Opinion
September 28, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Saladino, J.).
Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,
Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as cross-appealed from, and the branch of the defendant's motion which was to strike the plaintiffs' interrogatories and notice to produce is granted; and it is further,
Ordered that the defendant is awarded one bill of costs.
A partner in the law firm representing the plaintiffs in this action played a central role in the negotiations which resulted in the loan agreement that is at the center of this dispute. This attorney made certain averments in various documents which, in combination with the express terms of the loan agreement, clearly demonstrates that his testimony "may be prejudicial" to the plaintiffs when he is called to testify by the defendant (see, Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-102 [B] [ 22 NYCRR 1200.21 (b)]). We therefore conclude that the Supreme Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in disqualifying the plaintiff's law firm (see, People v Amato, 173 A.D.2d 714, 716, cert denied ___ US ___, 112 S Ct 935).
We find that the Supreme Court improperly denied the branch of the defendant's motion which was to strike the plaintiffs' interrogatories and notice to produce, since the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that any of the material in question is relevant to their case (see, CPLR 3101 [a]; Ritchie v Carvel Corp., 180 A.D.2d 788; Crazytown Furniture v Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 150 A.D.2d 420; Lopez v Huntington Autohaus, 150 A.D.2d 351). Bracken, J.P., Sullivan, Harwood and Lawrence, JJ., concur.