Opinion
Case No. 99-2526-JAR
October 30, 2002
MEMORANDUM ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on the Motions to Communicate with Jurors after Trial filed by plaintiff John S. Farr (Doc. 142) and defendant Midwest Woodworking, Inc. (Doc. 143). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are denied.
Both plaintiff and defendant seek leave to contact the jurors and to discuss with them "his or her impressions of the evidence presented at trial, the reasons he or she voted to enter a verdict for the defendant, and his or her impressions of counsel's performance at trial." The request is made to aid "counsel's professional development."
Local Rule 47.1(b) provides in pertinent part:
Under no circumstances except by order of the court in its discretion, and under such terms and conditions as it shall establish, shall any party or any party's attorney or their agents or employees examine or interview any juror, either orally or in writing, nor shall any juror consenting to be interviewed disclose any information with respect to the specific vote of any juror other than the juror being interviewed, or the deliberations of the jury.
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) provides in pertinent part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict . . ., a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or dissent from the verdict . . . or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.
The policy considerations underlying Rule 47.1 and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) include the protection of jurors from harassment and preserving the finality of judgments. "District courts have `wide discretion' to restrict attorney-juror contact in order to shield jurors from post-trial `fishing expeditions' by losing attorneys."
Kinser v. Gehl Company, 1998 WL 171271 *1 (D.Kan. 1998) (citation omitted).
Green Construction Co. v. The Kansas Power Light Co., 1 F.3d 1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted).
Having reviewed the motions, the Court in its discretion finds plaintiff and defendant have failed to articulate sufficient reasons for any communication with jurors. Counsel neither asserts, nor is there any indication, that the jurors were exposed to extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence during their jury deliberations. In fact, the very nature of the parties' request would necessarily involve inquiry into "matter[s] or statement[s] occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations," and the jurors' "mental processes" during deliberations.
See Fed.R.Evid. 606(b).
The Court concludes that the parties' reasons do not outweigh the policy considerations that underlie our local rule and Fed.R.Evid. 606(b). Accordingly, the motions are denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's and defendant's motions to communicate with jurors after trial (Doc. 142 and 143) are DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.