In this Circuit, a court must consider five factors when determining whether dismissal for failure to prosecute is appropriate: whether (1) the plaintiff's failure to prosecute caused a delay of significant duration; (2) plaintiff was given notice that further delay would result in dismissal; (3) defendant was likely to be prejudiced by further delay; (4) the need to alleviate court calendar congestion was carefully balanced against plaintiff's right to an opportunity for a day in court; and (5) the trial court adequately assessed the efficacy of lesser sanctions. See Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009); accord Farion v. Ezzo, 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020).
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 permits the Court to dismiss an action sua sponte for failure to prosecute or failure to comply with an order of the Court.” Farion v. Ezzo, 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2020) (citation omitted)
. “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiffs failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “District courts in this Circuit have recognized that ‘the failure to maintain [a current address] with the Court is a ground for failure to prosecute' because ‘[t]he case cannot proceed' without such information.”
Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009)). “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (internal citation omitted). “District courts in this Circuit have recognized that ‘the failure to maintain [a current address] with the Court is a ground for failure to prosecute' because ‘[t]he case cannot proceed' without such information.
. “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “‘No one factor is dispositive,' and the ultimate decision of whether to dismiss should be made ‘in light of the record as a whole.'” Blake v. Payane, No
Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009)). “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “District courts in this Circuit have recognized that ‘the failure to maintain [a current address] with the Court is a ground for failure to prosecute' because ‘[t]he case cannot proceed' without such information.”
Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009)). “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)); see Dong v. United States, No. 02 Civ. 7751 (SAS), 2004 WL 385117, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004) (finding that plaintiff's failure to respond for over two months was sufficient to justify dismissal).
Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009)). “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)).
Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Lewis v. Rawson, 564 F.3d 569, 576 (2d Cir. 2009)). “‘There is no fixed period of time that must elapse before a plaintiff's failure to prosecute becomes substantial enough to warrant dismissal,' but ‘[d]elays of several months' have been found sufficient.” Farion v. Ezzo, 19 Civ. 5477 (LJL), 2020 WL 5578294, at *1 (SDNY Sept. 17, 2020) (quoting Caussade v. United States, 293 F.R.D. 625, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). “District courts in this Circuit have recognized that ‘the failure to maintain [a current address] with the Court is a ground for failure to prosecute' because ‘[t]he case cannot proceed' without such information.” Cabrera v. Brann, No. 21 Civ. 780 (JMF), 2021 WL 1549818, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2021)