Summary
In Huntington Comm. v. Town of Huntington, NY, No. 02-CV-2787, 2005 WL 675838, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2005) ("'Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, there is no constitutional or statutory duty to provide low income housing, nor is there a constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.'") (quoting Acevedo, 500 F.2d at 1080-81) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Summary of this case from Kholost v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.Opinion
02-CV-2787 (DRH) (ARL).
March 23, 2005
Jeffrey Glekel, Michael Birnbaum, Jacob Radcliff, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher Flom, LLP, New York, New York. Nadine Cohen, Lawyers' Committee For Civil Rights of the Boston Bar Association, Boston, Massachusetts. Dennis Cortland Hayes, Hannibal G. Williams, The National Advancement for the Advancement of Colored People, Baltimore, MD, for the Plaintiffs.
James G. Ryan, Cullen Dykman, LLP, Garden City, NY, for the Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that Defendants engaged in discriminatory housing practices in violation of the Fair Housing Act, their civil rights and the Equal Protection Clause. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) and to dismiss for failure to join necessary parties, pursuant to 12(b)(7). For the reasons provided herein, Defendants' Rule 12(c) motion is granted and their 12(b)(7) motion is denied as moot.
BACKGROUND
I The Parties
Plaintiff Fair Housing in Huntington Committee, Inc. ("FHHC") is a "local non[-]profit organization consisting of concerned residents of Huntington and the surrounding areas." (Am. Compl. ¶ 17.) FHHC's goals include "the elimination of unlawful racially discriminatory housing practices and housing segregation that cause injury to its members, to all persons who seek to rent or buy housing units in Huntington, and to all persons who reside in Huntington." ( Id.)
Plaintiff Huntington Branch NAACP is a membership based, non-profit organization, established to ensure equality of minority groups in all facets of life. ( Id. ¶ 14.) It claims that Defendants' actions have caused injury by interfering with its programs intended to bring about equality, causing it to expend scare resources to investigate complaints, and frustrating its mission and purpose. ( Id.)
Plaintiff Bernard Peyton, a Caucasian male, lives in Melville, a part of the Town of Huntington. ( Id. ¶ 19.) The amended complaint alleges that Defendants' actions denied him the opportunity to live in an integrated community. Plaintiffs Athena Hawkins, Lynda John and Ian John are residents in the Town of Huntington who seek "affordable, multi-bedroom housing in an integrated community and [have] been denied that opportunity by the discriminatory practices of [Defendants.]" ( Id. ¶¶ 19-22.) Plaintiffs allege that they have been "forced by the lack of affordable family housing in integrated areas of Huntington to live in the Town's Racially Impacted Areas." ( Id. ¶ 23.)
The Town of Huntington, New York ("Town") is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of New York State. ( Id. ¶ 24.) The Town Board of the Town of Huntington ("Town Board") is an elected governing body in the Town of Huntington. ( Id. ¶ 25.) The Town offices and agencies that oversee development in the Town of Huntington derive their power and authority from the Town Board. ( Id.) The Town of Huntington Planning Board ("Planning Board") is a "quasi-independent board whose members are appointed by the Huntington Town Board." ( Id. ¶ 26.)
II The Allegations
Plaintiffs bring this action against Defendants, alleging "incessant rejection and obstruction of repeated efforts to create affordable family housing in Huntington's overwhelmingly white neighborhoods" (referred to in the Amended Complaint as the "White Areas"). (Am. Compl. ¶ 2.)
By way of background, Plaintiffs allege that the Town has an extended and well documented history of concentrating minority families in the least desirable areas of the Town in violation of the Fair Housing Act. ( Id. ¶ 3.) The amended complaint cites Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (" Huntington Branch"), where the Second Circuit found that the Town was in violation of the Fair Housing Act. Huntington Branch directed the Town to amend its zoning laws to allow a nonprofit housing development to be built in a white area. Plaintiffs allege that prior to Huntington Branch, the Town had refused to allow multi-family housing to be built in the White Areas. Instead, affordable multi-family housing had been concentrated in the disproportionately minority, low-income areas around Huntington's railroad station (referred to in the Amended Complaint as the "Racially Impacted Areas"). ( Id. ¶ 3.)
Further, Plaintiffs allege that the Town has for many years refused to comply with fair housing mandates from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD"). For example, in 1997, a review by HUD found that the Town's actions with respect to fair housing were inadequate to the point that sanctions and/or corrective actions were authorized. HUD specifically found that "the Town did not address the problem of the lack of multifamily housing for low and moderate income persons outside of the racially-impacted urban renewal area and the lack of homeownerships [sic] opportunities outside the racially-impacted urban renewal area at prices affordable for low and moderate income persons." ( Id. ¶ 36.) According to the amended complaint, in 1998, HUD reiterated its "significant concerns" regarding fair housing in Huntington. ( Id.) Plaintiffs allege that in 1999, HUD again criticized the Town for its inaction in a letter notifying the Town that it had referred a fair housing complaint to the Department of Justice. ( Id. ¶ 37.)
Plaintiffs allege that "[s]ince Huntington [ Branch] ordered the Town to amend its zoning laws, the Town Board and Planning Board have found myriad new ways to engage in the same discriminatory housing practices that were formerly effected through its zoning laws." ( Id. ¶ 4.) Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that "in 2000, after repeatedly acknowledging the Town's affordable family housing shortages, the Town amended the zoning laws for the largest parcel of land available for residential development in the White Areas — the 382-acre ["The Greens at Half Hollow"] (referred to in the Amended Complaint as "the Greens") — to allow the construction of approximately 1,375 new homes, not one of which was an affordable family housing unit." ( Id. ¶ 5.)
Plaintiffs claim that the "Town's decision to create and approve a development plan for the Greens that lacks any affordable housing further excludes minority families from the White Areas, not only perpetuating the housing segregation that currently persists along racial lines, but also exacerbating the problems minority families face in obtaining homes in the White Areas."( Id. ¶ 6.)
Plaintiffs claim that the Town is now on the verge of granting permits for the construction of approximately 120 one-bedroom and studio apartments at Ruland Road, also known as "Sanctuary," and they allege that none of those apartments will provide "affordable, multi-unit family housing." ( Id. ¶ 8.)
Plaintiffs claim that around July 1999, SBJ Associates L.L.C. ("SBJ"), a developer that owned certain property rights for Sanctuary, submitted a development proposal to the Town which included two- and three-bedroom affordable housing units. That proposal, which Plaintiffs allege would have provided the kind of housing likely to attract minority families to the White Areas, "was effectively rejected when the Town failed to even vote on the plan for more than a year. Tellingly, however, after the proposal was revised on September 11, 2000 so that the only affordable units planned for Sanctuary were one-bedroom and studio apartments, the Town acted the very next day to recommend the housing plan's approval, passing Resolution No. 2000-684." ( Id. ¶ 9.)
According to Plaintiffs, the Town's recommendation that the one-bedroom and studio apartment plan be approved came on the same day (and in the same resolution, No. 2000-684) that the Town approved a separate development plan at the Greens. The other plan at the Greens was in the white area, and it included approximately 72 market value family residences along with hundreds of affordable age-restricted units. ( Id. ¶ 10.)
Plaintiffs claim that the Town intentionally discriminated against them by "delay[ing] approval of the application for multi-bedroom units at the Ruland Road site when they knew or should have known that such units would increase the minority population who eventually will live there, yet the Town hastened to approve a one-bedroom and studio plan, knowing that these units were far less likely to attract minority applicants." ( Id. ¶ 11.)
Plaintiffs allege that using two available properties in the White Areas to develop approximately 1,500 new homes without building any dwellings available to low-income families will have a disparate impact on minority families by severely exacerbating the affordable family housing crisis in the Town and excluding those families from the White Areas. ( Id. ¶ 12.)
Plaintiffs allege that currently, the concentration of minorities in the racially impacted areas is nearly identical to the demographics on which the Second Circuit, in its 1988 Huntington Branch decision, based its conclusion that minorities are disproportionately impacted by the Town's lack of affordable family housing. ( Id. ¶ 30.)
The amended complaint cites the following statistics:
As the minority population in Huntington has increased, it has remained highly concentrated in a small number of census tracts in the Town of Huntington. Seven tracts combined housed 57.4% of the minority population in 1980, 59.6% of the minority population in 1990, and 59.2% of the minority population in 2000. Of 48 census tracts in the Town in 1980, 34 contained black populations of less than 2%. Of 47 census tracts in the Town in 2000, 30 contained black populations of less than 2%. In 2000 there were 7 census tracts (out of 47 census tracts in the Town) where blacks constituted 9% or more of the residents, ranging from 9.4% to 26.1%. Blacks and Hispanics together constituted 15.7% to 57.2% of the residents in these same tracts.
A study conducted in 2000 concluded that in Huntington, where less than one in nine residents is African-American or Hispanic, the need for affordable housing falls four times as heavily on African-Americans and Hispanics than on Whites.
( Id. ¶¶ 31-34.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Greens and the Sanctuary will exacerbate the segregated housing in Huntington. They allege that the Town is participating in the Sanctuary Development Plan by granting "density bonuses." Density bonuses are allowances for more homes per acre than existing zoning would ordinarily permit. Plaintiffs claim that the power to grant density bonuses gives the Town Board and the Planning Board considerable power to dictate what groups of residents a developer will serve. (Am. Compl. ¶ 38.)
In July 1999, SBJ requested a density bonus for the Greens. This density bonus effectively changed the zoning for the Greens to allow an approximately 1,375 unit development plan that, Plaintiffs claim, the Town cooperated with SBJ to create. Without a density bonus, the zoning for the Greens would have permitted only approximately 125 housing units. ( Id. ¶ 40.)
The original Greens proposal submitted in July 1999 included a development plan for Sanctuary comprising two- and three-bedroom homes that, according to Plaintiffs, would at least partially ameliorate the discriminatory impact that the Greens development would have on minority families. Plaintiffs claim that no hearings or formal proceedings were ever conducted in connection with SBJ's application. ( Id. ¶ 42.)
Approximately 14 months later, however, on September 11, 2000, the Town received a new plan for Sanctuary calling for one-bedroom and studio units. Plaintiffs allege that unlike the aforementioned two- and three-bedroom plan, the new plan "would do nothing to ameliorate the disparate impact the Greens would have on minority families but rather would have the opposite effect, further exacerbating the disparate impact the Town's housing plans have on minority families." ( Id. ¶ 43.) Apparently, the Town approved the new one-bedroom and studio plan the very next day, in connection with the Town's granting of a density bonus for the Greens property. ( Id.)
The Town required, in its September 12, 2000 resolution approving the Greens project, "that no building permits shall be issued for 200 of the market value condominium units at The Greens Project until such time as building permits are issued for all of the units at the Sanctuary Project at Ruland Road . . ." However, Plaintiffs claim, no permits have been issued for any affordable housing of any kind at Sanctuary, while permits for the 200 market rate units at the Greens have already been approved. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 44-45.)
Plaintiffs allege that the Town offered no public explanation for its decision to disregard its own September 12, 2000 resolution or for its fast-tracking the permit process for market rate units at the Greens compared to the "excruciatingly" slow track reserved for affordable housing projects in the White Areas. ( Id. ¶ 46.)
Further, Plaintiffs claim that the Town's implicit rejection of SBJ's initial proposal, which was likely to attract at least some low-income minority families, and the Town's subsequent approval of a plan for the Greens and Sanctuary, which will attract no low-income minority families, amounts to intentional discrimination and will have a disparate impact on poor minority families seeking affordable family housing in Huntington. ( Id. ¶ 47.)
III Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in May 2002. Approximately two weeks later, they sought a preliminary injunction. Specifically, Plaintiffs requested that the Court order the Town to revoke all current permits allowing development of the Greens, enjoin the town from issuing any further permits necessary for the development, and halt construction of The Greens by SBJ. On June 26, 2002, after a hearing, this Court determined that Plaintiffs were not likely to prevail on the merits of their FHA claim because Plaintiffs did not establish that the Town's housing plan violated the FHA. ( See Tr. of 6/26/02 at 70-88.) They appealed, and by decision dated January 17, 2003, the Second Circuit affirmed. Fair Housing In Huntington Comm., Inc. v. Town of Huntington, New York, 316 F.3d 357 (2d Cir. 2003).
The Second Circuit upheld this Court's determination that Plaintiffs did not show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits on their underlying Fair Housing Act ("FHA") claim:
Although disparate impact is not a novel theory under the FHA, plaintiffs seek a novel application of it in the context of this case. Rather than relying on a refusal to amend or otherwise alleviate the restrictive nature of a town's zoning ordinance to allow for development that would integrate a community, plaintiffs here rely on the Town's act of amending its ordinance (in response to SBJ's request) to allow a greater density of residential development, but only for senior housing. Plaintiffs argue that amending the Town's zoning ordinance to allow such age-restricted developments in the "White Areas" is either keeping them "white" or making them "whiter," despite increasing the overall amount of housing available in these areas, and thus perpetuates segregation in the Town. The novelty of this approach alone makes us hesitant to disturb the district court's decision regarding plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits.
Furthermore, the ultimate remedy that plaintiffs suggest — among other things, the Town affirmatively requiring SBJ to change the composition of its development at The Greens and the Town otherwise facilitating affordable family housing in the White Areas likely to attract minority occupants — also presents a higher obstacle for plaintiffs to surmount. See [ Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at] at 936, 941 (where plaintiff is suing to compel municipality to provide housing, as opposed to removing obstacle to housing, municipality need not make as strong a showing to justify its challenged action; balance is more readily struck in plaintiff's favor when simply seeking to remove obstacle to its own plans to build housing).
These considerations aside, there are specific facts in this case that also pose a problem for plaintiffs' success on the merits. Even assuming that plaintiffs are able to demonstrate a disparate impact flowing from the Town's zoning approval, a factually complex matter on which we express no opinion at this stage, it is still questionable whether they will prevail at the second stage of the inquiry, namely, whether the Town's "actions further . . . a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect." Id. at 936. Plaintiffs do not contest the urgent need for senior housing in the community, a need The Greens indisputably meets. Rather, the matter of contention is whether less discriminatory means exist for meeting this need.
The trial court in its oral decision took note of two facts in the relatively undeveloped record before it that we find relevant on this point. First, as one of the conditions to approval of the zoning change necessary for the age-restricted development, the Town required SBJ to contribute $2.5 million to an affordable housing trust fund created by the Town to assist first-time home-buyers. We discern no evidence in the record regarding how this might mitigate the discriminatory effect alleged by plaintiffs by demonstrating defendants are trying to provide senior housing in the least discriminatory way possible. But, on its face, this measure appears at least to attempt to do the very thing plaintiffs urge for the Town: offset the impact of the age-restriction in The Greens by facilitating family housing elsewhere.[FN7]
FN7. Not only is this fact relevant to whether defendants have undertaken the least discriminatory means of achieving the goal of senior housing, but may also be relevant to the question of disparate impact in the first instance. Cf. Pfaff [ v. United States Dep't of Housing, 88 F.3d 739, 746 (9th Cir. 1996)] ("A party charged with discrimination may diffuse a prima facie case against him, and hence avoid the need to supply a legally sufficient, nondiscriminatory reason in rebuttal, by successfully challenging the statistical basis of the charge."). It does not appear that plaintiffs' expert took the housing trust fund into account in performing his analysis of the impact of The Greens' development on integration in the Town.
The second, and more contested, fact of note relates to another condition imposed on SBJ by the Town. As a condition to the change of zoning, and as a prerequisite to permitting of the final phase of The Greens project, SBJ must develop another site it owns within the Town — referred to by the parties as the Ruland Rd. site — with affordable, multi-unit family housing. This measure, too, appears to be designed to mitigate the impact of The Greens with regard to family housing, but its effectiveness, at least with regard to minority families, is also unclear from the record and is disputed by plaintiffs.
The proposal for the Ruland Rd. development, as referenced in materials concerning The Greens, contemplates roughly 120 one-bedroom and studio apartments, priced at $125,000. Plaintiffs produced evidence from their expert, in his analysis of The Greens, that one-bedroom and studio apartments, even absent an age restriction, will attract a disproportionately white pool of occupants. They argue that this conclusion would also be applicable to the Ruland Rd. project such that the project would not only fail to mitigate the discriminatory impact of The Greens, but would have the same effect — perpetuating segregation. Although this evidence calls into question the effectiveness of the second mitigating measure, as noted above, plaintiffs produced no evidence to contest the effectiveness of the first, leaving the record equivocal at best on the question of whether the defendants have settled on the least discriminatory means of attaining the legitimate governmental goal of providing housing for seniors.
Given this state of the record, along with the novelty of plaintiffs' approach in this case and their higher burden based on the nature of the relief they seek, we cannot say that the district court's conclusion that they have failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits entitling them to a preliminary injunction exceeded the bounds of its discretion.Fair Housing in Huntington, 316 F.3d at 366-368 (citations and footnotes omitted) (emphasis supplied).
On April 8, 2004, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint, seeking to enjoin the Town from granting any permits for construction at Sanctuary, such as the proposal presently under consideration by the Town, that will discriminate against minority families. Plaintiffs also seek declaratory and injunctive relief preventing further construction of Sanctuary until the zoning and plan for the site are revised to include multi-bedroom units which are more likely to attract minority families.
The amended complaint alleges five causes of action: (1) violation of the Fair Housing Act; (2) violation of Plaintiffs' civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1982; (3) violation of Plaintiffs' civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (4) violation of Plaintiffs' civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; and (5) violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
DISCUSSION
I Judgment on the Pleadings
The standard for deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as that of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Irish Lesbian Gay Org. v. Giuliani, 143 F.3d 638, 644 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court "must accept all allegations in the complaint as true and draw all favorable inferences in the non-moving party's favor." Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 123 U.S. 1486 (2003) (citing Irish Lesbian Gay Org., 143 F.3d at 644). The Court may grant the relief requested only if `"it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Burnette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1052 (2000) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 33 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
1. Fair Housing Act
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' claims under the Fair Housing Act and Equal Protection Clause should be dismissed because they have not articulated cognizable claims.
The Fair Housing Act forbids racial discrimination with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling. Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 (2003) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 3605(a)). A claim under the Fair Housing Act can be brought under one of two alternate theories: disparate impact or disparate treatment. Fair Housing in Huntington Comm., 316 F.3d at 366 (citing LeBlanc-Sternberg v. Fletcher, 67 F.3d 412, 425 (2d Cir. 1995)). Here, Plaintiffs' rely on a theory of disparate impact.
"In order to make out a prima facie case under the FHA on a theory of disparate impact, a plaintiff must demonstrate that an outwardly neutral practice actually or predictably has a discriminatory effect; that is, has a significantly adverse or disproportionate impact on minorities, or perpetuates segregation." Fair Housing in Huntington Comm., 316 F.3d at 366 (citations omitted). Plaintiffs are not required to show discriminatory intent. Id. (citing Huntington, 844 F.2d at 934). Provided Plaintiffs have made this showing, the burden then shifts to Defendant to demonstrate that "its actions . . . furthered a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect." Id.
The gravamen of Plaintiffs' amended complaint is that the Town approved senior housing and studio/one-bedroom housing, but not two- and three-bedroom housing, which will not attract low income minority families. (Am. Compl. ¶ 47.) Even when accepting Plaintiffs' allegations as true, as the Court must in a 12(c) context, they have failed to state a violation of the Fair Housing Act.
Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, there is "no constitutional or statutory duty to provide low income housing," nor is there a "`constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality.'" Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1080-81 (2d Cir. 1974) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)). Further, the FHA is not implicated when a municipality "provid[es] housing for the elderly, without also providing housing for some other protected group." Brecker v. Queens B'nai B'rith Housing Dev. Fund Co., 798 F.2d 52, 57 (2d Cir. 1986). Thus, the Town's failure to include low income housing in its plan for the 382 acre parcel of land does not implicate the FHA. Acevedo, 500 F.2d at 1081.
As Defendants correctly point out, the FHA imposes liability upon municipalities which erect obstacles to proposed housing. See id. at n. 3; Huntington Branch, 844 F.2d at 938 (holding the Town's "refusal to rezone creat[ed] at strong prima facie showing of discriminatory effect"). Here, the Town has not passed any resolutions which obstruct low income housing for minorities, rather it has permitted the land to be used for senior citizens and for studio/one-bedroom apartment. There is no constitutional requirement that the Town include low income minority housing in its plan. Acevedo, 500 F.2d at 1081 ("We cannot conclude that appellees invidiously discriminated by providing low income senior citizen housing at Mitchel Field without also providing low income family housing. `Whether or not one agrees with this (decision), there is nothing in the Constitution that forbids it.'") (quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972)). Plaintiffs have not sufficiently stated a violation of the FHA. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted on this claim.
2. Equal Protection Clause
Plaintiffs' claim also fails under the Equal Protection Clause because they have not satisfactorily alleged that racially discriminatory intent was a motivating factor in the Town's approval of the resolution which did not include low income minority housing. Although Plaintiffs' allege that "Defendants' discriminatory practices [were] motivated by malice and/or callous disregard for the[ir] rights," conclusory allegations are not sufficient to establish discriminatory intent. See Orange Lake Assocs., Inc. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1227 (2d Cir. 1994) (upholding dismissal of Equal Protection claim where plaintiff "makes only conclusory allegations that the members of the Town Board were motivated by racial animus"); Catanzaro v. Weiden, 188 F.3d 56, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming dismissal of Equal Protection claim where plaintiff relied on conclusory allegations"). Further, the fact that Defendants approved a housing plan that does not include low income minority housing does not, by itself, implicate the Fourteenth Amendment. Acevedo, 500 F.2d at 1081 ("[T]here is no authority holding that once a city or county initiates low income senior citizen housing the Fourteenth Amendment requires it to build a certain amount of low income family housing, too."). Accordingly, Defendants' motion is granted as to Plaintiffs' claim under the Equal Protection Clause.
Section 1982 states that "[a]ll citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property." 42 U.S.C. § 1982. "[A]lthough the text of § 1982 does not expressly mention the race of the beneficiary of the statute's protections, the Supreme Court has construed the section to forbid public and private racially discriminatory interference with property rights." United States v. Nelson, 277 F.3d 164, 177 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968)).
The parties state that the requirements necessary to establish a claim under Section 1982 are the same as under the Fair Housing Act. However, the Court's research indicates that a Section 1982 claim has an additional requirement: Plaintiff must show discriminatory intent. See Mitchell v. Century 21 Rustic Realty, 233 F. Supp. 2d 418, 443 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("Under the Fair Housing Act, evidence of a discriminatory effect alone is sufficient to establish a prime facie case of discrimination. Claims brought under §§ 1981 and 1982, however, require a showing of discriminatory intent.") (citations omitted).
Above the Court determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the Fair Housing Act. Since Section 1982 imposes a higher burden than the FHA, it follows that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim under this statute. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on Plaintiffs' second claim is granted.
To set forth a claim under Section 1983, Plaintiffs must allege that "(1) the defendant acted under color of state law; and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff[s] suffered a denial of [their] federal statutory rights, or [their] constitutional rights or privileges." Annis v. County of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
Plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged that Defendants, all various departments of the political subdivision known as the Town of Huntington, are state actors. Plaintiffs have not, however, alleged a denial of their constitutional rights. Above, the Court determined that Plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the FHA and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiffs' amended complaint does not allege any other constitutional violations. Thus, Plaintiffs have not stated a claim under Section 1983. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on this claim is granted.
Plaintiffs' fourth cause of action alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, which states that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id.
The plain language of the statute indicates that a cause of action arising under Section 2000d must allege that a "program or activity [is] receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. Additionally, Plaintiffs must show a nexus between the federal funding and the alleged discriminatory practice. Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 647 F.2d 256, 276 (2d Cir. 1981) ("[S]ection [2000d] in effect requires a logical nexus between the use of federal funds and the practice toward which agency action is directed."); Cassells v. Univ. Hosp. at Stony Brook, No. 86 CV 0698, 1987 WL 17091, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1987) (stating that plaintiff is required to allege a nexus between the use of federal monies and the alleged discriminatory practice by defendants).
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendants are receiving federal funding or that any federal money has been used in the Greens or Sanctuary projects or in furtherance of those projects. Plaintiffs' failure to allege a nexus between federal funding and Defendants' alleged discriminatory actions is fatal to their claim. Accordingly, Defendants' motion for judgment on this ground is granted.
II Defendants' Additional Arguments
Because the Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims, it declines to address Defendants' remaining arguments.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint within thirty (30) days of the date of this order. Failure to file a second amended complaint within thirty days will result in dismissal of the action with prejudice. Failure to address the pleading concerns enunciated in this order may result in dismissal with prejudice.