Summary
rejecting Falby's argument that Peeler did not apply to bar his civil claims against his attorney percely because he was suing percely for failing to file a post-conviction application for writ of habeas corpus, not in connection with his conviction
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No. 09-04-422 CV
Opinion Submitted March 24, 2005.
Delivered May 5, 2005.
On Appeal from the 136th District Court, Jefferson County, Texas, Trial Cause No. D-166,054-A.
Affirmed.
Before GAULTNEY, KREGER and HORTON, J.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Allen J. Falby appeals from a Rule 166a(i) summary judgment. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). He filed a pro se suit against Alan S. Percely and William Satterwhite, Jr. for legal malpractice, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of contract. The trial court granted summary judgment on the malpractice and DTPA claims and denied summary judgment on the negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract claims. The former two causes of action against Percely were severed out and made final for appeal purposes.
In his petition, Falby states he sues for "criminal fraud," along with other causes of action. Both the trial court and Percely interpret the pleadings as alleging legal malpractice, DTPA violations, breach of contract, and negligent misrepresentation.
Falby was convicted of a criminal offense and has exhausted his appeals. Based on another inmate's recommendation, Falby's mother contacted Satterwhite in July 1999 about representing her son on an application for writ of habeas corpus. Falby's petition states Satterwhite told Falby's family that Satterwhite had a law degree, but was not licensed to practice law, and that he worked for the law firm of a licensed attorney. Falby's mother paid Satterwhite a retainer fee along with additional sums. Satterwhite and Falby's brother, Roy, exchanged numerous e-mails about the habeas corpus application. Falby explains Satterwhite was supposed to go to the prison to conduct "legal visits" with Falby, to investigate the case, and to review court records, but Falby says that, as of November 1999, "this never happened." Becoming suspicious, Roy and his mother came to Texas in January 2000 and confronted Satterwhite. He reassured the Falbys, and they paid him another $300.
Appellee's brief recites Falby was convicted of a criminal offense, his conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeals, and his petition for discretionary review was denied by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Falby does not contradict Percely's statement of these facts. See Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(f).
According to Falby, Satterwhite visited him in prison in early 2000. Satterwhite gained entry through a document, signed by Allen Percely, that authorized Satterwhite, as Percely's representative, to visit Falby. The habeas application was not filed by Satterwhite or Percely. Falby says he then filed a state habeas application himself with the aid of a "writ writer," but the application was denied. Falby maintains that because of Satterwhite's negligence (as "facilitated" by Percely) in failing to file a state writ, a deadline for filing a federal writ passed. Percely claims Falby cannot establish either proximate cause or the existence of an attorney-client relationship between Falby and Percely.
Under Rule 166a(i), a party may move for summary judgment if no evidence exists to support one or more essential elements of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. Unless the nonmovant produces more than a scintilla of evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on the challenged elements, the trial court must grant the motion. Sher v. Fun Travel World, Inc., 118 S.W.3d 500, 502 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, no pet.). Less than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence is so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of a fact. Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983). More than a scintilla of evidence exists when the evidence rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 711 (Tex. 1997).
A no-evidence motion for summary judgment is predicated on "adequate time for discovery." See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). Falby argues discovery "has not ceased." Two and one-half years elapsed between the filing of suit and the summary judgment. Discovery was conducted during that time. The no-evidence motion was on file more than one year before the trial court granted the summary judgment. We are unaware of any motion for continuance filed by Falby. The record does not demonstrate time for discovery was inadequate in this case. Issue one is overruled.
As a ground for the Rule 166a(i) motion, Percely contends a plaintiff who has not been exonerated of his crime cannot recover from his defense attorney for legal malpractice. This ground goes to the proximate cause element in a legal malpractice cause of action. See Peeler v. Hughes Luce, 909 S.W.2d 494, 496 (Tex. 1995). Percely relies on Peeler, where the Texas Supreme Court held that a person convicted of a crime may not maintain legal malpractice claims in connection with that conviction unless he has "been exonerated on direct appeal, through post-conviction relief, or otherwise." Id. at 498 (Tex. 1995). Peeler's attorney failed to inform her of the State's offer of transactional immunity prior to trial. Id. at 496. Unaware of the State's offer, Peeler pled guilty and was convicted. Id. Peeler later sued her trial attorney. The Supreme Court said Peeler's own conduct was the sole cause of her indictment and conviction, and "allowing civil recovery for convicts impermissibly shifts responsibility for the crime away from the convict." Id. at 498. Unless the conviction has been overturned, "it is the illegal conduct rather than the negligence of a convict's counsel that is the cause in fact of any injuries flowing from the conviction[.]" Id. at 498.
A legal malpractice cause of action has the following elements: (a) the attorney owed a duty to the plaintiff; (b) the attorney breached the duty; (c) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries; and (4) damages occurred. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 496.
To recover either for legal malpractice or under the DTPA, a plaintiff must prove causation. Id. at 498. Cause-in-fact means the defendant's conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about an injury which would not have otherwise occurred. Id. at 498. Since Peeler had not been exonerated, the Supreme Court held that her illegal acts remained the sole cause of her indictment and conviction as a matter of law. Id. The Court further noted that even if no bar existed to Peeler's malpractice claim, she would still be required at trial to meet the burden of proving all elements of malpractice, including obtaining a fact finding that but for the legal negligence, she would not have been convicted. Id. at 498 n. 3.
Arguing against the application of Peeler, Falby says his conduct is not the cause of his damages. He says that Percely did not represent him in the criminal proceeding, and there is no claim for malpractice or a DTPA violation in relation to that conviction. He argues his suit is not a "calculated attack" on his conviction. Instead, Falby maintains he is suing Percely for failing to file a post-conviction writ, and Percely's inaction is "the sole proximate and producing cause of Appellant's damages." Falby maintains his suit is unrelated to his conviction. Yet the gravamen of his complaint is that he has lost the ability to challenge his conviction through a federal post-conviction writ of habeas corpus because of Percely's negligence. He says he filed a petition for discretionary review but the court refused his petition. Falby also maintains he filed a writ himself with the assistance of a "writ writer." The habeas corpus application, regardless of who filed it, relates to and flows from the conviction.
Peeler's analysis is grounded on public policy. Falby provides no evidence of the basis for the writ he says should have been filed and provides no basis to distinguish Peeler. In Peeler, the Court explained that to allow a malpractice suit against the attorney "merely permits cost-shifting of the consequences of [the] criminal conduct to [the] lawyer." Id. at 498. The Court held a convicted person, unless exonerated, is barred from maintaining a legal malpractice claim for damages flowing from the conviction. Peeler, 909 S.W.2d at 497-498; see also Barnum v. Munson, Munson, Pierce and Cardwell, P.C., 998 S.W.2d 284, 286 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, pet. denied) (Relying on Peeler, the court held that inmate's malpractice suit against attorney appointed to represent him on appeal was barred, because the record contained no evidence Barnum's conviction had been overturned.). Falby's causes of action relate to and flow out of his conviction. Peeler controls this Court's decision. We overrule issues three and four. Because these issues are dispositive of this case, we need not consider issue two. The trial court's judgment is affirmed.