Summary
declining to determine whether maritime law applied to plaintiff's claims and therefore declining to remand
Summary of this case from Nase v. Teco Energy, Inc.Opinion
Civil Action No. 00-2049 Section "L"(2).
September 12, 2000.
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is plaintiffs' motion to remand. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' motion is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
This case concerns the capsizing of the D.L. Hanson ("Hanson"), a self-propelled liftbarge owned by Cardinal Services, Inc ("Cardinal") operating alongside a fixed offshore platform owned by Oxy U.S.A. Inc. ("Oxy") and located on the Outer Continental Shelf, south of Galveston, Texas. Oxy chartered the Hanson from Cardinal to perform a coiled tubing operation on one of the platform's wells. One week earlier, defendant Royal Service Rentals, Inc. ("Royal Service"), had surveyed the sea floor surrounding Oxy's platform to prepare for the Hanson's arrival.
When the Hanson reached the Oxy platform during the late hours of September 24, 2000, Captain Paul Fallon maneuvered the vessel alongside the platform and lifted its main deck to be level with the well deck of the platform. As the crew prepared for its tubing operations, the port leg of the Hanson apparently penetrated the seabed and caused the vessel to capsize suddenly at 1:30 a.m. on September 25, 2000. Captain Fallon suffered various injuries and crew member Larry Orkes was lost at sea.
Plaintiffs Paul and Sheila Fallon ("Fallon") filed suit against Oxy, Royal Service, and their respective insurers in the Civil District Court for the Parish of Orleans, Louisiana. Oxy then removed the matter to this Court pursuant to title 28, United States Code, sections 1331 and 1441(b). Oxy argues that the Hanson furthered mineral exploration on the Outer Continental Shelf and therefore this Court has original federal question jurisdiction under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, title 43, United States Code, section 1349(b)(1). Fallon now moves to remand contending that this Court lacks federal question jurisdiction because their claims arise under general maritime rather than federal law.
II. ANALYSIS
Removal of civil actions from state to federal district courts are proper for any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). The Outer Contimental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) provides that "the district courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction of cases and controversies arising out of or in connection with (A) any operation conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf which involves exploration, development, or production of the minerals, of the subsoil and seabed of the Outer Continental Shelf . . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1). The appropriateness of removal in the present controversy is thus dependent on the applicability of OCSLA to the factual scenario of this case.
The reach of OCSLA is broad and includes cases "arising out of or in connection with any operation conducted on the Outer Continental Shelf which involves. . . development or production of the minerals . . . ." 43 U.S.C. § 1349(b)(1).
Section 1331(L) explains that "the term `development' means those activities which take place following discovery of minerals in paying quantities, including . . . drilling, platform construction . . . which are for the purpose of ultimately producing the minerals discovered." 43 U.S.C. § 1331(L). Section 1331(M) indicates that "the term `development' means those activities including., field operations, maintenance, and work-over drilling." 43 U.S.C. § 1331(m). Thus the question narrows to whether Paul Fallon's injury that occurred while he was participating in workover operations, maintenance and construction arises out of the production of minerals on the Outer Continental Shelf as defined by OCSLA.
The Fifth Circuit has established a "but for" test to determine whether a cause of action arises under OCSLA. See Hufnagel v. Omega Service Industries, Inc., 182 F.3d 340, 350 (5th Cir. 1999).
In the present case, Paul Fallon's work maintaining and conducting workover operations involving the platform furthered mineral development. The purpose of the D.L. Hanson was to assist in a coil-tubing/nitrogen operation in order to increase flow from a well produced at Oxy's Matagorida Island Platform. Fallon would not have been injured "but for" the work he was performing. His activities fall within the scope of OCSLA. The fact that his injuries occurred off the platform does not exclude OCSLA coverage. This result is consistent with prior caselaw.
In Recar v. CNG Producing Co., 853 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1988), OCSLA was held applicable to a personal injury suit brought by a platform worker when a rope from which he was swinging from a platform broke causing him to fall on the desk of an adjacent transport vessel.
In Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 692 F.2d 337 (5th Cir. 1982), OCSLA was held applicable when a helicopter pilot was killed in a crash on the Outer Continental Shelf while ferrying employees to production platforms.
In Hufnagel, 182 F.3d at 350, OCSLA was held applicable where a platform worker who was housed on an adjoining vessel was injured while working on the platform performing certain maintenance or repair operations.
Fallon argues that OCSLA does not provide the district court with subject matter jurisdiction because of the maritime flavor of this case. He points out that he was injured when his vessel capsized and at the time he was a member of the vessel's crew. Failon's argument misses the point. This Court may well have both admiralty jurisdiction under the general maritime law and federal question jurisdiction by virtue of OCSLA. It is established law in the Fifth Circuit that where admiralty and OCSLA jurisdiction overlap, the case is governed by the substantive principles of general maritime law. See Hufnagel, 182 F.3d at 350; Laredo Offshore Constr., Inc. v. Hunt Oil Co., 754 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1985). Thus this Court may well conclude that the relationship of the alleged "wrong" in this case to traditional maritime activity is sufficiently strong to characterize the wrong as a maritime tort which requires application of general maritime law. See Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972); Recar, 853 F.2d at 369; Smith v. Pan Am Corp., 684 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1982).
But the Court is not required at this time to decide which substantive body of law applies to this case. The Court will make this decision after the facts are developed by applying the principles articulated in a plethora of cases which have considered this question. See Rodrigue v. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co., 395 U.S. 352, 355 (1969); Recar, 853 F.2d at 370; Laredo, 754 F.2d at 1229; Smith, 684 F.2d at 1109-10.
The sole question presented in the present motion to remand is whether OCSLA invests this Court with original federal question jurisdiction. For the reasons stated above, this Court concludes that it does. The fact that the case may be governed by the substantive principles of general maritime law does not dictate remand.
Furthermore, it is of note that other claims have resulted from the capsizing of the D.L. Hanson. A claim for another crew member of the vessel is pending in this Court and a limitation proceeding has been filed by the D.L. Hanson's owner in the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Judicial efficiency and consistency of verdicts further support proceeding in a federal forum.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs' motion to remand is DENIED.
Done this 12 day of September, 2000 New Orleans, Louisiana