Although Hurston was only a passenger in the vehicle, the inquiry does not end here, for in some circumstances, a passenger may possess, control or retain a vehicle for purposes of OCGA ยง 16-8-7. See, e.g., Fair v. State, 198 Ga. App. 437 (4) ( 401 S.E.2d 626) (1991); Tolbert v. State, 194 Ga. App. 319 ( 390 S.E.2d 301) (1990). Here, there was sufficient evidence that Hurston exerted the requisite control over the vehicle in that Reese left Hurston alone in the car with the vehicle running when he went into the convenience store.
Someone had attempted to conceal the nature of the property as stolen by substituting an Alabama license plate for Ms. Rider's North Carolina tag. The next day, defendant was driving a different vehicle, also with a stolen Alabama tag. This evidence is sufficient under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, supra, to authorize the jury's verdict that defendant possessed the motor vehicle under circumstances where he knew or, in the exercise of ordinary prudence, should have known the vehicle was stolen. Fair v. State, 198 Ga. App. 437, 438 (4) ( 401 S.E.2d 626). (b) "It shall be unlawful for any person to fire or discharge a firearm on the property of another person, firm, or corporation without having first obtained permission from the owner or lessee of the property."
The evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact in finding defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offense of theft by receiving stolen property. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, supra; Fair v. State, 198 Ga. App. 437, 438 (4) ( 401 S.E.2d 626). Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.