Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. 26-31508
Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Introduction
Plaintiffs are Robert Fanucci and his daughter Michelle (the Fanuccis). Robert Fanucci is an Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate) insured. The Fanuccis appeal from a final judgment entered after the trial vacated an earlier judgment. The judgments were entered subsequent to an arbitration proceeding and in response to Allstate’s petition to correct the arbitration award filed in Superior Court. In the first instance, the trial court corrected the arbitration award, pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.6, subdivision (c), to reflect an award of $1.15 million in favor of the Fanuccis and entered judgment in that amount. Allstate then filed a motion to vacate the judgment, pursuant to section 663, on the grounds that the trial court had exceeded its limited authority to review an arbitration award under section 1286.6. The trial court granted Allstate’s motion to vacate, corrected the arbitration award to reflect an award of $150,000 in favor of the Fanuccis, and re-entered final judgment in that lesser amount. The reason the trial court reversed itself was that it decided it lacked authority under section 1286.6 to resolve the issue of whether the Fanuccis’ $1 million Allstate excess liability/umbrella policy provided uninsured motorist coverage. In so ruling, the trial court stated its judgment “is expressly without prejudice to Fanucci’s right to file a declaratory relief action to determine coverage under the umbrella policy, including any claim that Allstate is estopped from denying coverage under that policy.” We conclude the trial court correctly granted Allstate’s motion to vacate, and therefore affirm.
Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise noted.
FACTS & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Pre-Arbitration Phase
In 1997, a vehicle driven by an elderly driver mounted the sidewalk and struck Michelle as she and a friend waited to cross the street. Michelle, who was twelve years old at the time, suffered a head injury resulting in some permanent cognitive impairment. Following the accident, the elderly driver’s insurance carrier paid to the Fanuccis her policy limits in the amount of $100,000. Also, the Fanuccis held an Allstate auto policy, which included uninsured/underinsured insurance coverage with policy limits of $250,000 per person and $500,000 per occurrence. The auto policy contained an arbitration provision, which stated: “If you and we disagree on your right to receive any damages or on the amount, then upon the written request of either party, the disagreement will be settled by a single neutral arbitrator.” On May 7, 2001, Allstate counsel wrote a letter to the Fanuccis’ counsel stating as follows: “It is my understanding that your client, Michelle Fanucci, is making an underinsured motorist claim through her parents automobile insurance policy with Allstate. It is also my understanding that the Fanuccis' auto policy has limits of $250,000/$500,000. [¶] In light of the fact that Ms. Fanucci has recently been paid the sum of $100,000 from Lucille Mayer’s carrier, the policy limits in Ms. Fanucci’s claim with Allstate have been reduced to $150,000. [¶] On March 28, 2001, you made a policy limits demand. [¶] Before Allstate can respond to your client’s demand, I will have to conduct a preliminary investigation of your client’s damages claims. [¶] . . . [¶] After I have had an opportunity to review the aforementioned documentation and taken Ms. Fanucci’s deposition, I will be in a better position to discuss Ms. Fanucci’s settlement demand. In addition, if you would like to propose names of individuals to act as an arbitrator we can move forward in that direction should an arbitration hearing become necessary.”
Arbitration Phase
Apparently, the parties were unable to reach a settlement agreement because arbitration did indeed become necessary, and was held before the Honorable David Lee (Judge of the Alameda County Superior Court, Retired) over four days between August 23 and 26, 2005. The arbitrator issued his award on September 1, 2005. The award states that, “There is no issue of liability, it having been stipulated by [Allstate]. Therefore the issues are causation, if any and damages, if any.” The arbitrator rendered neuropsychological, physical and occupational findings, and concluded that “the primary and substantial, if not only, reason for Ms. Fanucci’s condition was the impact she suffered at the time of the auto/pedestrian accident of January 17, 1997.” The arbitrator found that Michelle’s medically related special damages amounted to $68,024.07, and that $1,350,000 was “reasonable compensation for the shock, pain and fear claimant suffered during and immediately after the accident, for the pain and suffering suffered during the time of recuperation to date and for the next 60 years of future pain and suffering due to her mild to moderate permanent condition and residual injuries and deficits.” The arbitrator’s total award thus amounted to $1,418,024.07.
On September 15, 2005, Allstate wrote to counsel for the Fanuccis enclosing a draft in the amount of $150,000, stating it “represent[ed] Allstate’s contractual and legal obligation arising out of the award rendered by Judge Lee which exceeded the policy limits.” Allstate also enclosed a copy of its Application for Correction of Award, which it served on Judge Lee/ADR services on the same day. The application for correction of award states: “Allstate requests that the Arbitration award be corrected by incorporating language into the award specifically stating and making reference to the fact that the stated amount of the award shall be reduced in accordance with and is limited to the applicable contractual underinsured motorist coverage limits set forth in Allstate’s policy of insurance which was in force and effect at the time of the claimant’s loss. [¶] Further, this Application is being made with the understanding that any issues concerning applicable amounts of insurance policy coverage applicable to claimant’s loss which may be in dispute are not now and have never been before the Arbitrator for consideration and no evidence on these issues were presented during the arbitration hearing.” The Fanuccis opposed the motion.
On October 3, 2005, the arbitrator issued a post arbitration motion ruling. It states: “Said motion is made pursuant to CCP 1284 et seq. and Cal. Insurance Code 11580.2. [Allstate] seeks to have the award corrected to address the contractual issue of policy limits. Claimant opposes the motion citing CCP 1286.6 (a)&(c) as the only authority of the Arbitrator to correct the award. [¶] On the face of the CCP provision cited by the Claimant there is no authority to modify or correct the award. Moreover, the issue of policy limits was not joined in the arbitration by pleading, motion or evidence. As such the Arbitrator cannot make such a ruling based upon mistake or omission. The record shows nothing about whether or not there is a policy limit, if so, what it is; whether or not, if existing, it was waived, modified or altered by deed, stipulation, conduct, contractual provision or operation of law. [¶] As a consequence the motion is denied. The arbitrator does not by this ruling intend to adjudicate the merits of the subject matter of the motion in any way.”
Post-Arbitration Phase
On November 16, 2005, Allstate filed in Superior Court its petition to correct arbitration award. In its petition, Allstate contended that the award should be vacated, pursuant to section 1286.2, subdivision (a)(4), or, alternatively, corrected, pursuant to section 1286.6, subdivisions (b) and (c). Allstate contended that the award “is not in conformity with the contractual relationship between the parties. More specifically, the terms and conditions contained in Allstate’s policy of insurance affording applicable policy limits of $250,000 with a right of an offset in the amount paid by the insurer for the third party tortfeasor, in the amount of $100,000 places a $150,000 ceiling on Ms. Fanucci’s recovery.” Allstate asked the court to correct the award “to reflect the contractual and legal obligation of Allstate which is $150,000.”
This subsection provides that “the court shall vacate the award if the court determines . . . [that] . . . [t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)
These subsections provide that “the court, unless it vacates the award pursuant to Section 1286.2, shall correct the award and confirm it as corrected if the court determines that: . . . (b) The arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted; or (c) The award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.” (§ 1286.6, subds. (b) & (c).)
Robert Fanucci submitted a declaration in opposition to Allstate’s petition to correct the arbitration award. In the declaration, Fanucci states that in 1987 he met with Michael Baldwin, an Allstate agent, on several occasions to discuss his insurance needs. Fanucci stated he advised Baldwin that he wanted “the maximum insurance protection for all of my insurance requirements, including uninsured motorist coverage. [Baldwin] advised me that the best and most economical way to acquire the maximum coverage was to obtain an excess liability policy. He advised me that the excess liability policy would supplement each of my underlying coverages. We agreed that a $1 million excess liability policy was prudent at that time. [Baldwin] never advised me that the excess liability policy did not apply to my uninsured motorist coverage. If he had done so, I would have purchased additional uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage.” Relying on Robert Fanucci’s declaration, the Fanuccis argued that the “excess liability policy provides supplemental coverage and is linked to the uninsured motorist coverage. Either Mr. Fanucci in fact had the coverage he believed he had, or Mr. Baldwin affirmatively and negligently represented to Mr. Fanucci that he had coverage that he did not have. In either scenario, Allstate’s petition to correct the award to $150,000 should be denied, and the award should be corrected to $1,150,000 which reflects the coverage Mr. Fanucci understood that he had obtained, that is for $1,150,000 ($250,000 UIM plus $1,000,000 under the umbrella policy less $100,000 paid by the underinsured motorist).”
This is the first time the issues of coverage under the excess liability policy and promissory estoppel are raised in the course of the proceedings. The only prior reference to the excess policy in the record is a letter from Allstate counsel to Fanuccis’ counsel dated March 5, 2002, stating, “Allstate has retained this firm to represent it with regard to your clients’ claims (or, at least, arguments) for coverage under their Personal Umbrella Policy. Haskell &Goodman will continue to represent Allstate on issues relating to the underinsured’s liability and damages. [¶] Allstate’s umbrella policy contains no UM or UIM coverage. Indeed, it is a liability policy, not a first-party auto policy. This should be obvious from the contract’s language, which in your client’s possession. To my knowledge, there is no Allstate umbrella policy that affords UM or UIM coverage. If you would like to discuss the Fanuccis’ umbrella policy, I would be happy to listen to your theories. The UIM arbitration is not the place for such a discussion, however, and efforts to obtain information about Allstate’s coverage through the discovery process of the UIM proceeding will be resisted strenuously.” There is no indication that the issue of coverage under the excess policy, or the related question of estoppel, was raised in the arbitration proceeding.
The Fanuccis urged the court to determine whether the excess liability policy provided uninsured motorist coverage on the grounds that “Mr. Fanucci . . . is entitled to a judicial review of his insurance coverage in its entirety.” Furthermore, the Fanuccis urged that even if the excess policy is read to exclude uninsured motorist liability, “Allstate is estopped from denying excess coverage and from relying on the exclusionary provisions.”
In a reply filed on December 14, 2005, Allstate asserted that “the only policy governing the underinsured motorist proceeding is the Allstate Auto Policy,” the Declarations page of which shows the policy limits to be $250,000. Further, Allstate argued that “coverage issues and/or disputes were not before the arbitrator, David Lee. Judge Lee’s award is clearly in excess of Allstate’s applicable [auto] policy limits. Any coverage disputes and defenses thereto can be asserted in a different forum by way of a properly pled civil action and not in an opposition to a petition to correct an arbitration award. . . . Fanucci has cited no authority[] which gives the court in the instant case proper jurisdiction and/or authority to decide alleged coverage disputes. . . .”
The trial court held a hearing on the matter on December 21, 2005. At the outset, the court asked counsel, “I’d like to know what issues were submitted for decision to the arbitrator, and by that I mean was there anything about this policy that was presented to the arbitrator? Did the arbitrator have a policy in front of him?” Counsel informed that court, “The short answer to that is no, your Honor.” At the conclusion of the hearing, the court gave counsel an opportunity to provide further briefing “in light of the factual issues introduced by Fanucci,” regarding the scope of its authority to vacate or correct the award.”
In its further briefing filed on December 29, 2005, Allstate did not contest the factual basis of the Fanucci’s estoppel claim, but stuck to its legal position that the court had no authority to hear coverage disputes because such issues “were not before and decided by Judge Lee during the underinsured motorist arbitration governed by California Insurance Code § 11580.2(h) et seq.” Indeed, Allstate’s position was that such matters were not arbitrable at all in an uninsured motorist proceeding, and it rejected the notion that merely by bringing its petition to correct the award it had somehow bestowed on the court authority to decide any coverage disputes between the parties.
The trial court issued its first ruling on February 24, 2006. Preliminarily, and relying on Furlough v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 40, the trial court concluded that “it may properly decide the issue presented by the parties here, to wit, the amount of underinsured motorist coverage available to the Fanuccis, and whether that coverage amount should result in a correction of the $1.4 million arbitration award.” Accordingly, the court stated it “will consider all policy limit/coverage arguments in ruling on the motion to correct the award.” Next, the court stated that it “finds no ambiguity here and concludes that under its express terms, the umbrella policy does not include UIM coverage.” However, based on Robert Fanucci’s “uncontradicted declaration” the court further concluded that “Allstate is estopped from denying [UIM] coverage” under the umbrella policy. On that basis, the court corrected the award to $1,150,000 in favor of the Fanuccis.
On March 17, 2006, Allstate filed its notice of motion to vacate judgment and enter different judgment. Allstate contended that the court should have declined to adjudicate any issues regarding the excess liability policy, or, at a minimum, confined its review to the legal issue of coverage, not a factual issue like estoppel. Without waiving its argument that the court lacked authority to consider fact issues related to estoppel on a motion to correct the arbitration award, Allstate submitted a declaration from its agent Michael Baldwin, in which he denies making the representations made by Fanucci, purporting “to demonstrate that Fanucci’s misrepresentation claim can be, and is, disputed.”
The trial court took the matter under submission after a hearing held on April 28, 2006. On May 2, 2006, the trial court issued its ruling on Allstate’s motion to vacate the judgment, stating: “Upon further consideration . . . the court has determined that it exceeded the extent of the authority it had to correct under CCP § 1286.6. It is conceded by both sides that the arbitrator in this case was to decide whether Fanucci was entitled to recover against the underinsured motorist and if so, the amount of damages. The arbitrator was not called upon to evaluate the amount of coverage available for payment of the damages. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] As conceded by Allstate, it is not improper for a court to determine policy coverage when the issue presented is one purely of law; this is what the court did in Furlough when it determined that the insured’s umbrella policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage. In this case, however, the court’s decision correcting the award went beyond examining the four corners of Fanucci’s umbrella policy, and entered the realm of factfinding, albeit based on uncontradicted evidence in the record. . . . [T]his court now concludes that under CCP § 1286.6, which sets out the exclusive grounds upon which a court may correct an arbitration award, it exceeded the scope of its authority in ruling on the question of estoppel.”
Accordingly, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion to vacate the judgment and entered a new judgment for $150,000 in favor of the Fanuccis, without prejudice to their right to file a declaratory relief action to determine coverage under the umbrella policy. Notice of entry of said judgment was served on June 15, 2006, and the Fanuccis filed a timely notice of appeal on August 10, 2006.
DISCUSSION
(I)
The Fanuccis contend that in its initial ruling on Allstate’s motion to correct the arbitration award pursuant to section 1286.6, the trial court had “jurisdiction to decide the extent of applicable insurance coverage” available to fund the arbitrator’s award. This formulation does not accurately state the issue to be addressed here. The issue is not whether the trial court had “jurisdiction” to consider matters not submitted to the arbitrator. Correctly stated, the issue is whether the trial court properly corrected the arbitrator’s award on one of the limited grounds permitted under section 1286.6. To bring the issue into this proper focus, a few preliminary observations are required.
First, it is undisputed that the arbitration proceedings in this matter were instigated pursuant to the arbitration provision of the auto policy. That cannot be otherwise, for there is no other insurance contract between the parties containing an arbitration provision. In short, the arbitration proceedings were a standard UIM arbitration as required under Insurance Code section 11580.2, the statute governing uninsured and underinsured motorist coverage. The arbitration provision therein states: “The policy or an endorsement added thereto shall provide that the determination as to whether the insured shall be legally entitled to recover damages, and if so entitled, the amount thereof, shall be made by agreement between the insured and the insurer or, in the event of disagreement, by arbitration. The arbitration shall be conducted by a single neutral arbitrator.” (Ins. Code, § 11580.2 subd. (f).) The arbitration provision in the auto policy mirrors these statutory requirements: It states: “If you and we disagree on your right to receive any damages or on the amount, . . . the disagreement will be settled by a single neutral arbitrator.”
Second, “where, as in the present case, the [auto] policy essentially restates the statutory language, arbitration is limited to issues relating to liability of the uninsured motorist to the insured (citation); it does not include determination of the extent of coverage and the amount of money the insurance company is obligated to pay the insured. (Citations.) While the parties voluntarily may submit to arbitration issues other than those required by statute and the policy, ‘the courts will not infer a voluntary submission of a nonstatutory issue in the absence of a clear showing that the parties so intended, either by actual litigation or argument of the issue . . . or by some other unambiguous conduct.’ (Citations.)” (Furlough v. Transamerica Ins. Co., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 45-46 (Furlough); accord Weinberg v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (Weinberg) (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1082.) Here, there is no evidence that the parties submitted any issue to the arbitrator other than those required under the auto policy, i.e., liability and damages. Indeed, the arbitrator noted that because Allstate stipulated to the liability of the underinsured motorist, “the issues are causation, if any and damages, if any.” Thus, in rendering his award, the arbitrator considered only the issues contemplated by the arbitration agreement. (National Indemnity Co. v. Superior Court (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 345, 349 [“an arbitration under uninsured motorist provisions is limited to the issues contemplated by the agreement unless a clearly expressed agreement to broaden the scope of such an arbitration is established”].)
Third, “where parties have agreed their dispute will be resolved by binding arbitration, judicial intervention is limited to reviewing the award to see if statutory grounds for vacating or correcting the award exist. (Citations.) . . . Unless a statutory basis for vacating or correcting an award exists, a reviewing court ‘shall confirm the award as made . . . .’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.)” (Corona v. Amherst Partners (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 701, 706; Malek v. Blue Cross of California (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 44, 55, quoting Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 33 [“ ‘[A]n award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in [ ] sections 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction).’ ”].) At issue here are the grounds for correction of an arbitration award where “[t]he arbitrators exceeded their powers but the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted[.]” (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).)
Fourth, the limits of uninsured motorist coverage under the auto policy containing the arbitration clause are $250,000 per person. The arbitrator’s award totaled $1,418,024.07. This award was far in excess of the policy limits. Under Insurance Code section 11580.2, which governs the provision of underinsured motorist arbitration, “ ‘the maximum liability of the insurer providing the underinsured motorist coverage shall not exceed the insured’s underinsured motorist coverage limits, less the amount paid to the insured by . . . [any party] legally liable for the injury.’ ” (Pilimai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange Co. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 133, 142, quoting Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (p)(4).) Thus, the arbitrator exceeded his power by making an award in excess of the applicable policy limits. (Cothron v. Interinsurance Exchange (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 853, 860 [“An arbitrator in an uninsured motorist proceeding may not award an amount in excess of the policy limits.”]; (Campbell v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 105, 113, disapproved on other grounds by Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 27 [award above policy limits exceeded powers of the arbitrator].)
Fifth, where an arbitrator acts in excess of his powers in an uninsured motorist arbitration, and makes an award in excess of the applicable policy limits, the insurance carrier’s remedy is to file, within 100 days of the award, a petition to correct the award pursuant to section 1282.6. (Weinberg, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084 [stating that “if the arbitrator makes an award of damages in excess of the policy limits, then the insurer must move in a timely manner, either before the arbitrator or in court, to vacate the award or correct it”]; Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 47 [noting that “the trial court properly corrected the arbitration award to restrict appellant’s recovery to the uninsured motorist limits”].) Indeed, the Weinberg court acknowledged that in those cases where the arbitrator makes an award in excess of applicable policy limits, insureds often will “accept payment of the policy limits from the insurer and then seek to collect the balance from the UIM” rather than moving to confirm the entire award against the insurer. (Weinberg, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084.) However, the court cautioned that where the arbitrator makes an award in excess of policy limits and the insurer fails to move “in a timely manner, either before the arbitrator or in court, to vacate the award or correct it,” the insurer “risk[s] having the court confirm the entire award upon a motion to confirm by the insured.” (Ibid. [italics added].)
(II)
With these observations in mind, we turn to the first question: Did the trial court, in its first order dated February 24, 2006, properly correct the award from over $1.4 million to $1.150 million, pursuant to section 1286.6, on the basis that “[t]he award is imperfect in a matter of form, not affecting the merits of the controversy.”? (§ 1286.6, subd. (c).) The answer is, “No.” The reason is that in correcting the award from $1.4 million to $1.150 million, the trial court decided an issue that was not before the arbitrator and was outside the scope of the arbitration—namely, that the Fanuccis were entitled to underinsured motorist coverage under the excess policy on a theory of promissory estoppel. This clearly affected “the merits of the controversy” between the parties because that controversy was limited to damages and did not include the issue of insurance coverage under either the auto policy or any other policy. Thus, the trial court was not empowered by section 1286.6, subdivision (c), to correct the award in that manner.
This brings us to the second question: Did the trial court, in its ruling on Allstate’s motion to vacate judgment dated May 2, 2006, properly correct the award from $1.4 million to $150,000, reflecting the policy limits of underinsured motorist coverage offset by the $100,000 already obtained from the underinsured motorist’s carrier? The answer is, “Yes.” The reason is that the trial court was empowered to correct the award in this manner pursuant to section 1286.6, subdivision (b), because the arbitrator “exceeded [his] powers [and] the award may be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” (§ 1286.6, subd. (b).) As noted above, the arbitrator exceeded his powers by making an award in excess of the auto policy limits for underinsured motorist coverage. (See, e.g., Cothron v. Interinsurance Exchange, supra, 103 Cal.App.3d at p. 860.) And as also noted above, the insurer is required to file a petition to correct an award in excess of the policy limits or else risk that its insured may obtain “a windfall amount of damages far in excess of the amount of damages for which he paid premiums.” (Weinberg, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) Accordingly, the court properly granted Allstate’s motion to vacate the first judgment and properly corrected the award pursuant to section 1286.6, subdivision (b), to reflect the applicable policy limits under the auto policy for underinsured motorist coverage.
The Fanuccis, however, relying on Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d 40, contend that the trial court could properly decide the issue of whether uninsured motorist coverage was available to them under the excess policy on a theory of promissory estoppel because “[t]he nature of a petition to correct an arbitration award is to ask the superior court to determine the extent of available coverage.” We disagree. Indeed, given our earlier observations, we reiterate that in furtherance of the “ ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution’ ” and the concomitant goal of “arbitral finality,” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pp. 9-10), “an award reached by an arbitrator pursuant to a contractual agreement to arbitrate is not subject to judicial review except on the grounds set forth in section 1286.2 (to vacate) and 1286.6 (for correction).” (Id. at p. 33 [italics added].) Nevertheless, Furlough, supra, merits some discussion.
In Furlough supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 43, plaintiff James Furlough leased a tractor-trailer rig. When driving the rig, Furlough was injured after being forced off the road by a hit-and-run vehicle and driver. At the time of the accident, three insurance policies were in effect, viz., (1) a comprehensive business auto policy issued by Transamerica Insurance Company (Transamerica) to the lessor (the primary policy), which included uninsured motorist insurance with limits of $300,000 per accident; (2) a personal umbrella policy issued by Transamerica, which provided uninsured motorist coverage of $25,000 maximum per accident; and, (3) a commercial umbrella policy, with $1 million limits of liability, which did not mention uninsured motorist coverage. (Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 43-44.) Furlough filed a demand for arbitration regarding his right to recover under the uninsured motorist insurance, arguing that the commercial umbrella policy provided a maximum of $1 million uninsured motorist coverage. Subsequently, the arbitrator entered an award “ordering Transamerica to pay Furlough $744,695 ‘as general damages under the uninsured motorist provision of the policy.’ ” (Id. at p. 44.)
Furlough filed a petition in superior court to confirm the arbitrator’s award. In its response, Transamerica sought to correct the award to the alleged policy limits of $325,000, and contended the arbitrator exceeded his powers by making an award in excess of those policy limits. (Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at pp. 43-44.) The trial court found that the commercial umbrella policy did not include uninsured motorist coverage, and that uninsured motorist coverage was limited to $325,000 (primary policy [$300,000] plus personal umbrella policy [$25,000]). Accordingly, the trial court corrected the award to $325,000 and entered judgment in that amount. (Ibid.)
On appeal, Furlough asserted that the parties “ ‘by submitting pleadings in written form, relinquished to the authority of the arbitrator the right of determination of issues of coverages and policy limits’ ” and therefore “the award, which in effect determined that such coverage was afforded by the commercial umbrella policy, is binding.” (Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 46.) The appellate court noted that “[t]he record on appeal does not include the papers purportedly submitted in the arbitration proceeding upon which the argument was based.” Given this, the appellate court stated that “it must be presumed in support of the judgment that the trial court resolved against appellant the issue of the parties’ claimed submission of coverage and policy limits to arbitration.” (Ibid.) Further, the appellate court reasoned that “[a]n arbitration award which embraces matters outside the agreement and not submitted to the arbitrator is subject to modification under Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.6, subdivision (b),” as an award exceeding the power of the arbitrators. (Ibid.) The appellate court concluded that “[t]he trial court impliedly determined that the issue of the extent of uninsured motorist coverage was not submitted to the arbitrator and therefore such issue was before the court for determination. (See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shmitka, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d 59, 63.) The only remaining question is whether the trial court correctly resolved that issue by ruling that the commercial umbrella policy did not furnish uninsured motorist coverage.” (Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 47.) The appellate court went on to conclude the trial court was correct in that determination because the commercial umbrella policy “did not expressly provide uninsured motorist coverage and may not be read to include such coverage.” (Ibid.) “Accordingly,” the appellate court added, “the trial court properly corrected the arbitration award to restrict appellant’s recovery to the uninsured motorist limits provided by the primary policy as supplemented by the personal umbrella policy. Such result not only is mandated by the express terms of the uninsured motorist statute, but also is in accord with the purpose of the statute which is ‘not to make all drivers whole from accidents with uninsured drivers, but to make sure that drivers injured by such drivers are protected to the extent that they would have been protected had the driver at fault carried the statutory minimum of liability insurance.’ (Citation.)” (Ibid.)
The Furlough court’s citation to Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shmitka (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 59 (Shmitka) is not exactly on point, because in Shmitka the trial court decided the coverage issue in the context of a declaratory relief action brought by the automobile insurance company after both parties had introduced evidence in an arbitration proceeding under the uninsured motorist coverage but before an arbitration decision even had been rendered. (Shmitka, supra, 12 Cal.App. at pp. 61-62.) Patently, the trial court in this case could decide issues of coverage in a separate action for declaratory relief filed by either party.
The Fanuccis assert that Furlough provides authority for a superior court, in a petition to confirm or correct an arbitration award, to “decide[] issues not considered by the arbitrator, “look at [] policies and determine the applicable coverage,” and “look to see if an umbrella policy provides uninsured motorist coverage.” In our view, the Fanuccis read Furlough much too broadly. Each case, of course, will turn on its own facts, but, in light of the limited scope of judicial review applicable to arbitration awards, the focus in any challenge to an arbitration award must always remain on whether any statutory grounds exist to either vacate or correct the award pursuant to sections 1286.2 and 1286.6, respectively. (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 33.) In Furlough, unlike this case, three insurance policies were apparently the subject of arbitration proceedings. Indeed, Furlough claimed in his demand for arbitration that he was entitled to $1 million of uninsured motorist coverage under the commercial umbrella policy. (Furlough, supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at p. 44.) In contrast, only the auto policy in this case was the subject of arbitration and the Fanuccis never asserted in the arbitration proceedings that they were entitled to uninsured motorist coverage under the Allstate excess policy. In this case, unlike Furlough, the Fanuccis did not claim in superior court that issues of coverages and policy limits were submitted to the arbitrator—indeed the parties here do not dispute that the arbitrator decided only the issue of damages. This is an important distinction, because the trial court in Furlough, having concluded that issues of coverage and policy limits regarding the three policies had not been decided by the arbitrator, necessarily had to decide those very issues in order to determine whether the arbitrator acted beyond his powers in awarding the sum of $744,695, which was less than the policy limits of the three policies combined but more than the policy limits of the only two policies which, according to Transamerica, provided uninsured motorist coverage in a maximum amount of $325,000 (primary policy [$300,000] plus personal umbrella policy [$25,000]). But the circumstances present in Furlough, supra, are not present in this case: Here, arbitration proceedings were mandated under one policy only, namely, the auto policy—the excess policy does not even contain an arbitration clause and was never the subject of arbitration proceedings. Rather, arbitration proceedings were triggered by one policy only—the auto policy—with policy limits of $250,000 per person for uninsured motorist coverage. Thus, the trial court in this case, unlike the trial court in Furlough, had no need to determine any other coverages or policy limits in order to decide whether the arbitrator had exceeded his powers in making an award in excess of the auto policy’s limits.
In sum, we are not persuaded that Furlough is controlling on the facts before us. Rather, as stated above, we conclude the trial court properly corrected the arbitrator’s award pursuant to section 1286.6, subdivision (b), to reflect the applicable policy limits. Furthermore, we categorically reject the Fanuccis’ fallback position—that the trial court was empowered to decide the question of uninsured motorist coverage under the excess policy on the basis of promissory estoppel—under section 187 and the “inherent power” of the court. At the risk of belaboring the point, we again reiterate that under the “comprehensive statutory scheme regulating private arbitration in this state . . . the Legislature has expressed a ‘strong public policy in favor of arbitration as a speedy and relatively inexpensive means of dispute resolution’ (citations).” (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 9.) Also, “. . . judicial review of private arbitration awards [is limited] to those cases in which there exists a statutory ground to vacate or correct the award.” (Id. at p. 28; see also National Auto. & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 948, 955 [rejecting respondent’s reliance on section 187 to trump the arbitration statutes on the grounds that “section 187 itself restricts its scope to situations where jurisdiction is conferred upon the trial court by . . . a statute but the precise means to effectuate it are not also set forth” and also that “fundamental rules of statutory construction render section 187 subservient to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 and Insurance Code section 11580.3, because the latter statutes are both more specific and more recent”].) Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decision to grant Allstate’s motion to vacate the initial judgment, correct the arbitrator’s award to $150,000, and re-enter judgment in that amount.
Section 187 provides: “When jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or by any other statute, conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this Code or the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which may appear most conformable to the spirit of this code.”
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Fanuccis shall bear the costs of appeal.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Siggins, J.