¶ 37 Appellant asserts that the UUPA deprives him and others of property without due process of law in violation of Okla. Const. art. 2, § 7, U.S. Const. amend. V, and U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, by taking trust property, through the statutory provisions requiring transfer of abandoned property exceeding the reserve into the General Revenue Fund. Oklahoma's Due Process Clause is generally coextensive with its federal counterpart. State ex rel. Bd. of Regents of University of Okla. v. Lucas, 2013 OK 14, n. 25, 297 P.3d 378 ; Gladstone v. Bartlesville Indep. School Dist. No. 30 (I–30), 2003 OK 30, n. 16, 66 P.3d 442 ; Fair School Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, n. 48, 746 P.2d 1135. At a minimum, due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
¶ 15 The right to free public schools does not guarantee, on its face, equal expenditures per pupil. Fair School Finance Council v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 52, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (wherein we used a rational basis standard to evaluate the classification used for expenditures per pupil.) We hold that a rational basis exists for the distinction made in these ordinances regarding which public school districts will receive the sales tax revenues.
The terms of Art. 2, § 7, Okla. Const., are: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Messenger v. Messenger, Okla., 827 P.2d 865, 872 (1992); Fair Sch. Finance Coun. of Okla. v. State, Okla., 746 P.2d 1135, 1148 n. 48 (1987); Matter of Rich, Okla., 604 P.2d 1248, 1250-1251 (1979); McKeever Drilling Co. v. Egbert, 170 Okla. 259, 40 P.2d 32, 35 (1935). See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972), citing Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 17 L.Ed. 531 (1864), and Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).
Oklahoma does not have a separate Equal Protection Clause like that contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 54, 746 P.2d 1135. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has identified “a functional equivalent of that clause in the anti-discrimination component of our state constitution's due process section, Art. 2, § 7, Okla. Const.”
The court held that the State of Oklahoma was immune from suit by a citizen of Oklahoma against it brought in state court because the State of Oklahoma had not consented to suit under the Act. In FairSchoolFinanceCouncilofOklahoma, Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶3, 746 P.2d 1135, this Court reviewed a lawsuit for a declaration that Oklahoma's system of financing public elementary and secondary schools was constitutionally infirm. The State of Oklahoma, among others, was a named party in that lawsuit.
Oklahoma does not have a separate Equal Protection Clause like that contained in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State,1987 OK 114, ¶ 54, 746 P.2d 1135. Nonetheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has identified "a functional equivalent of that clause in the anti-discrimination component of our state constitution's due process section, Art. 2, § 7, Okla. Const."
In essence, you ask whether the Oklahoma Constitution mandates equal funding for all students. This question has been answered by the Supreme Court in Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987). In Fair School Finance, an action was brought by public school students and others challenging the constitutionality of the State system of financing public education, claiming that the formula used violated the United States and Oklahoma Constitutions.
The Legislature stated the view that local control of a discretionary matter by a local school board is preferable. For example, in Ritter v. State, 2022 OK 73, 520 P.3d 370, we quoted from Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶45, 746 P.2d 1135, and its reliance on 70 O.S.1981 §18-101: "The school system is designed to strengthen and encourage local responsibility for control of public education, with the maximum public autonomy and responsibility remaining at the local level." Ritter, 2022 OK 73, ¶17, 520 P.3d at 380.
¶10 Regarding article 2, section 2 of the Constitution specifically, this Court has stated that courts may not annul a statute "as being in violation of substantive due process unless it is clearly irrelevant to the policy the Legislature may adopt or is arbitrary, unreasonable or discriminatory." Edmondson v. Pearce, 2004 OK 23, ¶ 35, 91 P.3d 605, 624, as corrected (July 28, 2004) (quoting Jack Lincoln Shops, Inc. v. State Dry Cleaners' Bd., 1943 OK 28, 135 P.2d 332,333; see also Fair Sch. Fin. Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 1987 OK 114, ¶ 62, 746 P.2d 1135, 1150 (stating that we review the constitutionality of a statute to determine if the Legislature acted within its power, and "the act will be declared constitutional unless it can be clearly demonstrated that the Legislature acted arbitrarily and capriciously."). But instead of following this Court's standard, which would require the Court to uphold the statute unless it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or discriminatory, the majority chooses to apply a much stricter standard.
The statute came to state as follows, in part.Fair School Finance Council of Oklahoma, Inc. v. State , 1987 OK 114, 746 P.2d 1135, 1142-1143, citing State of Okla. ex rel. Poulos v. State Bd. of Equalization , 1982 OK 68, 646 P.2d 1269 (Poulos III ). 70 O.S.Supp.1989 § 18-109.