Opinion
No. X07CV010079601S
November 6, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The defendants have moved for summary judgment as to all counts of this three-count complaint filed by the plaintiff, Reza Farahani, sounding in wrongful termination against the defendants Mansoor Sarfarazi, the plaintiff's supervisor, and the University of Connecticut Health Center (UCONN). The first count, against UCONN, alleges a violation of General Statutes § 46a-60(a)(1) in terminating the plaintiff because of his physical disability, which existed at the time he was hired by the defendants, and work-related injuries. The second count, against Sarfarazi in his official and individual capacities, alleges a violation of the plaintiff's right to equal protection. The third count, against UCONN, is brought pursuant to General Statutes § 31-290a and alleges discrimination against the plaintiff because of a work-related injury and/or the filing of a workers' compensation claim.
The plaintiff's claims for violation of due process and injunctive relief in the second count were previously stricken on July 9, 2002.
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings and documentary proof submitted demonstrate that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Practice Book § 17-49.
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff was hired by defendant Sarfarazi to work in a grant-funded position as a postdoctoral fellow at the UCONN Health Center. Sarfarazi is a professor of genetics and directs the Molecular Opthalmic Genetics Laboratory and was the plaintiff's immediate supervisor. Before his hiring, the plaintiff informed Sarfarazi that he would need a special chair due to a bilateral hip replacement. The plaintiff began working for the defendants on or about July 30, 1999.
At the time the plaintiff was hired, his position was funded by the U.S. National Institute of Health (NIH) for the fiscal years 1996-1999. In March 1999, a grant application was submitted to the NIH requesting continued funding. By letter dated February 29, 2000, defendant Sarfarazi was notified by the NIH that funding for the plaintiff's position had been cut for the 2000 fiscal year.
On April 12, 2000, the plaintiff and defendant Sarfarazi were involved in a verbal altercation. Subsequently, defendant Sarfarazi contacted Assistant Dean Scott Wetstone M.D. and expressed his desire to terminate the plaintiff because of performance deficiencies and the elimination of the grant funding for the plaintiff's position. Later that same day, April 12, 2000, Sarfarazi met with Dr. Wetstone, Dr. David Gillon (Associate Dean for Finance and Administration) and Assistant Attorney General Jane Comerford. The decision to terminate the plaintiff was confirmed at this meeting. Dr. Wetstone drafted a termination letter on April 12, 2000 which was distributed to Sarfarazi, Dr. Gillon and Attorney Comerford for review. The termination letter was finalized on April 13, 2000. The letter, which was given to the plaintiff on April 14, 2000, indicated that the plaintiff was being terminated but gave him the option to extend the final date of his employment to June 30, 2000, the end of the 1999 fiscal year, contingent on his agreement to fulfill four conditions described in the letter. The plaintiff rejected these conditions and, accordingly, the effective date of termination was April 20, 2000. The plaintiff never returned to work in Sarfarazi's laboratory after the verbal altercation on the morning of April 12, 2000.
On April 14, 2000, the plaintiff sought medical treatment for work injuries. The plaintiff filed a claim for Workers' Compensation benefits on April 18, 2000. The court will note other undisputed factual issues as they become pertinent to each count.
I
The first count is brought against UCONN and alleges a violation of § 46a-60(a)(1), which provides in pertinent part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an employer . . . to discharge from employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of the individual's . . . physical disability." The plaintiff claims that he was suffering from a disability at the time of his hire as a result of a bilateral hip replacement for which he alleges he required a special chair, and asthma and carpal tunnel syndrome which he alleges he developed through the course of his employment with the defendants. The plaintiff claims that it is a result of his complaints about these disabilities for which he was, in part, terminated.
Although the plaintiff's claim is based on alleged violations of a state statute, "in interpreting the [Act], the Connecticut courts apply federal case law dealing with federal anti-discrimination statutes for the purpose of applying and analyzing the essential elements of a discrimination claim . . ." see Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 176 Conn. 533, 527 (1979); Pik-Wik Stores, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 170 Conn. 327, 330 (1976); see also Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 237 Conn. 209, 224-26 (1996) (applying the federal standard). "Under federal law, there are four general theories of employment discrimination: disparate treatment, adverse or disparate impact, perpetuation into the present of the effects of past discrimination, and failure to make reasonable accommodation . . . To date, in Connecticut, we have recognized the disparate treatment and adverse impact theories of employment discrimination." Levy v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96, 103-04.
"This [case] requires consideration of only the `disparate treatment' type of case. Used in this general sense, `disparate treatment' simply refers to those cases where certain individuals are treated differently than others . . . The principal inquiry of a disparate treatment case is whether the plaintiff was subjected to different treatment because of his or her protected status." (Citation omitted.) Id., 104. "Under the analysis of the disparate treatment theory of liability, there are two general methods to allocate the burdens of proof: (1) the mixed-motive/ Price Waterhouse model; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); and (2) the pretext/ McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973)." Id., 104-05. The present case requires the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model because the plaintiff's claim is based on pretext. "Often, a plaintiff cannot prove directly the reasons that motivated an employment decision. Nevertheless, a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of discrimination through inference by presenting facts [that are] sufficient to remove the most likely bona fide reasons for an employment action . . . From a showing that an employment decision was not made for legitimate reasons, a fact finder may infer that the decision was made for illegitimate reasons." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 107; see Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 248; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 792. Accordingly, "[i]n the absence of direct evidence of employment discrimination, the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model of analysis must be employed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Langner v. The Stop Shop Supermarket, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven, Docket No. 377385 (January 27, 2000, Licari, J.); see Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, supra, 237 Conn. 225; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra, 411 U.S. 802-04; Texas Dept of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. 252-53. "Under this model, `[first, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection . . . Third, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.'" Langner v. The Stop Shop Supermarket supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 377385, quoting Wroblewski v. Lexington Gardens, Inc., 188 Conn. 44, 61, 48 A.2d 801 (1982). The defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on physical disability.
To establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine model, "[t]he plaintiff need prove only four elements by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) that he belongs to a protected class; (2) that he applied to and was qualified for the position in question; (3) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that after he was rejected, the position remained open . . . Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case of discrimination, a presumption of discrimination is created." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ann Howard's Apricots Restaurant v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, supra, 237 Conn. 225.
In order to meet the first required element, the plaintiff must prove that he is a member of a protected class. The plaintiff claims that he was a member of a protected class because of physical disabilities, namely a disability from a bilateral hip replacement and his need for a special chair, and work-related asthma and carpal tunnel. It is undisputed that the plaintiff was not diagnosed, and, in fact did not seek treatment for, carpal tunnel or work-related asthma until after the date of termination. Consequently, these disabilities would not have placed him in a protected class while in the employ of the defendant. The disability which would have afforded the plaintiff protected status is that regarding his bilateral hip replacement. General Statutes, § 46a-51(15) defines "physically disabled" as
any individual who has any chronic physical handicap, infirmity or impairment, whether congenital or resulting from bodily injury, organic process or changes or from illness, including, but not limited to, epilepsy, deafness or hearing impairment or reliance on a wheelchair or other remedial appliance or device.
The plaintiff informed the defendant Sarfarazi of this disability at the time of his hire and that he had difficulty walking and needed a special chair to accommodate this disability. This may arguably fall within the penumbra of "chronic, physical handicap" and raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether the plaintiff fell within a protected class for purposes of analysis pursuant to § 46a-60(a)(1).
The next two elements require the plaintiff to prove that he was qualified for a position, but despite his qualification, he was rejected. In other words, his job performance was satisfactory but that he was terminated anyway. See Quarantino v. Tiffany Co., 71 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 1995). It is undisputed that the plaintiff was terminated. The defendant claims that the plaintiff was terminated, in part, due to his lack of productivity, playing computer games, disrespectful behavior toward staff, not following instructions, and violating lab procedures. Though the plaintiff himself does not defend or refute these allegations, he has provided affidavits from colleagues which would make his job performance a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.
Finally, the plaintiff has not shown that he was replaced by an individual who was not a member of a protected class or that, after his termination, the position remained open. In fact, the defendant claims that one of the reasons that the plaintiff was terminated, in addition to those mentioned above, is that the grant which funded his position had not been renewed. Not only does the plaintiff not dispute this, the plaintiff does not even address this issue. In the absence of this element, the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination and the court need not go further as to this count.
II
The second count alleges that Sarfarazi violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by violating the plaintiff's right to equal protection. "In order to establish an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must prove that (1) in comparison with others similarly situated, he was selectively treated, and (2) such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise the constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person." Lisa's Party City, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 185 F.3d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1999).
Without entertaining the analysis of whether or not the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated persons or whether the defendant Sarfarazi selectively acted in bad faith in his treatment of the plaintiff, the undisputed fact remains that the funding for the plaintiff's postdoctoral fellowship had been cut and the position, therefore, could not have been filled by anyone, similarly situated to the plaintiff or not.
III
The third count alleges that UCONN violated General Statutes § 31-290a by discriminating against the plaintiff because of a work-related injury and/or a workers' compensation claim. General Statutes § 31-290a provides, in pertinent part:
(a) No employer who is subject to the provisions of this chapter shall discharge, or cause to be discharged, or in any manner discriminate against any employee because the employee has filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits or otherwise exercised the rights afforded to him pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
The work-related injuries for which the plaintiff is claiming he was unjustly terminated are asthma and carpal tunnel. The plaintiff did not seek treatment for these injuries until after the defendants had decided to terminate him. It is undisputed that the plaintiff did not file a workers' compensation claim until after he was terminated. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim that he was terminated in retaliation for filing a claim for workers' compensation benefits is without merit.
In conclusion, the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on all three counts of the plaintiff's complaint and the motion for summary judgment is granted.