Fahey v. Cook County Police Dept. Merit Bd.

26 Citing cases

  1. People ex Rel. Kilquist v. Brown

    203 Ill. App. 3d 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    It is fundamental that administrative agencies cannot extend the substantive provisions of a legislative enactment or create substantive rights through exercise of their rulemaking powers. Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 583, 315 N.E.2d 573, 576. The issue then becomes what are the statutory functions of the merit commission and in what areas has regulation been upheld as incident to carrying out those statutory functions.

  2. O'Grady v. Cook Co. Sheriff's Merit Bd.

    260 Ill. App. 3d 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 18 times
    In O'Grady, this court determined that the Merit Board had the authority under the Act to uphold the voiding of the merit certification of certain individuals hired by a former sheriff "where that action was reasonably necessary [by the Board] to execute the duty to investigate and enforce the terms of the Act."

    An express grant of power to an administrative body or officer includes the authority to do all that is reasonably necessary to execute that power or to perform the duty specifically conferred. Parliament Insurance Co. v. Department of Revenue (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 341, 347, 365 N.E.2d 667; Meana v. Morrison (1975), 28 Ill. App.3d 849, 854, 329 N.E.2d 535; Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 583, 315 N.E.2d 573. Section 3-7015 of the Merit Act provides that the Merit Board "shall investigate the enforcement of this Division and its rules, and the conduct and action of the appointees herein provided for."

  3. Schalz v. McHenry Co. Sheriff's Mer. Com

    135 Ill. App. 3d 657 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    Administrative agencies possess only the authority expressly conferred upon them by statute, or that which by fair implication and intendment is incident to the authority expressly conferred for the purpose of accomplishing the objectives of the agency. Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573. Plaintiffs argue that section 9 of the Sheriff's Merit System Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 125, par. 159) clearly refers only to the ability of the commission to set up rules for itself, not for the operation of the sheriff's office, while the commission contends that this language sanctions the subject rules.

  4. McArdle v. Rodriguez

    659 N.E.2d 1356 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995)   Cited 12 times
    Affirming the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction to the plaintiff where the defendant exceeded the authority provided to him by the Chicago Municipal Code, when he promoted some sergeants based solely on merit and not on examination results

    ( Peoples Gas Light Coke Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n (1987), 165 Ill. App.3d 235, 520 N.E.2d 46.) This limit on the powers of an administrative agency applies with special force to civil service rules because these are deemed part of the employment contract. Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573. Whether the Code authorized the merit promotions, of course, depends on an interpretation of the Code.

  5. Parliament Ins. Co. v. Dept. of Revenue

    365 N.E.2d 667 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 14 times

    • 2 The authority of the Department to act as it did in the instant case may be implied from the terms of the Act. ( Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 583, 315 N.E.2d 573, 576.) Section 2a of the Act provides in pertinent part:

  6. Zurek v. Cook County Police Merit Bd.

    42 Ill. App. 3d 1044 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 9 times
    Holding that the board had no authority from its enabling act to extend the time within which the sheriff was required to bring charges against a suspended employee

    An administrative body, such as the Board exercises purely statutory powers and must find within its enabling statute the authority to exercise the power it claims. ( Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573.) In Fahey this court stated at pages 583, 584:

  7. Schrader v. Krok

    410 N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 2 times

    The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that under accepted rules of statutory construction the fact that in some instances the legislature has specifically provided a prohibition on political activities but has not done so under section 58.1 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to counties" is strong evidence that the legislature did not intend to empower the Commission to promulgate such a rule. Both parties rely on the case of Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573, in support of their respective positions. In the course of holding that the Cook County Merit Board had no authority to set a mandatory retirement age, the Fahey court reasoned:

  8. Department of Public Aid v. Brazziel

    377 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    The agency has only such authority as is conferred by express provision of law or is found, by fair implication and intendment, to be incident-to and included in the authority expressly conferred for the purpose of carrying out and accomplishing the objectives for which the agency was created. Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 583, 315 N.E.2d 573, 576. • 2 While there is no express authority in the Personnel Code authorizing Rule 9.

  9. Carston v. County of Cook

    962 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1992)   Cited 16 times
    In Carston v. Cook County, 962 F.2d 749 (7th Cir. 1992), a group of long-time security officers for Oak Forest Hospital brought suit alleging that they had achieved Civil Service or "career" status under the HHGC and that Cook County was required to recognize that status.

    Thus, the Civil Service Commission has no statutory authority to subject the officers to examinations to retain their positions. Fahey v. Cook Co. Police Dep't Merit Board, 21 Ill.App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573, 577-78 (1974) (rules, which were adopted, were beyond Board's authority and therefore void.). Thus, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the officers, excluding Kokaska.

  10. Warner v. State

    819 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Therefore, we remand these cases to the superior court with instructions to remand them to the Commission for hearings in accordance with the Surety Fund Claims Act. See also Kauer v. Amemiya, 56 Haw. 182, 532 P.2d 664 (1975) (per curiam) (Director of Consumer Protection Agency was without power to promulgate rules under the consumer protection statute); Fahey v. Cook County Police Dep't Merit Bd., 21 Ill. App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573 (1974) (Police Merit Board had no authority to promulgate rule on compulsory retirement age). See generally, 1 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise §§ 5.01-5.