Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden

37 Citing cases

  1. Lee v. BSB Greenwich Mortgage, LP

    2007 Ct. Sup. 15060 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2007)

    In 1927 it was said that "Its [the statute's] effectiveness must almost wholly depend upon the right of attachment of the body, because it presupposes an inability to find property which may be attached." Farley-Harvey Company v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 681 (1927). Yet, when the body attachment provision was abolished by 1981 Public Act 410, § 11, the creditor's cause of action was otherwise left intact.

  2. Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc.

    292 Conn. 381 (Conn. 2009)   Cited 162 times
    Holding that, when actions are virtually alike, it is proper to dismiss later action if nonmoving party will not be prejudiced, nonmoving party will have opportunity to litigate claims in prior action, prior action provides remedy for claims, and dismissal of later action serves policy interests behind prior pending action doctrine

    Further, the fact that the present summary process action offers a remedy to the plaintiff that is not available in its defense of the prior action, although not dispositive; see Gaudio v. Gaudio, supra, 296; weighs against dismissal of the present action. See Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 683, 136 A. 586 (1927) (while law is careful to screen defendant from oppression and vexation, it is equally impartial, even indulgent, in permitting plaintiff to seek redress by pursuing several remedies at same time, if reasonable and necessary). Finally, dismissal of the present summary process action at this stage in the proceedings would defeat the policy behind the prior pending action doctrine, namely, "to prevent unnecessary litigation that places a burden on our state's already crowded court dockets." Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co., supra, 207 Conn. 588; see also Edgewood Village, Inc. v. Housing Authority, 54 Conn. App. 164, 167-68, 734 A.2d 589 (1999) (filing of subsequent action identical to one that previously was dismissed rendered moot plaintiff's appeal from dismissal of original action because, under prior pending action doctrine, reinstatement of original action afforded no practical relief). It would no longer serve the interests of judicial economy for this court to direct the trial court to d

  3. Beaudoin v. Town Oil Co.

    207 Conn. 575 (Conn. 1988)   Cited 167 times
    Noting that the goal of the impleader statute, § 52-102a, is the "efficient administration of justice"

    " Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 113; Halpern v. Board of Education, supra, 653. "We must examine the pleadings to ascertain whether the actions are `virtually alike.'

  4. State v. Nugent

    199 Conn. 537 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 29 times
    Clarifying common-law right of bail bondsman to apprehend principal

    The defendant's ignorance of the right does not diminish it. See Dreier v. Upjohn, 196 Conn. 242, 248, 492 A.2d 164 (1985); Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 684, 136 A. 586 (1927). The course of action pursued by the defendant is not without its risks and a bondsman might very well be liable in tort if he oversteps the bounds of his authority.

  5. Halpern v. Board of Education

    196 Conn. 647 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 227 times
    In Halpern, supra, the relief sought in the prior pending action was a reversal of the Board of Education's decision to terminate the plaintiff, a declaration that the Board's action was invalid, and an order to remand the matter back to the Board to determine the benefits and back wages owed to the plaintiff.

    `The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one "of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . ." Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 112-13.

  6. Solomon v. Aberman

    196 Conn. 359 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 242 times
    In Solomon v. Aberman, supra, 196 Conn. at 375, 493 A.2d 193, the trial court in its memorandum of decision stated that only two trustees testified at trial, although four trustees actually had testified.

    `The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one "of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . ." Hatch v. Spofford, [supra].' Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393." Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., supra, 112-13.

  7. Dreier v. Upjohn Co.

    196 Conn. 242 (Conn. 1985)   Cited 226 times
    In Dreier v. Upjohn Co., supra, 245, [the] Supreme Court cited its decision in Theron Ford Co. as authority for the general rule that statements in withdrawn or superseded pleadings may be considered as evidential admissions.

    Tait LaPlante, Handbook of Conn. Evidence (1976) 6.7(a), p. 75. Admissions of a conclusory nature are not necessarily determinative, however, as a court may be justified in deviating from any such admission if unsupported by the underlying facts in evidence. Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 684, 136 A. 586 (1927); see also Pyne v. New Haven, 177 Conn. 456, 464-65, 418 A.2d 899 (1979); Peiter v. Degenring, 136 Conn. 331, 337-40, 71 A.2d 87 (1949). The fact that some conclusory judicial admissions may not be binding has no impact on the admissibility of evidential admissions of a conclusory nature.

  8. Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co.

    183 Conn. 108 (Conn. 1981)   Cited 125 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Henry F. Raab Connecticut, Inc. v. J. W. Fisher Co., 183 Conn. 108, 438 A.2d 834 (1981), the court heard and decided an appeal from the trial court's granting of a substitution of a bond for a mechanic's lien brought pursuant to General Statutes 49-37.

    "The rule forbidding the second action is not, however, one `of unbending rigor, nor of universal application, nor a principle of absolute law . . . .' Hatch v. Spofford, [supra]." Farley Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 682, 136 A. 586 (1927); see Brochin v. Connecticut Importing Co., 137 Conn. 350, 352, 77 A.2d 336 (1950); Dettenborn v. Hartford-National Bank Trust Co., supra, 393. The Stamford application was brought under 49-35a and sought the reduction or discharge of the mechanic's lien.

  9. Pyne v. City of New Haven

    177 Conn. 456 (Conn. 1979)   Cited 25 times

    "Admissions made by counsel in the course of a trial as to facts, the issues in dispute, and the like, serve a very useful purpose, and ordinarily a trial court is amply justified in proceeding with the case upon the basis afforded by them, although it may in a proper case disregard them." Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 684, 136 A. 586 (1927). A formal stipulation of facts under ordinary circumstances should be adopted by the court as a mutual judicial admission.

  10. Little v. United National Investors Corp.

    280 A.2d 890 (Conn. 1971)   Cited 26 times
    Interpreting Conn. Gen. Stat. 37-1

    In either event it was in error." Farley-Harvey Co. v. Madden, 105 Conn. 679, 684, 136 A. 586.