Opinion
CIVIL 3:24-CV-352
04-09-2024
SEAN A. FAIRWEATHER, Plaintiff, v. SPATHELF, et al., Defendants.
Mannion Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Daryl F. Bloom United States Magistrate Judge
I. Factual Background
This case comes before us for a screening review of the prisoner plaintiff's pro se civil complaint. The plaintiff, Sean Fairweather, is an inmate incarcerated in the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) at the State Correctional Institution at Dallas (“SCI Dallas”). Fairweather's civil rights complaint names three defendants and arises out of an April 2023 traffic stop in Scranton, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 6).
Fairweather filed an initial complaint and filed an amended complaint on March 21, 2024. (Docs. 1, 6). Accordingly, we regard Fairweather's amended complaint as the operative pleading.
According to the amended complaint, Fairweather was stopped by Scranton Police Officer Spathelf in April of 2023 for alleged traffic violations. (Doc. 6 ¶¶ 3-5). Fairweather asserts that Spathelf asked for consent to search his vehicle, which Fairweather declined. (Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 11). Spathelf then contacted a K-9 unit and requested they come to the scene. (Id.). After their arrival, Spathelf searched Fairweather's vehicle. (Id.). The amended complaint also asserts that Spathelf pulled a passenger out of Fairweather's vehicle and searched and arrested him. (Id. ¶ 8). Fairweather claims that Spathelf did not find anything during the search. (Id. ¶ 11). Fairweather alludes to a similar traffic stop in May of 2017, allegedly performed by Spathelf, which also involved Defendants Thomas, a former Scranton Police officer, and Ossont, an assistant district attorney. (Id. ¶¶ 8, 11, 14). Fairweather brings his claims against Spathelf, Thomas, and Ossont, alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as a state law claim of defamation. (Id. ¶¶ 16-17, 22).
Along with this complaint, Fairweather filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 4). After consideration, we will grant Fairweather's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and after a screening review, we recommend that this amended complaint be served on Defendant Spathelf as to the Fourth Amendment claim against him but that the remaining claims be dismissed.
II. Discussion
A. Screening of Pro Se Complaints - Standard of Review
We have a statutory obligation to preliminarily review pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). We review such complaints to determine whether there are frivolous or malicious claims, or if the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Id. This statutory preliminary screening mirrors review under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides for dismissal of a complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this legal benchmark, under federal pleading standards a plaintiff is required to set forth a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In determining whether a complaint states a claim for relief under this pleading standard, a court must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), and accept “all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them after construing them in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court is not required to accept legal conclusions or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”).
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has aptly summarized:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Id. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 1950. In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement with its facts. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35. As the Supreme Court instructed in Iqbal, “[w]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. This “plausibility” determination will be “a context-specific task that requires
the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id.Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2009).
Generally, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court relies on the complaint and its attached exhibits, as well as matters of public record. Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007). A court can also consider “undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attached as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Additionally, if the complaint relies on the contents of a document not physically attached to the complaint but whose authenticity is not in dispute, the court may consider such document in its determination. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However, the court may not rely on any other part of the record when deciding a motion to dismiss. Jordan, 20 F.3d at 1261.
Finally, when reviewing a pro se complaint, we are reminded that such complaints are to be construed liberally, “so ‘as to do substantial justice.'” Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(f)). We must apply the relevant law even if the pro se plaintiff does not mention it by name. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002)).
B. This Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted Against Defendants Thomas and Ossont.
At the outset, the amended complaint appears to assert claims against former Scranton Police officer Thomas and ADA Ossont arising out of a May 2017 search. However, any such claims would be barred by the statute of limitations. The statute of limitations for § 1983 claims mirror the state's statute of limitations for personal injury claims. Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 639 (3d Cir. 2009). In Pennsylvania, this limitations period is two years from the date the cause of action accrued. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. The limitations period begins to run “when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Kach, 589 F.3d at 634) (quotations omitted).
Fairweather did not file the instant matter until February 29, 2024, more than six years after the alleged illegal search in May of 2017. Accordingly, any claims arising out of that alleged illegal search involving Defendants Thomas and Ossont would be barred by the two-year statute of limitations and should be dismissed.
Further, to the extent Fairweather's complaint attempts to implicate these two defendants in the April 2023 search, there is no indication that either of these individuals was involved in the search. It is well settled that liability under § 1983 requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant had personal involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1988). Personal involvement may be shown through allegations regarding the defendant's own conduct, or that the defendant had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the behavior. Id. Here, other than a vague assertion that the April 2023 traffic stop was reminiscent of the May 2017 traffic stop, the complaint fails to assert any allegations that either Thomas or Ossont were involved in the April 2023 stop and subsequent search. Accordingly, we cannot conclude that these defendants were personally involved, and any constitutional claims against them should be dismissed.
C. The Complaint Adequately States a Fourth Amendment Claim Against Defendant Spathelf.
As to Fairweather's allegations against Defendant Spathelf, we conclude that Fairweather has adequately pleaded a claim of an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend IV; Brower v. Cnty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 595 (1989). To state a Fourth Amendment claim, a plaintiff must plead facts to show that “the defendants' actions (1) constituted a ‘search' or ‘seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and (2) were ‘unreasonable' in light of the surrounding circumstances.” Open Inns, Ld. V. Chester Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 24 F.Supp.2d 410, 424 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (citations omitted). This prohibition typically requires the police to obtain a warrant prior to conducting a search or an arrest. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 136 (2009). However, police may search a vehicle without a warrant “if there is ‘probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime.'” United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1123 (3d Cir. 1991)).
In this case, Fairweather's amended complaint alleges that Spathelf approached Fairweather's vehicle as Fairweather was parked outside of his residence, alleging that Fairweather had run through nine stop signs. He then claims that Spathelf called for a K-9 unit and searched his car without a warrant and without probable cause after Fairweather declined to give Spathelf consent to search. The amended complaint further asserts that the search yielded no evidence of a crime. Thus, liberally construed and accepting the plaintiff's allegations as true, we conclude that Fairweather has pleaded facts from which we can infer that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by Spathelf.
D. The Remainder of Fairweather's Claims Fail as a Matter of Law.
While we have concluded that Fairweather's Fourth Amendment claim against Spathelf survives, the remaining claims asserted in the amended complaint fail as a matter of law.
Fairweather vaguely asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated. However, rather than alleging facts sufficient to support a procedural or substantive due process claim, Fairweather's claims arise out of the alleged Fourth Amendment violation. Thus, any Fourteenth Amendment claim is barred by the more-specific-provision rule and should be dismissed. United States v Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997) (“[I]f a constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision ... the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process.”).
The plaintiff also attempts to assert a claim of defamation against Spathelf, alleging that his landlord was disturbed by the incident, and that Spathelf called the plaintiff's parole officer and referred to the plaintiff as a known drug dealer. (Doc. 6 ¶ 12). Under Pennsylvania law, to state a claim for defamation, a plaintiff must show:
(1) the defamatory character of the communication; (2) its publication by the defendant; (3) its application to the plaintiff; (4) the understanding by the recipient of its defamatory meaning; (5) the understanding by the recipient of it as intended to be applied to the plaintiff; (6) special harm resulting to the plaintiff from its publication; and (7) abuse of a conditionally privileged occasion.Reed v Pray, 53 A.3d 134, 140 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) (citation omitted); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8343. Importantly, an action for defamation requires some communication, either oral or written, by the defendant. Rossi v. Schlarbaum, 600 F.Supp.2d 650, n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (noting that “defamation has two forms: slander (oral defamation) and libel (written defamation).”).
Here, to the extent that Fairweather is claiming that the act of searching his car, which was allegedly disturbing to his landlord, constituted defamation, he has not alleged any communication between Spathelf and the landlord that could have been defamatory. Accordingly, any such claim fails. Fairweather also alleges that Spathelf contacted Fairweather's parole officer the day after the search and referred to Fairweather as a known drug dealer. However, Fairweather's amended complaint contains no allegations of harm stemming from this communication. Rather, Fairweather's allegations appear to assert that the harm he suffered was a result of his landlord observing the search, as he alleges that he was unable to use his landlord as a reference following the encounter with Spathelf. Accordingly, we conclude that Fairweather has not pleaded sufficient facts to state a claim against Spathelf for defamation, and his defamation claims should be dismissed.
However, while we have concluded that several claims in Fairweather's complaint fail as a matter of law, recognizing that the plaintiff is pro se, we recommend that these claims be dismissed without prejudice to afford Fairweather an opportunity to amend his complaint to endeavor to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007); Alston v Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004).
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff's amended complaint (Doc. 6) be DISMISSED as to Defendants Thomas and Ossont, as well as to his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law defamation, but that these claims be dismissed without prejudice to the plaintiff endeavoring to correct the defects cited in this report, provided that the plaintiff acts within 20 days of any dismissal order. IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED THAT the amended complaint should be served on Defendant Spathelf as to the Fourth Amendment claim against him.
The parties are further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination because of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.