Opinion
C.A. No. 04A-06-006 SCD.
Submitted: June 16, 2005.
Decided: June 22, 2005.
ORDER
This 22nd day of June, 2005, cross-motions for reargument having been received and reviewed, it appears that:
1. I issued an opinion dated June 1, 2005, related to the appeal of this matter from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas. The decision affirmed in part, and reversed in part the decision below.
Faraone v. Ramunno and Madric, Del. Super., C.A. 04A-06-006 SCD, Del Pesco, J. (June 1, 2004).
2. Ramunno has filed a motion for reargument contending that the ruling of the Court below — that there was no meeting of the minds with regard to what I called the transfer agreements — as factually and legally correct. I concluded to the contrary, that the ruling of the Court below is not supported by the evidence, and is incorrect as a matter of law. The transfer agreements are in evidence. It is clear that all aspects of the transfer agreements were, in fact, honored by the parties — and a considerable amount of money paid — except the two matters which were submitted to the Court below for decision. That is sufficient evidence to prove not only the existence of the contracts, but the intent of the parties to recognize them. In fact, there was no denial of the authenticity or enforceability of those agreement in the testimony or arguments offered below. The consideration for the agreements was the transfer of the file, and the relinquishment by Faraone of his representation of the plaintiff.
3. Ramunno argues error based on a finding of a charging lien. The argument is simply inaccurate. This case is not about a charging lien. That was not what I said in my ruling, nor is a charging lien applicable. A charging lien is an equitable lien which can be imposed in the absence of an expressed agreement. Faraone had a transfer agreement with Madric. He had a separate transfer agreement with Ramunno. It is the transfer agreement with Ramunno which is at issue. In that agreement, Ramunno agreed to protect his lien.
Polin v. Delmarva Poultry Corp., 188 A.2d 364, 366 (Del.Super. 1963).
4. The motion for reargument filed by Faraone seeks a ruling on the claim he asserted against Ramunno claiming tortuous interference with the contract Faraone had with Madric. The Court below ruled that there was no tortuous interference by Ramunno with Madric's contract with Faraone. Tortious interference with a contract requires proof of: (1) a valid contract, (2) about which the defendant has knowledge, (3) an intentional act by defendant that is a significant factor in causing the breach of the contract, (done without justification, and (4) injury. The relationship between Ramunno and Madric was a confidential relationship, attorney-client. Ramunno's advice to his client, even if wrong, is justified by that relationship. As such it is lawful, and does not give rise to an independent cause of action. That was the decision below, and it is legally correct. Nothing presented persuades me that reargument is required.
Wallace v. Wood, 752 A.2d 1175, 1182 (Del.Ch. 1999).
WHEREFORE, the cross-motions for reargument are DENIED, as I find upon further review, no misapprehension of fact or error of law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.