Opinion
Case No. 3:12-cv-387
02-14-2014
JENNIFER FAIRCHILD Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
Judge Thomas M. Rose
Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
ENTRY AND ORDER OVERRULING FAIRCHILD'S OBJECTIONS (Doc.
#16) TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS; ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (Doc. #15) IN ITS ENTIRETY;
AFFIRMING THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT FAIRCHILD
WAS DISABLED AS OF JANUARY 19, 2011, BUT NOT BEFORE, AND
TERMINATING THIS CASE
Jennifer Fairchild ("Fairfield") brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the decision of the Defendant Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") that she was disabled as of January 19, 2011, but not before. Fairchild argues that she was disabled as of her onset date or, at the very least, April of 2008 when her condition worsened.
On January 9, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman entered a Report and Recommendations (doc. #15) recommending that the Commissioner's decision that Fairchild was disabled as of January 19, 2011, but not before, be affirmed. Fairchild subsequently filed Objections. (Doc. #16.) The time has run and the Commissioner has not responded to Fairchild's Objections. This matter is, therefore, ripe for decision.
Fairchild sought financial assistance from the Social Security Administration by applying for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") in June of 2007, and for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") in October of 2008. Fairchild claimed that she was disabled due to muscle weakness of the upper and lower extremities, headaches, neuropathy with arthritis and depression.
The Commissioner denied Bubeck's application initially and on reconsideration. Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Thomas McNichols ("McNichols") held a hearing following which he determined that Fairchild was disabled as of January 19, 2011, but not before. The Appeals Council denied Fairchild's request for review and ALJ McNichols' decision became the Commissioner's final decision. Fairchild then appealed to this Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
As required by 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 72(b), the District Judge has made a de novo review of the record in this case. Based upon the reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (doc. #15) and in Fairchild's Objections (doc. #16), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court's file and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in its entirety and, in so doing affirms the Commissioner's decision that Fairchild is disabled as of January 19, 2011, but not before.
This Court's function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. Bowen v. Commissioner of Social Security, 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). This Court must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria. Id.
Regarding the substantial evidence requirement, the ALJ's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citing Consolidated Edison Company v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401; Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the ALJ/Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
The second judicial inquiry - reviewing the ALJ's legal criteria - may result in reversal even if the record contains substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's factual findings. See Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. A reversal based on the ALJ's legal criteria may occur, for example, when the ALJ has failed to follow the Commissioner's "own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right." Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746 (citing in part Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 (6th Cir. 2004)).
In this case, the ALJ applied the correct legal criteria and the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the ALJ's decision. WHEREFORE, Fairchild's Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations are OVERRULED, and this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge in its entirety. The Commissioner's decision that Fairchild was disabled as of January 19, 2011, but not before, is affirmed. Finally, the captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Fourteenth Day of February, 2014.
___________________
JUDGE THOMAS M. ROSE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Copies furnished to: Counsel of Record