Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart

14 Citing cases

  1. Glick v. KF Pecksland LLC

    C.A. No. 12624-CB (Del. Ch. Nov. 17, 2017)

    Pls.' Post-Trial Reply Br. 1. See Bushnell v. Elkins, 245 P. 304, 308 (Wyo. 1926) (fraud case could not stand where representations complained of "were merely opinions, or expressions of hope, or expectation that the business of the corporation would be successful"); Sundown, 8 P.3d at 331 ("opinions [] are not actionable under the law"); Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 256 P. 84, 86 (Wyo. 1927) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Swan, 23 P. 743, 750 (Wyo. 1890)) (a representation "'which relates to the future, or which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen, furnishes no foundation for a claim of fraud or deceit'"). These statements also resemble "puffing" that should be viewed as opinion and "discounted as such by the buyer" due to "broad, vague, and commendatory language."

  2. Hiatt v. LaFever

    242 P.2d 214 (Wyo. 1952)   Cited 17 times
    Applying clear and convincing standard of proof to cases involving consent procured by fraud

    "A representation which is promissory in its nature, which relates to the future, or which depends upon contingencies which may or may not happen, furnishes no foundation for a claim on fraud or deceit." To the same effect is the comment made by this court in Farmers' Lumber Co. vs. Luikart 36 Wyo. 413-420, 256 P. 84. So even though statements were made as set forth in the paragraph stricken, they were promises relating to the future depending upon contingencies which may or may not happen and furnish no foundation for a claim of fraud. If the petition was to have been founded upon fraud, the appellants should allege with certainty and definiteness, tangible facts to sustain the general averments of fraud, as fraud must be alleged with particularity. Smith vs. Stone 21 Wyo. 62, 128 P. 612. Goldberg vs. Miller 54 Wyo. 485, 93 P.2d 947, 37 C.J.S. 370 § 78, 24 Am. Jur. 72 § 244.

  3. Cook v. McDonald

    148 P.2d 594 (Wyo. 1944)   Cited 4 times

    This Court has held many times that where there is conflicting evidence, and there is substantial evidence to support a judgment, it will not disturb such judgment. McMahon v. Midwest Refining Company, 36 Wyo. 90; Kamp v. Kamp, 36 Wyo. 310; Farmers Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413; Riordan et al, v. Horton et al., 16 Wyo. 363. There was ample evidence to support the Judgment in favor of the defendants in error.

  4. Luikart v. Farmers' Lumber Co.

    38 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1930)   Cited 12 times

    The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, which affirmed the judgment, and denied a rehearing. Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413, 256 P. 84; and on rehearing, 37 Wyo. 201, 259 P. 1053. The courts of the United States have no general supervisory or appellate powers over the state courts.

  5. Johnson v. Soulis

    542 P.2d 867 (Wyo. 1975)   Cited 130 times
    Requiring actual reliance only

    The general rule is that fraud ordinarily cannot be founded upon a representation which is promissory in nature. Lawson v. Schuchardt, Wyo., 363 P.2d 90 (1961); Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954); In Re Adoption of Hiatt, 69 Wyo. 373, 242 P.2d 214 (1952); Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413, 256 P. 84 (1927); and First National Bank v. Swan, supra. This general rule, however, is subject to an exception to the effect that if the representation, although promissory in nature, is made with no intention of performing it or with a present intention not to perform, it may then serve as a foundation for an action in fraud; one of the justifications for the exception being that there does exist a misrepresentation of a present fact, that is, the intention of the promissor.

  6. John B. Roden, Jr., Inc. v. Davis

    460 P.2d 209 (Wyo. 1969)   Cited 9 times

    The newly discovered evidence upon which the motion was predicated related first to evidence of an admission made by plaintiff Harvey Dean Davis to George Mead, the defendant's witness at the trial, that on the morning of the accident Davis had argued with decedent about personal matters and advised her that he was going to get a divorce, and secondly to evidence impeaching in part the testimony of plaintiff's witness Peterson. In advancing the contention, defendant gives recognition to the prevailing rule that the granting or denial of a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and its ruling will not be disturbed unless abused, Opie v. State, Wyo., 422 P.2d 84, 85; also, that a new trial will not be granted unless such evidence would have affected the result of the trial, Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413, 256 P. 84, 87 rehearing denied 37 Wyo. 201, 259 P. 1053. The proffered evidence of an admission by Davis is apparently offered in part for purposes of impeachment inasmuch as Davis at the trial had testified that he loved decedent very much and that she was a happy person.

  7. Schaffer v. Standard Timber Co.

    331 P.2d 611 (Wyo. 1958)   Cited 19 times

    Woods says he told Schaffer that the entire matter must be checked with the Forest Service; but regardless of what Woods said on this subject, persons now complaining to have been misled were obligated to use the ordinary means of information available to them, which, under the circumstances, were the records of the Forest Service. Defendants apparently made no effort to check either the company's contracts or the Government records, and one of them testified it was some two years after the agreement was executed before he discovered what the true situation was. This we think must be interpreted as a lack of diligence, and they cannot now complain because of insufficient knowledge when this resulted from indifference or credulity. A party preparing to consummate a contract cannot be heard to complain if he fails to make reasonably diligent inquiry regarding the facts. Farmers' Lumber Co. v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413, 256 P. 84; id., 37 Wyo. 201, 259 P. 1053. See also Burnett v. Taylor, 36 Wyo. 12, 252 P. 790; 5 Williston on Contracts, 1937, § 1516.

  8. Bernstein v. Friedman

    62 Wyo. 16 (Wyo. 1945)   Cited 13 times
    In Bernstein v. Friedman, 62 Wyo. 16, 160 P.2d 227, 228, the Court held that the name "Western Outfitters" infringed the name "Western Ranchman Outfitters", especially where the former is used in connection with the picture of a man wearing ranchman regalia.

    There is abundant precedent in this state for the holding of the federal court that questions of fact will not be disturbed on appeal as that has been the policy of this court for many years. (Bayles vs. VandenBoom, 40 Wyo. 411, Farmers Lumber Co. v. Lukart, 36 Wyo. 413.) Whether the make-up of the trade-name renders that trade-name so similar to the trade-mark of another, that the former deceives, or will probably deceive purchasers is a question of fact.

  9. Hill et al. v. Breeden

    79 P.2d 482 (Wyo. 1938)   Cited 14 times
    In Hill v. Breeden, supra, at 79 P.2d 486, it was pointed out that when a contract is payable to two or more persons jointly, payment may be made to either of them.

    For the respondents there was a brief and oral argument by C.A. Swainson of Cheyenne. There is ample substantial evidence to support the finding of the lower court and it should not be disturbed. Hester v. Smith, 5 Wyo. 291; Phelan v. Brick Company, 26 Wyo. 493; Gray v. Elliot, 36 Wyo. 361. Lumber Company v. Luikart, 36 Wyo. 413. Defendant introduced evidence of an attempted accord and satisfaction. Where payment is pleaded, the burden of proof is on the one alleging it. Kelly v. Dellman, 38 Wyo. 346. The defense of accord and satisfaction must be substantially pleaded. 1 R.C.L. 202; Poor v. Johnson, (Ind.) 96 N.E. 189; Deming Inv. Co. v. McLaughlin, 118 P. 380; Harvey v. D. R.G., (Colo.)

  10. Dinkelspeel v. Lewis

    62 P.2d 294 (Wyo. 1937)   Cited 5 times

    The case of Wilde v. Amoretti Lodge, 41 P.2d 512, cited by appellant decides no question such as we have in the case at bar. We, of course, agree that if there is substantial evidence in the record to sustain the trial court's finding upon conflicting evidence, such finding must stand on appeal. Kumor v. Scottish Union and National Ins. Co., (Wyo.) 33 P.2d 916; Finance Corporation of Wyoming v. Commercial Credit Company, (Wyo.) 123 P. 414; Lumber Company v. Luikart, (Wyo.) 256 P. 84; In re Shaul, (Wyo.) 30 P.2d 478; Bank v. Ennis, (Wyo.) 34 P.2d 1; Perko v. Comm. Co., (Wyo.) 259 P. 520; Big Horn Power Company v. State, (Wyo.) 148 P. 1110; Gray v. Elliott, (Wyo.) 255 P. 593. On the question of the cancellation of the chattel mortgage, we believe the case of Bank v. Northern Trust Company, (Wyo.) 270 P. 163 is applicable. Tobin v. Town Council of City of Sundance, (Wyo.) 17 P.2d 666. Two appeals upon the same record were considered, and the rule regarding conflicting evidence was before the court.