Opinion
03-20-1897
FARLEE v. FIELD et al.
Charles T. Cowenhoven, for complainant. Alvah A. Clark, for defendant Isaac N. Field. Hugh K. Gaston, for defendants John Field Auten and Charles Raymond Auten.
Bill by Laura W. Farlee, as administratrix of the estate of Lucinda Field, deceased, against Isaac N. Field and others, to liquidate debts, and for other relief. Decree for defendants.
John K. Field died in 1888. By his will, he left his property, real and personal, with the exception of a clock and a watch, to his executors in trust (with power to dispose of the same either at public or private sale, according to their judgment), for the support and maintenance of his wife, Lucinda, the support and maintenance of his daughter, Laura W., a widow, while not remarried, and for the support, maintenance, and education of John Field Auten and Charles Raymond Auten, two children of his daughter, Laura W. Auten, directing his executors, or the survivor of them, to pay such portion of all the principal of his estate, for the purposes aforesaid, to his said wife, as she might, in her discretion, require and demand. The real estate consisted of a tract of 50 acres, having two dwelling houses thereon, with outbuildings, and a 25-acre tract of woodland and pasture disconnected from the first-named tract. All of the estate of the testator was realty, except personalty of the value of $750. Upon the real estate was a $4,000 mortgage. There were other debts more than sufficient to exhaust the personal property. Isaac N. Brokaw and Lucinda, the widow, proved the will, and took out letters testamentary. Isaac N. Field, the other one of the named executors, did not join in the administration of the estate. Lucinda Field, the widow, died on May 10. 1891. Isaac N. Brokaw died February 10, 1892. On March 9, 1892, Isaac N. Field, the remaining executor named in the will, qualified, and took upon himself the burden of administration. There was upon the life of John K. Field, the testator, an insurance policy written for the benefit of his wife, Lucinda. After the death of her husband, there was paid to Isaac N. Field, for her, by the insurance company, the sum of $10,082. This sum Mr. Field held and managed for her thereafter. This money was hers, free from any trust. Out of this money, she, shortly before her death, directed Mr. Field to pay off the $4,000 mortgage. He did so, paying for the mortgage and interest the sum of $4,000. By the direction of Lucinda, Mr. Field also paid from the said sum of $10,082 the sum of $1,860, for the debts of the estate, in the shape of insurance, interest on mortgages, taxes, etc. After the death of Lucinda, she dying intestate, Laura W. Auten, who, soon after the will of the testator was proved, had married Mr. Farlee, took out letters of administration upon her mother's estate. Mr. Field paid over to her, as administratrix, the remaining portion of the insurance money left in his hands, amounting to $4,130, on October 28, 1891. This bill is filed by Mrs. Farlee, as administratrix of her mother, Lucinda, to obtain a decree compelling Mr. Field, executor of John K. Field's estate, to pay to her out of that estate the amount of money which said Field had paid by direction of Lucinda, toliquidate debts of the estate, and to satisfy the $4,000 mortgage.
Charles T. Cowenhoven, for complainant.
Alvah A. Clark, for defendant Isaac N. Field.
Hugh K. Gaston, for defendants John Field Auten and Charles Raymond Auten.
REED, V. C. (after stating the facts). The widow, after the death of her husband, was the equitable owner of the real estate of her husband, with the duty cast upon her of supporting the infant grandchildren, and of supporting the daughter, Laura W., so long as she remained a widow. Of the trust, under which Lucinda had this right, she was both a trustee and cestui que trust. She seems to have had the power of compelling a sale of the real estate by demanding all or part of the corpus of the estate, for the purpose of maintaining and educating the cestui que trust. She could also have permitted the property to be sold for the payment of the debts of the testator, which debts included the $4,000 mortgage. She did not choose to take the first course of action, or to permit the second line of action to be taken. Instead of this, she chose to protect the estate, by devoting to its preservation a part of her own money. Out of the $10,082 which had been received by her from the insurance company, she paid the debts of the testator, and also the recurring expenses required to keep the estate intact up to the time of her death. She paid the taxes and the interest upon the $4,000 mortgage. She kept the property insured, and, so far as appears, supplied what the income from the estate was inadequate to supply, in the way of support for the cestui que trust. Shortly before her death, she directed the $4,000 mortgage to be paid out of her own money. Now, as a general rule, an executor who advances his own money to pay off the debts of an estate which he is administering, or a trustee who advances money for the benefit of his trust estate, is entitled to be subrogated to the position of the creditors whose debts he has paid; and, upon the death of such executor or trustee, this right of subrogation would pass to his personal representatives. The right to be subrogated, however, is an equitable one, depending upon the intention of the party who makes the advances. If it appears that the payor, when the payments were made, had no intention of reclaiming the amount so expended, then no right of subrogation would flow from the payments, and therefore no such right would pass to his personal representatives.
The question, then, is, what was the intention of Lucinda in respect to this matter when she directed these payments to be made? It does not appear that she expressed any intention whatever to any one concerning this matter. She merely directed Mr. Field to make the payments out of her own money then in his hands. Her intent must be gathered from this fact, viewed in connection with the circumstances with which she was then environed. Her daughter, Laura W., had then remarried, and thereafter Lucinda held the trust property for the support of herself and her two grandchildren. During her life, Lucinda was concerned to keep the estate intact, and to preserve a family homestead. From 1888 to the time of her death, as already observed, she devoted her own money to accomplish that purpose. A short time before her death, she directed the mortgage to be paid. These acts of the grandmother were entirely consistent with the intention on her part to leave the property disencumbered of any lien at the time of or after her death. She used her money during her life to carry out her idea of preserving the estate in the best way for furnishing a support for herself and her grandchildren. It is quite unlikely that she ever contemplated a breaking up of the homestead during the minority of the infants; yet this would be accomplished, or the power to accomplish it would be put in the hands of the daughter, if she, as administratrix, is now decreed to be entitled to a lien upon the trust estate for all the money expended by Mr. Field on behalf of Lucinda. In my judgment, Lucinda never had any intention of asserting such a claim. The expenditures were gifts of her own money, for the benefit of the trust estate. If she had taken her money, and bought property, and put it in the name of the infants, no trust would have resulted to her, for her relationship to the grantees would have raised the presumption that it was a gift. So now all the circumstances surrounding the payment of these sums persuade me that the payments were intended for the eventual benefit of the infants, by enabling them to have the benefit of the trust estate, free from all incumbrances. I will advise a de cree for the defendants.