Opinion
CIVIL NO. 00-1377 (JP).
October 27, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
The Court has before it co-Defendant Victor Fajardo's ("Fajardo") Motion to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ( docket No. 48), Plaintiffs' Motion requesting Leave to Reply to Motion to Dismiss filed by Victor Fajardo ( docket No. 50), and co-Defendant Fajardo's Motion to Strike (docket No. 52).
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Fajardo's Motion to Dismiss was filed on September 18, 2000. Pursuant to Local Rule 311(5), "[i]f the respondent opposes a motion, he or she shall file a response within (10) days after service of the motion." Id. Therefore, if Plaintiffs intended to oppose the motion to dismiss, they were required to file an opposition to Fajardo's motion on or before October 2, 2000, at the latest, since the ten day time limit to respond included a weekend. On October 19, 2000, a full seventeen (17) days after the deadline to file the opposition, and without offering any explanation for their tardiness, Plaintiffs requested an extension of time of an additional ten (10) days, or until October 27, 2000, in which to oppose co-Defendant Fajardo's Motion to Dismiss. As a practical matter, this Court does not grant extensions in the eleventh hour without just cause. Further, the Initial Scheduling Conference ("ISC") for this case is set for October 31, 2000. At the ISC, the Court records the stipulated facts of the parties, sets the discovery time-table, dispositive motion deadline, and the pre-trial and trial date. All motions to dismiss are customarily decided by the date of the ISC. Therefore, granting an eleventh hour extension would upset the case management schedule of this Court, as it would be a waste of time for the parties and for this Court to schedule discovery when the case may be subject to dismissal. For the aforementioned reasons, the Court GRANTS co-Defendant Fajardo's Motion to Strike. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting Leave to Reply to Motion to Dismiss filed by Victor Fajardo is hereby DENIED.
Turning to the Motion to Dismiss at hand, Plaintiffs Raul Negron Falcon ("Negron") and Maria M. Ayala ("Ayala") filed the instant case on their own behalf, in representation of the conjugal partnership constituted between them, and on behalf of their daughter, Taira Negron Ayala ("Taira"), under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988. They invoked the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1131 and 1343(3). In addition, Plaintiffs claim that this Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) to hear and decide their state law claims. However, Plaintiff's Complaint does not specify their state law cause of action. Plaintiffs seek monetary and punitive damages.
Co-Defendant Fajardo is the Secretary of the Department of Education. He argues that dismissal is warranted in this case because Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim based on supervisory liability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and that Plaintiffs Ayala and Negron lack standing to sue under § 1983.
II. LEGAL STANDARD FOR A MOTION TO DISMISS
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may, in response to an initial pleading, file a motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It is well-settled, however, that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); see also Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F.2d 41 (1st Cir. 1991). The Court must accept as true "all well-pleaded factual averments and indulg[e] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1996) (citations omitted); see also Berrios v. Bristol Myers Squibb Caribbean Corp., 51 F. Supp.2d 61 (D. Puerto Rico 1999) (Pieras, J.). A complaint must set forth "factual allegations, either direct or inferential, regarding each material element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory." Romero-Barcelo v. Hernandez-Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 28 n. 2 (1st Cir. 1996) (quoting Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir. 1988)). The Court, however, need not accept a complaint's "`bald assertions' or legal conclusions" when assessing a motion to dismiss. Abbott, III v. United States, 144 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Shaw v. Digital Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1216 (1st Cir. 1996)). It is with this framework in mind that this Court will assess the motion before it. The Court takes the following allegations as true for purposes of evaluating the instant motion.
III. PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGATIONS
At all relevant times, Taira was a student at the Maria C. Santiago intermediate school, Second Unit, in Comerio, Puerto Rico. On March 18, 1999, Taira attended school and at about 11:30 a.m. went to lunch with some classmates. At that time, Taira noticed a ruckus around the lunch area and observed what she describes as law enforcement officials. Upon noticing numerous people in the area of the disturbance, Taira decided to wait outside the cafeteria until some of the students who were having lunch left the area.
While waiting outside of the cafeteria, Taira acted out with her friends a mock search and seizure. At this time, co-Defendant Maria C. Rodriguez Cora ("Rodriguez"), an official of the school security corps, known in Spanish by its acronym Z.E.L.D.A., approached the group of friends and in a menacing and aggressive manner, grabbed Taira and screamed "[you are] making a show, so now I am going to make a show using you." Rodriguez frisked Taira in front of everyone in the area. She also ordered Taira to remove her sneakers and inspected them as if she were looking for controlled substances. Thereafter, Rodriguez threw the sneakers far away and ordered Taira to return to her classroom. Humiliated and in tears, Taira left the area while Rodriguez followed her and mocked her. Rodriguez performed the detention described above without a search warrant.
Besides Rodriguez and Fajardo, Plaintiffs also sued Puerto Rico Police Superintendent Pedro Toledo Davila ("Toledo"). By Order dated July 7, 2000, this Court dismissed Plaintiffs' claim against Toledo for failure to draw a causal connection between co-Defendant's acts or omissions and Plaintiffs' injuries, and for failure to allege the grounds for supervisory liability.
Fajardo now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs' claims against him, arguing that the Complaint fails to specify which constitutional rights he allegedly violated, and fails to allege a causal connection between him and the alleged deprivation of those rights. In the Complaint Plaintiffs allege that Fajardo,
is liable to plaintiffs, in his individual capacity, for implementing public policy and laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as Secretary of Education, in his official capacity, with respect to school protection, for implementing public policy which promotes illegal searches and seizures and the violation of the civil rights of students, and in particular minor plaintiff Taira Negron; for not implementing a proposed course of action for these type [sic] of incidents in the schools of Puerto Rico; for providing human resources for the `Z.E.L.D.A.' program; for permitting illegal interventions by their police officers without proper authorization or probable cause and for inflicting this type of damages upon children of tender ages, in particular minor plaintiff Taira Negron
(Compl. ¶ 18.) These allegations amount to a claim of supervisory liability against Fajardo. Therefore, the Court must now determine whether Plaintiffs have brought an actionable claim against him under the principles of supervisory liability.
IV. DISCUSSION
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, a section 1983 claim must 1) allege that the conduct complained of was "committed by a person acting under the color of state law," and 2) allege that the "conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1912, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983);see also Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 819 (1st Cir. 1985). Long settled case law holds that supervisory personnel liability in § 1983 cases cannot be brought under the theory of respondeat superior. See Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct 2018, 56 L.Ed 2d 611 (1978); Seekamp v. Michaud, 109 F.3d 802, 808 (1st Cir. 1997; Manrite v. City of Springfield, 957 F.2d 953, 956 (1st Cir. 1992);Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989) In other words, it is insufficient to establish supervisory liability by merely establishing the existence of an employment relationship between a supervisor and a subordinate. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 818, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 2433, 85 L.Ed 2d 791 (1985). Rather, a supervisor's liability under § 1983 is subject to a three part test. First, a plaintiff must show that the supervisor's own acts or omissions deprived the plaintiff of protected rights, Gutierrez-Rodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 562 (1st Cir. 1989); Figueroa v. Aponte-Rogue, 864 F.2d 947, 953 (1st Cir. 1989). Second, the supervisor's conduct or inaction must amount to "a reckless or callous indifference to the constitutional rights of others." Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 562;see also Germany v. Vance, 868 F.2d 9, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1989). Finally, "there must be an `affirmative link' between the street-level misconduct and the action, or inaction, of [the] supervisory official."Gutierrez-Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 562, (quoting Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 371, 96 S.Ct. 598, 604, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976)).
In the complaint, the plaintiff must allege that the supervisor was "personally involved and responsible for the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional rights." Figueroa v. Molina, 725 F. Supp. 651, 653 (D. Puerto Rico 1989). Moreover, the plaintiff must present a scenario that would allow a fact-based inference that the supervisor was guilty of "`conduct that amounted to condonation or tacit authorization' of wrongdoing." Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir. 1999). Upon examining the Complaint, this Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to make the allegations necessary to successfully assert a supervisory liability claim under § 1983.
This Circuit has repeatedly held that in civil rights cases, complaints grounded on mere conclusive statements, unsupported by specific facts as to "who did what to whom and why," will not survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under which relief can be granted. See Gilbert v. City of Cambridge, 932 F.2d 51, 62 (1st Cir. 1991); Correa Martinez v. Arrillaga Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990); Dewey v. University of New Hampshire, 694 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 944, 103 S.Ct. 2121, 77 L.Ed.2d 1301 (1983). Plaintiffs' allegations against Fajardo are merely conclusory because Plaintiff does not allege any specific wrongdoing on Fajardo's part. Further, the Complaint states that co-Defendant Fajardo should be found liable "for negligently training officials who must serve at public schools in Puerto Rico, for providing human resources for the `Z.E.L.D.A.' program; for permitting illegal interventions by their police officers without proper authorization or probable cause and for inflicting this type of damages [sic] upon children of tender ages . . . in particular minor plaintiff Taira Negron." (Comp. ¶ 18.) However, Plaintiffs fail to allege that Fajardo personally participated in the training of Z.E.L.D.A. officers or engaged in grossly negligent behavior toward this program, or even that the harm that Taira suffered resulted from Fajardo's acts, instructions or oversight. The Court can safely assume that, as Secretary of the Department of Education, Fajardo acts through agents and employees and does not necessarily oversee all aspects of training Z.E.L.D.A. officers. See Guzman v. City of Cranston, 812 F.2d 24, 25-26 (1st Cir. 1987)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs state that Fajardo should be held liable for the acts of Rodriguez, including "past negligent and/or intentional actions and/or practices which have injured plaintiffs." (Compl. ¶ 4). However, Plaintiffs do not cite to any specific prior incidents that would lead this Court to believe that co-Defendant Fajardo knew or had any reason to know of co-Defendant Rodriguez's actions. Plaintiffs have not even cited to any of Rodriguez's past actions. Complaints based on civil rights statutes "must at least outline the facts constituting the alleged violations." Goldman v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 607 F.2d 1014, 1018 (1st Cir. 1979). Plaintiffs fail in this endeavor because their allegations of past acts are clearly unsubstantiated and speculative.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS co-Defendant Fajardo's Motion to Dismiss and hereby DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' claims against Co-Defendant Fajardo. As this case has been dismissed on the grounds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court need not address the issues of whether Plaintiffs Negron and Ayala have standing to bring suit against co-Defendant Fajardo on their own behalf, and in representation of their conjugal partnership.
IT IS SO ORDERED.