Opinion
NO. 2017 CA 1512
06-04-2018
JESSE DARREL FAIRCHILD AND WALTER LANCE FAIRCHILD v. JOSEPH LAYNE ORILLION AND POINTE COUPEE PARISH POLICE JURY
CY J. D'AQUILA, JR. NEW ROADS, LA ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES JESSE DARREL FAIRCHILD AND WALTER LANCE FAIRCHILD WILLIAM C. SHOCKEY BRADLEY C. STIDHAM BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT JOSEPH LAYNE ORILUON WILLIAM C. HELM BATON ROUGE, LA AND JOHN WAYNE JEWELL NEW ROADS, LA ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE POINTE COUPEE PARISH POLICE JURY
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION Appealed from the 18t Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Pointe Coupee, State of Louisiana
Trial Court No. 44,118
Honorable Bruce C. Bennett, Judge CY J. D'AQUILA, JR.
NEW ROADS, LA ATTORNEY FOR
PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES
JESSE DARREL FAIRCHILD AND
WALTER LANCE FAIRCHILD WILLIAM C. SHOCKEY
BRADLEY C. STIDHAM
BATON ROUGE, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
JOSEPH LAYNE ORILUON WILLIAM C. HELM
BATON ROUGE, LA
AND
JOHN WAYNE JEWELL
NEW ROADS, LA ATTORNEYS FOR
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE
POINTE COUPEE PARISH POLICE
JURY BEFORE: GUIDRY, PETTIGREW, AND CRAIN, JJ. PETTIGREW, J.
Judge Bruce C. Bennett, retired, served as judge ad hoc by special appointment of the Louisiana Supreme Court, for Judge James J. Best who heard and ruled in the case, pending the election of Judge Best's successor following retirement.
This matter is before us on appeal from a judgment of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court in Pointe Coupee Parish. Plaintiffs, Jesse Darrel Fairchild and Walter Lance Fairchild, filed the instant possessory action against defendants, Joseph Layne Orillion and Pointe Coupee Parish Police Jury ("Police Jury"), seeking to have the boundary between the Fairchild property and Orillion property judicially determined and requesting damages for alleged trespass and injunctive relief. Following a bench trial, the trial court found merit in the Fairchilds' acquisitive prescription claim. Orillion appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Fairchilds filed this possessory action in August 2011 asserting a disturbance in their possession of two tracts of property located in Pointe Coupee Parish. The record reflects that the Fairchilds and Orillion own contiguous tracks of land that share a boundary, running east and west along a drainage canal known as canal M-18, which separates the Fairchilds' land to the north and Orillion's land to the south. Canal M-18 was straight at one time, but now has a small strip of land lying south of canal M-18 ("the disputed property") with a deviation or curve caused by a mineral producer. The Fairchilds maintained a barbed-wire fence on the south bank of canal M-18 and grazed cattle up to the fence line. The Fairchilds' ancestors-in-title and the Orillions granted the Police Jury a servitude to construct, operate, and maintain canal M-18.
In their petition, the Fairchilds asserted that they and their ancestors-in-title had been in continuous, peaceful, uninterrupted possession of this property, including the disputed property, for more than thirty years, and that defendants had disturbed their possession by cutting and destroying trees located on their property. The Fairchilds contended that Orillion and the Police Jury trespassed on their land, uprooting trees and removing soil from their property and placing the removed timber and soil on the Orillion property. The Fairchilds asked the trial court to fix the boundary according to the visible bounds that once existed, the barbed-wire fence. The Fairchilds also sought a temporary restraining order to enjoin the Police Jury and Orillion from any further work on their property that would further destroy the trees that had been removed or disturb their possession. Orillion filed a reconventional demand, seeking to have the boundary fixed in accordance with title and possession. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order and subsequently granted a preliminary injunction.
Following a bench trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment June 29, 2017, in favor of the Fairchilds, finding the Fairchilds to be in possession of the disputed property and setting the boundary between the Fairchild property and the Orillion property in accordance with the survey of James H. Chustz, Jr., dated June 1, 2017, i.e., exactly where the barbed-wire fence was. The trial court denied the Fairchilds' claims for damages. From this judgment, Orillion appeals, asserting the trial court erred in: 1) finding that the Fairchilds possessed the disputed property; 2) finding that the Fairchilds have a right to possess the disputed property; 3) excluding Roland F. Dugas, Ill's testimony; 4) failing to find that the Fairchilds began as precarious possessors of the disputed property; 5) failing to find the Fairchilds have acknowledged Orillion's ownership of the disputed property; 6) finding that the Fairchilds acquired the disputed property by acquisitive prescription; and 7) rejecting Orillion's reconventional demand to fix the boundary of the disputed property per title.
Because we find that the Fairchilds have proven acquisitive prescription in the instant matter and that the boundary was properly "fixed according to limits established by prescription rather than titles," see La. Civ. Code art. 794, we need not discuss the issue raised by Orillion concerning the trial court's rejection of his reconventional demand. --------
DISCUSSION
Proffered Testimony/Precarious Possession
(Assignment of Errors Nos. 3 and 4)
We first consider the only procedural issue presented for our review. During trial, counsel for Orillion attempted to tender Roland F. Dugas, III as a "Petroleum Landman" expert, at which time counsel for the Fairchilds lodged an objection to relevance. The following exchange occurred concerning the purpose of Dugas' testimony:
THE COURT:
You wish to be heard briefly?
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Absolutely, because possession -- just possession alone doesn't satisfy the test 'cause possession must have certain characteristics. For example, it must be continuous. It cannot be clandestine. It must be unequivocal, and it cannot begin as precarious possession.
Now, our claim is the possession of the property north of the -- or in the curve began as precarious possession by the oil company; hence, it remained precarious possession.
So, the whole purpose of this witness' testimony is to establish why the possession began of that curve, if you will; how that possession began; how that property wound up on the north side of the canal, rather than on the south side of the canal where historically, it belonged.
THE COURT:
The property's the property; the canal changed. The question would be, if it's relevant, why did the canal drop below where - where it is?
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Absolutely; that's what I'm talking about, and that -- the possession -- what started -- there was an oil well, the testimony -- there was an oil well at that site, okay, and of course, the site was possessed by Texaco, the oil company, and the Fairchilds are attempting to capitalize upon a possession that began - that started with an oil company that held a lease from both landowners. So, therefore, the possession could not be adverse to the Austins, who are Mr. Orillion's ancestors in title, because it was possession being exercised by their lessee.
THE COURT:
I don't know whether this Court accepts your - your argument on this -- ... issue as to -- regarding the significance of precarious possession or not -- ... but I'm going to allow it in, because if I don't, then I will not have that information to consider if the Court determines -- I - I can tell you, this is gonna all boil down to the - the state of the law -- ... -- in this. I can tell you that at this point in time. I knew that from [the] get-go. Then I can consider it for what it's worth. I'm not saying I agree or disagree with your - your argument that -- how precarious possession fits in. ... But if I don't listen to it, and if it goes up on that issue and it's sent back down, I'll be hearing it. So I'll take it for what it's worth.
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
All right.
THE COURT:
I'll give it the weight I think it is -- deemed appropriate, and I can tell y'all right now, at this point in time, I'm going to -- when we finish this trial, I'm gonna take it under advisement and ask y'all to brief it, because this is very law intensive.
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Right.
THE COURT:
So, I'm going to -- and - and use what I think is - is best judgment in this tedious situation or argument that we're having, and to allow it in, and I'll - I'll deal with it in due course.
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:At that point, counsel for the Fairchilds asked for an opportunity to voir dire Dugas regarding his expertise. After asking Dugas some questions concerning the data on which his opinion was based, counsel for the Fairchilds asked for an opportunity to review the data on which Dugas was basing his expert opinion such that an adequate cross-examination could be formulated. The trial court agreed with the request, and Dugas was recalled to the stand the following day.
Okay.
THE COURT:
So the objection and the reasons, I'm going to allow it in.
As soon as Dugas took the stand, counsel for the Fairchilds re-urged the objection as to relevance as follows:
[COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS]:
Yes, sir. I was -- I was about to lodge the same objection that I had made yesterday, and/or ask the Court that he -- that the Court limit the testimony of Mr. Dugas.
I have reviewed all of the documentation provided to me by Mr. Dugas, and - and in - in the sense that when - when asked yesterday, I know that he was being called to testify as to how this deviation could have possibly occurred, and according to Mr. Dugas, and according to the - the evidence that I've looked at, there's no -- there's no document, there's no written evidence; there's nothing that can tend to prove or show how the deviation occurred, and with - with that said, as Mr. Dugas told me yesterday, he would be making an assumption as to how that deviation occurred. There's no concrete evidence of showing how that deviation did occur. There's no documentation or evidence, and he's been offered as an expert in the -- in the, I guess, the land title, petroleum title field, and I don't think within that -- I mean, I don't think any - any -- no person could make an assumption as to how this deviation occurred, and it be regarded as an expert opinion and accepted by this Court as an expert opinion.
Clearly, if Texaco said -- has documentation that hey, yes; we - we diverted this fence and this canal or this ditch, and you know -- and they had some type of writing or somebody from Texaco that was actually there did it, would be a different story, but I'm requesting that this Court limit his opinion as to his theory as to how or - or his assumption as to how that deviation occurred.
THE COURT:
I'm listening to your -- to your concern, and I'm trying to figure out what is it about what he will likely say, and if we just jump ahead, 'cause I think we all anticipate that what he will likely say is that he may have an opinion or it may be an assumption that the - the -- once -- that the canal was once straight, and the reason why it has a dogleg in it is because they that was before directional drilling.
Now, we know today, they can be a couple of miles away, and with directional drilling, they can go up under your - your place, and - and get minerals, but obviously, at that point in time, that was before directional drilling. So, they needed to get straight down on that canal.
I'm not sure -- I'm just curious to know how that -- if he said that, if that was the reason why the canal was moved, how that would affect your case on acquisitive prescription which is the - the issue here, and that -- you know what I'm saying? Just --
[COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS]:
It - it doesn't and it's also irrelevant.
THE COURT:
But sometimes the most interesting evidence a Court can get is irrelevant evidence (laughing), if you wanted to liven up a trial.
Okay. So, listen, I - I hear your objection. So you -- you're kind of -- [counsel for Orillion], I appreciate what his --
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Uh-huh.
THE COURT:
-- concern is, and it's his concern, and I --
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
I understand.
THE COURT:
-- and I have -- must give credence to his concern as a Judge. Is - is that what you're going to do with your client? Is he gonna make some assumption that is not supported in the documents, and he's gonna take a leap of faith and jump a few chains in the -- in the evidence and say, the canal was moved because they put an oil well there?
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
He's going to state certain facts, okay, based upon the historical record.
THE COURT:
And no assumptions?
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
And - and then, it's -- from those facts, it's gonna be your job, Judge, to determine what the conclusion is to reach from those facts. He's not gonna offer an opinion that - that -- of why the curve is in the canal. He's gonna provide us certain facts.
THE COURT:
But not to why the canal is crooked, or that it was once straight?
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Those - those facts relate to that. Okay. It would be relevant to that question, but I haven't asked him to - to offer an opinion in that regard.
THE COURT:
Okay. So - so this is the ruling of the Court, with reasons. Matter submitted for a ruling on the Court on the issue of --
[COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS]:
Yes, sir, Your Honor.
THE COURT:
Okay. The - the Court is going to sustain the objection to relevance. You can -- will proffer the testimony. I know you wanted -- you offered to do that yesterday; I think it was this witness, and here's why: I don't think why the canal -- if it was once straight, I don't know, but why it was moved, it -- I don't think is relevant to whether or not this Court is satisfied that that fence and - and the configuration is -- it is where it is, and why it is where it is, is not an issue that is determinative of as to whether or not the Fairchilds have adversely possessed the property or not. That doesn't have anything to do, in my opinion, of why it was moved, and that's the ruling of the Court.
Now, I'm gonna allow you to proffer it, and if I'm --
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
Uh-huh.
THE COURT:
-- wrong, then it'll be in the record --
[COUNSEL FOR ORILLION]:
All right.
The decision to admit or exclude expert testimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its judgment will not be disturbed by an appellate court unless it is clearly erroneous. See La. Code Evid. art. 702, comment (d); Nitcher v. Northshore Regional Medical Center, 2011-1761 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/2/12), 92 So.3d 1001, 1006, writ denied, 2012-1230 (La. 9/21/12), 98 So.3d 342. Given the trial court's observations and our review of the record, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination regarding Dugas' testimony and leave its ruling undisturbed. These assignments of error lack merit. Possession/Acquisitive Prescription
(Assignments of Error Nos. 1, 2, and 6)
Arguing that the Fairchilds were required to prove continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal possession, Orillion contends on appeal that the Fairchilds offered proof of occupancy, but not possession, of the disputed property. Moreover, Orillion maintains that to the extent that the Fairchilds were ever in possession of the disputed property, their possession had been interrupted from 2009 to the filing of the suit in August 2011 when they erected a three-strand electric fence on the north side of canal M-18 in January 2009, making the disputed property inaccessible. Thus, Orillion asserts, pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 3422 and La. Code Civ. P. art. 3658, the Fairchilds did not acquire the right to possess the disputed property and could not maintain the possessory action.
In response, the Fairchilds argue that there is no evidence in the record that anyone other than them or their ancestors-in-title have ever possessed the disputed property or exercised any acts of possession on the disputed property for fifty plus years. The Fairchilds further contend that they never abandoned their possession of the disputed property, which possession they have proven by thirty years acquisitive prescription. Based on our review of the record before us, we agree with the Fairchilds.
An owner or one who possesses as owner may bring an action to have the boundary of his property judicially fixed. La. Civ. Code arts. 786 and 789. Pursuant to La. Civ. Code art. 794, where a party possesses property beyond his title for thirty years without interruption and within visible bounds, the boundary shall be fixed along those bounds. See Secret Cove, L.L.C. v. Thomas, 2002-2498 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/7/03), 862 So.2d 1010, 1015, writ denied, 2004-0447 (La. 4/2/04), 869 So.2d 889. Thus, where a party proves acquisitive prescription, the boundary shall be fixed according to the limits established by acquisitive prescription rather than by titles. La. Civ. Code art. 794.
Under the general codal provisions governing acquisitive prescription, a possessor lacking just title may acquire prescriptive title to land by corporeally possessing a tract for thirty years with the intent to possess as owner. Such possession confers prescriptive title upon the possessor only when it is continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal; further, such possession confers title only to such immovable property as is actually corporeally possessed. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3424, 3426, 3476, and 3487; George M. Murrell Planting & Mfg. Co. v. Dennis, 2006-1341 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/21/07), 970 So.2d 1075, 1080.
For purposes of acquisitive prescription without title, possession extends only to that which has been actually possessed. La. Civ. Code art. 3487; George M. Murrell Planting & Mfg. Co., 970 So.2d at 1080. Actual possession must be either inch-by-inch possession or possession within enclosures. An enclosure is any natural or artificial boundary. La. Civ. Code art. 3426, 1982 Revision Comments, comment (d). The party who does not hold title to the disputed tract has the burden of proving actual possession within enclosures sufficient to establish the limits of possession with certainty, by either natural or artificial marks, giving notice to the world of the extent of possession exercised. George M. Murrell Planting & Mfg. Co., 970 So2d at 1080-1081.
Whether a party has possessed property for purposes of thirty-year acquisitive prescription is a factual determination by the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong. Additionally, boundary location is a question of fact, and the determination of its location by the trial court should not be reversed absent manifest error. Secret Cove, L.L.C., 862 So.2d at 1016.
After considering the testimony and documentary evidence presented by the parties, the trial court in the instant case determined that the Fairchilds had proven their possession of the disputed property:
So, this Court finds that on the possession of the Fairchilds' of the property, that considering the evidence and there's two areas of evidence that this Court is leaning on that I find satisfies this Court by a preponderance of the evidence, that is the testimony of the Fairchilds that they possess the property where the fence line existed at the time it was removed.
There was testimony that was believable and unrefuted that for more than thirty years, that the Fairchilds themselves, the Plaintiffs and their Ancestors-in-Title, that fence was there. The cattle grazed to the fence, albeit they had to get in the canal to get to the fence for the most part, except for a dogleg at the western end of the canal, which this Court finds interesting that these parties would actually labor over that small, small ground.
There was a small ground, that a very tired and hungry cow could stand on flat ground and browse in some briars on the -- on the south side of the canal, but on the north side of the fence. I believed it, it was unrefuted and the time was there.
The second point is that I heard testimony from the witnesses, it was unrefuted, that barbed wire's been there way longer than thirty years. Like one of them said, "Trees don't lie." That fence was there, it was embedded
in there, they did the research. They cut the trees, they looked at the rings. The wire was there all that time, enough -- more than enough for acquisitive prescription.
. . . .
Now, the Court must fix the boundary line, I'm also called upon to do that. Now, I know there's a canal, but I didn't see any cases or it wasn't argued that if it's on a canal or a street or something, I mean, you've got to fix it. But, in my opinion and y'all got those -- y'all have got those maps.
The line is going to be exactly where the fence was and I think for at least half of it, except for the dogleg, it was exactly where the property lines were, except for the dogleg. So, if it inconveniences somebody that that fence might be a few feet on Mr. Orillion's property, that's the ruling of the Court that I'm making for reasons stated. But, the other -- and if it's in the canal where you can't put up a fence, I'm sorry, also.
Your clients were called upon to fix this themselves. They are neighbors, they couldn't do it. So, as a Judge, I'm not going to put it all on the Orillion's side, and inconvenience them and I certainly don't want to go on the other side. But, the easiest decision for me to make is that you get that the property prescription, but wherever that line is.
Now, I don't know how you're going to build a fence that's going to be on the edge of a canal in a canal, but that's not this Court's problem. That's why I would have -- as I'm thinking about this, I would have hoped that they would have thought about this, so I don't know, but look, y'all presented a good case and argument, I've labored over this long enough, that's the ruling of the Court. I've given my reasons orally.
After a thorough review of the evidence in this case, we find the trial court's determination that prescriptive title was conferred upon the Fairchilds, based on a factual finding of thirty years of corporeal possession by the Fairchilds and their ancestors-in-title, is amply supported by the testimony and documentary evidence of record herein. Specifically, the trial court relied on the testimony of Darrel Fairchild and Walter Fairchild, who both testified that when they were children, they would ride the property with their grandfather, checking the cattle. Darrel testified that canal M-18, which began as a ditch, has been there for many, many years, and was becoming a canal because of the way the erosion is taking place. Darrel stated that as a young child, he can remember riding around canal M-18 and that the fence was on the southern border of the canal. He explained that they worked the property, repairing the fence as needed to contain the cattle and cutting, raking, and bailing hay. Darrel indicated that there was a headland on the south side of canal M-18 and that the cattle could walk in the canal and graze up the bank to the fence line. According to Darrel, the fence had been on the south side of the canal, i.e., on the Orillion property, at all times; there had never been a fence on the north side of the canal.
Darrel testified that it had always been his understanding that the property line between the Fairchild property and the Orillion property was the fence line on the southern border. Darrel maintained that no one other than him, Walter, or persons acting on their behalf, had ever attempted to show physical acts of possession of the disputed property. With regard to the electric fence on the property, Darrel indicated that it was erected after Hurricane Gustav in August or September 2008.
With regard to the work done by the Police Jury, Darrel stated that he was surprised that the Police Jury was going to clean the fence line because his family had not been contacted about work being done from their side of the canal. He was under the impression that the Police Jury was only going to clean up the Orillion property, up to the tree line. However, when Darrel returned to the canal "a couple of weeks or a week or so" later, "the trees were all in a pile, [and] there was no fence on the southern bank." He added there were "no trees left, maybe one or two and it was done." According to Darrel, when the Police Jury stopped working on the canal, the southern bank of the canal had been cleaned out; the trees and the fence on the southern bank of the canal had been removed. The deviation in the canal, however, had not been straightened.
Walter testified that he started helping his grandfather with the actual repair of the fence on the property in 1971. He recalled going to the property every weekend as a child and riding his dirt bike on the "cow trails, up and down the ditches." Walter indicated this was before the Police Jury came in and dug out the drainage canal. When asked about the boundary line between the Fairchild property and the Orillion property, the following colloquy occurred:
[BY COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS] Okay. Other than the temporary [electric] fence that you put up in 2009, was there ever a fence on the north side of Canal M18?
[BY WALTER] There never was a fence on the north side.
[BY COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS] As far as you know, what is the boundary line between your property and Mr. Orillion's property?Walter explained that the three-strand electric fence was just a temporary fence that he put up after Hurricane Gustav "tore all [his] other fences up." According to Walter, Orillion approached him about the Police Jury cleaning the south side of the fence row. Orillion told Walter that if anything happened to the fence during the work done by the Police Jury, he would repair the fence "[w]here it stood." Walter stated that no one from the Police Jury ever contacted him about working on the north side of the canal.
[BY WALTER] That would be the fence on the south side of the canal, including the deviation.
[BY COUNSEL FOR THE FAIRCHILDS] Right, because the fence ran around the deviation?
[BY WALTER] Right.
The trial court also heard from Edward Daniel, an expert witness who testified in the field of forestry. Daniel indicated that he was able to determine how long the fence had been on the property by looking at the markings left on the trees by the wires. Daniel testified that based on his calculations, he was able to determine that wire had been in one tree for in excess of thirty-five years and in another tree for in excess of fifty years.
Orillion testified that he asked the Police Jury to come out and clean the servitude. He acknowledged that it was upon his request that the Police Jury then decided to straighten out the deviation in the canal. Orillion explained that while he always believed that the property line was the fence line, it was not until the Police Jury began their work and the property was surveyed that he realized the property line may be different.
Considering the factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial court, we decline to disturb the trial court's determination that the Fairchilds and their ancestors-in-title have been in possession of the disputed property "where the fence line existed at the time it was removed" and that the Fairchilds were entitled to judgment "fixing" the boundary between the Fairchild property and the Orillion property as shown on the Chustz plat. Accordingly, we find no merit to these assignments of error. Acknowledgment
(Assignment of Error No. 5)
By this assignment, Orillion argues that should this court decide that the Fairchilds have possessed the disputed property and have the right to possess it, such possession has been interrupted on multiple occasions and cannot serve as the basis for fixing the boundary at the location of the fence by acquisitive prescription. Orillion maintains that the Fairchilds and their ancestors-in-title have repeatedly and consistently acknowledged, in multiple legal documents, that the southern boundary of the Fairchilds' property is the straight line shown initially on the Hargrave Plat. In response, the Fairchilds argue that "the mere fact that the various acts of conveyance of the [Fairchild] property do not contain any language that would show the entirety of the disputed portion, it is not enough to interrupt acquisitive prescription." The Fairchilds maintain that they and their ancestors-in-title have possessed the disputed property for more than thirty years.
Acquisitive prescription is interrupted by the filing of suit, by acknowledgment, or when possession is lost. See La. Civ. Code art. 3462; La. Civ. Code art. 3464; La. Civ. Code art. 3465. As pertinent to Orillion's claim, Article 3464, provides that: "Prescription is interrupted when one acknowledges the right of the person against whom he had commenced to prescribe."
Pertinent to this matter in which the Fairchilds assert ownership strictly by acquisitive prescription, La. Civ. Code art. 3486 provides that: "Ownership and other real rights in immovables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the need of just title or possession in good faith." Additionally, "[f]or purposes of acquisitive prescription without title, possession extends only to that which has been actually possessed." La. Civ. Code art. 3487. Central to the defendant's inquiry in the second component of this assignment of error, which addresses the nature of the plaintiffs' possession, La. Civ. Code art. 3476 describes the attributes of possession as follows: 'The possessor must have corporeal possession, or civil possession preceded by corporeal possession, to acquire a thing by prescription. The possession must be continuous, uninterrupted, peaceable, public, and unequivocal." The party claiming acquisitive prescription has the burden of proving such possession and must establish that he or she intended to possess the property as owner. See Crowell Land & Mineral Corp. v. Funderburk, 96-1123 (La. App. 3 Cir, 3/5/97), 692 So.2d 535, 537. A trial court's finding regarding possession is a factual determination that will not be disturbed on review unless manifestly erroneous. Id.
As previously discussed, we are in agreement with the trial court's finding that the Fairchilds and their ancestors-in-title have possessed the disputed property up to the fence line for in excess of thirty years. These factual findings by the trial court are not manifestly erroneous, and we decline to disturb them on review. Based on our review of the evidence and applicable law, we find no acknowledgment by the Fairchilds such that acquisitive prescription would be interrupted. See Brooking v. Vegas, 2003-1114 (La. App. 3 Cir. 2/4/04), 866 So.2d 370, 373, writ denied, 2004-0577 (La. 4/30/04), 872 So.2d 491 (fact that adjacent property owners conducted surveys, both indicating that the fence line was not the boundary, was not sufficient to interrupt prescription when it was clear from the record that owners claiming acquisitive prescription continued to possess the land up to the fence line). Accordingly, Orillion's arguments regarding acknowledgement are without merit.
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's June 29, 2017 judgment. We assess all costs associated with this appeal against defendant, Joseph Layne Orillion.