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981), reh. denied, 451 U.S. 1032, 101 S.Ct. 3023, 69 L.Ed.2d 401 (1981), the Supreme Court again found equitable estoppel was not available vis-รก-vis the government, but the Court did not preclude the possibility of its application in another case. On the other hand, in Farrell Lines, Inc. v. United States, 69 C.C.P.A. ___, 657 F.2d 1214 (1981), reh. denied, ___ C.C.P.A. ___, 667 F.2d 1017 (1982), the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that the applicable statute of limitations was tolled in a case involving a protest of duties assessed on foreign repairs of a ship. In Farrell, the shipbuilder failed to file a timely protest because both the shipbuilder and the Customs Service were genuinely confused as to the proper procedures for administrative review.