Its purpose is remedial, and as such we apply the Act liberally to accomplish its purposes. See State v. Therrien, 161 Vt. 26, 31, 633 A.2d 272, 275 (1993); Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 586, 580 A.2d 51, 53 (1990). In construing the Act, we look to the interpretations accorded similar terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act and other state consumer protection laws.
There is no standard of review in such cases; the party who invites the error waives or "intentional[ly] relinquish[es]" their right to challenge it on appeal. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (quotation omitted); see also State v. J.S., 2018 VT 49, ¶ 21, 207 Vt. 379, 189 A.3d 552 (recognizing invited error where defendant challenged on appeal standard that trial court used to decide whether to revoke his youthful-offender status, despite defense counsel's having conceded at trial that court would be on "strong ground" to use this standard (quotation omitted)); Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 587-88, 580 A.2d 51, 53-54 (1990) (holding that defendants waived their claim that trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that plaintiff's agent was in fact plaintiff's agent by stating at charge conference, "I think it's up to the jury to decide whether [she] is an agent or not." (quotation omitted)).
More broadly, "derivative liability for consumer fraud cannot be imposed `absent direct participation in the unfair or deceptive acts, direct aid to the actor, or a principal/agent relationship.'" Vermont Mobile Home Owners' Ass'n, Inc. v. Lapierre, 94 F. Supp.2d 519, 526 (D. Vt. 2000) (quoting State v. Stedman, 149 Vt. 594, 598, 547 A.2d 1333, 1335-36 (1988) Plaintiff does not allege that the Woodall Defendants were aware of the allegedly poorly maintained trees at the Campground or that the Woodall Defendants are agents of the Lake Champagne Defendants or had some other kind of direct relationship with them. Cf. Stedman, 149 Vt. at 598 (real estate broker engaged in residential real estate sales was a "seller" under the VCFA); Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 585-586, 580 A.2d 51, 52-53 (1990) (agent who made misrepresentations about health on behalf of the owner of a horse liable under VCFA). Even construing the VCFA liberally to accomplish its remedial purpose, Wilder v. Aetna Life Cas. Ins. Co., 140 Vt. 16, 19, 433 A.2d 309, 310 (1981), and construing the Plaintiff's complaint generously as the Court must on a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against the Woodall Defendants upon which relief can be granted under the VCFA. Plaintiff's VCFA claim against the Woodall Defendants is dismissed. Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the VCFA, the Court need not address the Woodall Defendants' alternate argument that Plaintiff has failed to plead her VCFA claim with particularity under Rule 9(b).
Act 250 and the Consumer Fraud Act are remedial legislation. See Fancher v. Benson, 154 Vt. 583, 586, 580 A.2d 51, 53 (1990); 1969, No. 250 (Adj. Sess.), § 1 (purposes of Act 250 are remedial); 10 V.S.A. § 8221(b)(2) (courts authorized to "order remedial actions to be taken to mitigate hazard to human health or the environment" for any Act 250 violations).