Under the comparative negligence rule, the jury may apportion damages as it determines within its discretion to be proper when the evidence shows all parties' negligence contributed to the injuries, the plaintiff's to a lesser degree than the defendants'. Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686, 687 ( 227 S.E.2d 464). [Emphasis supplied.] 148 Ga. App., supra at p. 290.

]" Strickland v. English, 115 Ga. App. 384 (4) ( 154 S.E.2d 710); Waggoner v. Bevich, 127 Ga. App. 877, 880 ( 195 S.E.2d 246). Under the comparative negligence rule, the jury may apportion damages as it determines within its discretion to be proper when the evidence shows all parties' negligence contributed to the injuries, the plaintiff's to a lesser degree than the defendants'. Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686, 687 ( 227 S.E.2d 464). Thus, where the evidence authorized the application of the comparative negligence rule, inadequacy of the verdict would not appear simply because the amount awarded plaintiff is smaller than the amount sought.

Under the comparative negligence rule, the jury may apportion damages as it determines within its discretion to be proper when the evidence shows all parties' negligence contributed to the injuries, the plaintiff's to a lesser degree than the defendants'. Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686, 687 ( 227 S.E.2d 464). 148 Ga. App., at 290, 250 S.E.2d 859.

The court observed that the cases "support any apportionment of damages the jury sees fit to make when the negligence of both parties contributes to the injuries but the plaintiff's to a lesser degree than the defendant's." Accord Wright v. Satilla Rural Elec. Co-op., 179 Ga. App. 230, 232 (2) ( 345 S.E.2d 892) (1986); Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686 (1) ( 227 S.E.2d 464) (1976). Thus, while we cannot agree that defendant presented a sound method for computing comparative negligence damages, the failure to sustain the objection to his argument was not reversible error.

We disagree. See Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686 ( 227 S.E.2d 464). 3. Appellant enumerates as error the trial court's charge to the jury that it could return a verdict for appellant Cindy L. Thomas on her claim of personal injuries without returning a verdict for appellant Richard W. Thomas on his consortium claim.

Redd v. Peters, 100 Ga. App. 316 (1) ( 111 S.E.2d 132). See also Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686, 687 (2) ( 227 S.E.2d 464). Here, even though the jury awarded no amount for pain and suffering, we find no indicia of bias and prejudice for contrary to the plaintiff's assertions on appeal, the evidence was such as to authorize a charge on the principles of comparative negligence.

The trial court limited the jury, in computing damages, to the consideration of damage to certain equipment and the wall of Molly Pitcher's plant; the jury's determination as to these damages was within the range of evidence and was not so inadequate as to justify the inference of gross mistake or undue bias. See Fargason v. Pervis, 138 Ga. App. 686 ( 227 S.E.2d 464); Childs v. Logan Motor Co., 103 Ga. App. 633, 639 ( 120 S.E.2d 138). 7.