Fantasia v. Kinsella

7 Citing cases

  1. Covington v. Smith

    Case No. 05-1204 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 16, 2005)

    First, it is difficult to see how Plaintiff could have been actively resisting or attempting to evade arrest when he had no idea that he was in danger of being arrested. See Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1413-14 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (holding that a person cannot actively resist or evade arrest when he is unaware that his arrest is imminent). As discussed above, when Plaintiff opened his front door, Defendant told him that he was there to search for Plaintiff's son, not to effectuate Plaintiff's arrest.

  2. Dreyer v. City of Kokomo

    IP 00-1914-C-M/S (S.D. Ind. Jan. 17, 2002)

    To establish a prima facie case of civil conspiracy, Plaintiffs must show (1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights and (2) actual deprivations of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement. Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (N.D.Ill. 1997) (citing Scherer v. Balkema, 840 F.2d 437, 442 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1043 (1988)). Even assuming Plaintiffs could show that the Marion County Defendants somehow entered into an agreement with the KPD to violate their constitutional rights, they fail to explain what rights were actually violated.

  3. McNamara v. Guinn

    No. 98 C 7382 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2000)

    Wendt was not at the scene of the incident and his understanding of what happened in the alley was based entirely on the report of his subordinates. Wendt, as the watch commander, simply was doing his job and had no reason to doubt the veracity of Guinn and Kirincic. Based on these circumstances, Wendt cannot be held liable on a Section 1983 conspiracy theory.SeeVukadinovich v. Zentz, 995 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1993) (officer not liable for simply reviewing and signing police report); Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1415-16 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (officer who arrested plaintiff on the basis of a fellow officer's report was not liable for conspiracy under Section 1983); Humphrey v. Demitro, 931 F. Supp. 571, 583 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1998). Indeed, in their lawsuit, McNamara and Ostrowski concede that Wendt is not liable for his involvement in the alleged conspiracy.

  4. McNamara v. Guinn

    CASE NUMBER 98 C 7382; 99 C 2853 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 22, 2000)

    Wendt was not at the scene of the incident and his understanding of what happened in the alley was based entirely on the report of his subordinates. Wendt, as the watch commander, simply was doing his job and had no reason to doubt the veracity of Guinn and Kirincic. Based on these circumstances, Wendt cannot be held liable on a Section 1983 conspiracy theory.SeeVukadinovich v. Zentz, 995 F.2d 750,756(7th Cir. 1993) (officer not liable for simply reviewing and signing police report); Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1415-16 (N.D. 111. 1997) (officer who arrested plaintiff on the basis of a fellow officer's report was not liable for conspiracy under Section 1983); Humphrey v. Demitro, 931 F. Supp. 571, 583 (ND. Ill. 1996)(same), rev'd in part on other grounds, 148 F.3d 719 (7th Cir. 1998). Indeed, in their lawsuit, McNamara and Ostrowski concede that Wendt is not liable for his involvement in the alleged conspiracy.

  5. Anton v. Sheriff of Dupage County, Ill.

    47 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Ill. 1999)   Cited 14 times

    To sufficiently plead conspiracy under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of secured constitutional rights and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement." Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1415 (N.D.Ill. 1997). "A plaintiff need not establish these elements by direct evidence; circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy is sufficient."

  6. DuFour-Dowell v. Cogger

    969 F. Supp. 1107 (N.D. Ill. 1997)   Cited 39 times
    Holding that where officers threw arrestee to the floor and applied substantial pressure to her back, and arrestee was not resisting and gave no indication of fleeing, the actions were so plainly excessive that a lack of closely analogous caselaw was not dispositive of the qualified immunity issue

    Even if one officer stood by while the other applied the pressure, the first officer could still be liable if he had a realistic opportunity to prevent further harm. See Fantasia v. Kinsella, 956 F. Supp. 1409, 1414 (N.D.Ill. 1997). Claims that a law enforcement officer used excessive force in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other seizure are analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard which requires the court to balance "`the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests' against the countervailing governmental interests at stake."

  7. Guy v. State of Illinois

    958 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ill. 1997)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that an assistant state attorney was an appointee on the policymaking level

    To sufficiently plead conspiracy under § 1983, plaintiff must demonstrate "(1) an express or implied agreement among defendants to deprive plaintiff of secured constitutional rights and (2) an actual deprivation of those rights in the form of overt acts in furtherance of the agreement." Fantasia v. Kinsella, No. 96 C 1537, 1997 WL 18430, at *6 (N.D.Ill. Jan. 16, 1997). Plaintiff's allegations must raise an inference of a mutual understanding and "acts performed together by the members of the conspiracy are adequate when they are unlikely to have been undertaken without an agreement."