After receipt of Judge Schoenberger's report and the transcript of the hearing he conducted, and after briefing and oral argument, this Court rendered its first opinion in this case. Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63; 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981) (Falk I). Plaintiff has not contested the validity of expenditures in support of the Attorney Grievance commission, the Character and Fitness Committee, and the Institute for Continuing Legal Education.
The Michigan Supreme Court treated plaintiff's petition as a complaint for a writ of superintending control over the State Bar of Michigan, within the original jurisdiction of the Court. Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 8586, 305 N.W.2d 201, 202-03 (1981) (Ryan, J., concurring) [hereinafter cited as Falk I]. Subsequently, the Michigan court issued two per curiam opinions along with a collection of concurring opinions. Falk I; Falk v. State Bar of Michigan, 418 Mich. 270, 342 N.W.2d 504 (1983) ( per curiam) [hereinafter cited as Falk II].
We have no guidance on what interest will meet this criterion: the Michigan Supreme Court, which considered this matter twice, was unable to reach agreement. ( Falk v. State Bar of Michigan (1981) 411 Mich. 63 [ 305 N.W.2d 201] [ Falk I]; Falk v. StateBar of Michigan (1983) 418 Mich. 270 [ 342 N.W.2d 504] [ FalkII], cert. denied (1984) 469 U.S. 925 [83 L.Ed.2d 253, 105 S.Ct. 315].) Such a procedure would be an extraordinary burden.
Just as ".equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights," Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich 63, 113 n 27; 305 NW2d 201 (1981) (RYAN, J., joined by MOODY and FITZGERALD, JJ.) (quotation marks and citations omitted), so does the appellate process. See Lothian v Detroit, 414 Mich 160, 175; 324 NW2d 9 (1982) (denying relief to an appellant who, "wholly apprised of the facts which constituted his cause of action, chose to sleep on his rights until a subsequent appellate court decision roused him to action").
231 et seq. In Falkv.StateBarofMichigan, 411 Mich. 63, 153, 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981) , the petitioner challenged the use of mandatory bar dues “for sponsoring Lawyer Referral, Prepaid Legal Services, Lawyer Placement and the Client Security Fund...." He argued that the expenditures were for private purposes and were not authorized in accordance with Const. 1963, art. 4, § 30 . Falk,supra at 153, 305 N.W.2d 201. Justice WILLIAMS, joined by Chief Justice COLEMAN, opined as follows: As to the first argument that the expenditure of Bar funds for the challenged activities is not for a public purpose we note that petitioner's analysis of the purpose of the Bar program is inadequate.
Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-484; 85 S.Ct. 1678; 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965).Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 111; 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981).California Democratic Party v Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 574; 120 S.Ct. 2402; 147 L.Ed.2d 502 (2000).
Individuals also have no constitutional right to receive any particular governmental benefits. Falk v State Bar of Mich, 411 Mich 63, 107; 305 NW2d 201 (1981) (opinion by RYAN, J.), quoting Elrod v Burns, 427 US 347, 361; 96 S Ct 2673; 49 L Ed 2d 547 (1976). However, under limited circumstances, the government may be prevented from denying a benefit to an individual because that person has exercised a constitutional right; this is known as the "doctrine of unconstitutional conditions."
While we have found that plaintiffs' allegations are sufficient to state a cause of action for a violation of their due process rights, further factual development is necessary to determine the nature and extent of the county policy. Until this further factual development occurs, an evaluation of plaintiffs' claim that defendants have unclean hands is inappropriate.Stachnik v Winkel, 394 Mich. 375, 382, 386; 230 N.W.2d 529 (1975); Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 113, n 27; 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981); Seguin v Madison, 328 Mich. 600, 607; 44 N.W.2d 150 (1950); Rust v Conrad, 47 Mich. 449, 454; 11 N.W. 265 (1882). Thus we do not join in the concurrence's claim, post, p 117, that the ex parte orders can be viewed as a misinterpretation of the requirements of the act or were inartfully drafted.
Moreover, an improperly denominated pleading may be treated as a complaint for an order of superintending control in appropriate circumstances. See Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 86; 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981); People v Wilkins, 121 Mich. App. 813, 817; 329 N.W.2d 500 (1982). The federal courts have recognized a similar procedure to allow prosecutor challenges in the absence of a right of appeal. Federal prosecutor appeals are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which provides in relevant part:
We find no violation of the common-law right of privacy in the contemplated release of names and addresses of public employees to a public employee labor organization. Nor do I read the separate opinion in Falk v State Bar of Michigan, 411 Mich. 63, 161-164; 305 N.W.2d 201 (1981) (WILLIAMS, J., joined by COLEMAN, C.J.), as suggesting that the use of the State Bar membership list for commercial mailings violates the recipient's common-law right of privacy. My colleague's opinion noted that under Rowan v United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728; 90 S Ct 1484; 25 L Ed 2d 736 (1970), the addressee of any advertisement has an absolute right to prevent the sender from further mailings to the named addressee.