” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 46, 3 A.2d 313 (1938). Our Supreme Court stated as well: “A fair and full cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the absolute right, and not the mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called, and a denial of this right is a prejudicial and fatal error. It is only after the right has been substantially and fairly exercised that the allowance of cross-examination becomes discretionary with the trial court.”

He may, as this appellant has done, deny any criminal act, but his denial if given on the stand in his own defense is subject to cross-examination. The cross-examination of a witness is a matter of right. Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 3 A.2d 313, 120 A.L.R. 517; Babirecki v. Virgil, 97 N.J. Eq. 315, 127 A. 594, 39 A.L.R. 171; Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 691, 51 S.Ct. 218, 75 L.Ed. 624. We conclude that the rationale of the rule as to waiver of the privilege by an accused who voluntarily offers himself as a witness in his own behalf and testifies in chief applies in civil cases.

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Struckman v. Burns , supra, 205 Conn. at 549, 534 A.2d 888 ; see also Gordon v. Indusco Management Corp ., 164 Conn. 262, 271, 320 A.2d 811 (1973) ("[t]he right of cross-examination is not a privilege but is an absolute right and if one is deprived of a complete cross-examination he has a right to have the direct testimony stricken"); Fahey v. Clark , 125 Conn. 44, 47, 3 A.2d 313 (1938) ("[a] fair and full cross-examination of a witness upon the subjects of his examination in chief is the absolute right, and not the mere privilege, of the party against whom he is called, and a denial of this right is a prejudicial and fatal error" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Contra State v. Jordan , 305 Conn. 1, 27, 44 A.3d 794 (2012) ("[t]he defendant's right to cross-examine a witness ... is not absolute" (internal quotation marks omitted)).

Although the rule does not explicitly state that offers of proof may be made during cross-examination, neither does the rule limit offers of proof to questions posed during direct examination. It appears clear to us that even though Calci v. Brown, 95 R.I. 216, 186 A.2d 234 (1962), decided some ten years prior to Rule 26 (b), does state that "[a] trial court may not properly require offers of proof with respect to inquiries made during cross-examination except in some unusual and peculiar circumstance," 95 R.I. at 220, 186 A.2d at 236 (citing Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 3 A.2d 313 (1938)), Justice Kelleher some thirteen years later, and after adoption of Rule 26 (b), made clear that offers of proof on cross-examination were encompassed within the rule. State v. Crescenzo, 114 R.I. 242, 332 A.2d 421 (1975).

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 47, 3 A.2d 313 (1938). To "absolutely stop" a party's cross-examination is to deny that party the right to cross-examine.

On the other hand, if it is the defendant's claim that the statement contained more information such that, having been made in the defendant's hearing, it might have had an effect on his state of mind and to that extent would have supported his claim of self-defense, this claim is not reviewable in the absence of an offer of proof. Lavieri v. Ulysses, 149 Conn. 396, 405, 180 A.2d 632 (1962); Seney v. Trowbridge, 127 Conn. 284, 290-91, 16 A.2d 573 (1940); see Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 48, 3 A.2d 313 (1938). III

As a rule, the extent of a cross-examination is within the court's discretion, although it should be liberally allowed. State v. Green, 172 Conn. 22, 26-27, 372 A.2d 133; Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 47, 3 A.2d 313. Nonetheless, the court may restrict a cross-examination to evidence which is competent, material, and relevant, and "`when the examination has been carried as far as will serve to develop the issues involved and aid the search for the truth, we approve of the trial court curtailing the length and the limit of examinations.'" Fahey v. Clark, supra, 46. The record reveals that the defendant was belaboring his point, seeking contradiction in minute verbal distinctions.

The court does have wide discretion as to the scope of cross-examination. State v. Palozie, 165 Conn. 288, 297, 334 A.2d 468; Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 46, 3 A.2d 313; 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses, 478. This discretion is not so unlimited, however, as to permit cross-examination of a defendant (whom the state cannot make its own witness) on matters totally unrelated to his testimony on direct, and not relevant to his credibility, especially where prejudice results. The evidence which was introduced in this cross-examination did not rebut, impeach, modify or explain any of the defendant's direct testimony and was not relevant to his credibility.

The defendant's counsel argued for the admissibility of all this testimony on the ground that he was rehabilitating the defendant's credibility following the introduction of the prior felony conviction. Under recross-examination, over a defense objection, the state was permitted to ask whether the 1974 burglary charge concerned a drugstore, to which the defendant replied that it did not. This was not error because the defense can be said to have opened the door to that inquiry by its explanation of the 1971 burglary. State v. Malley, 167 Conn. 379, 384, 355 A.2d 292; see Akers v. Singer, 158 Conn. 29, 36, 255 A.2d 858; Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 47, 3 A.2d 313. The state also elicited an admission from the defendant that the 1974 charge had to do with an attempted safecracking. No objection was made to this latter question nor was an exception taken; thus the admission of that evidence will not be considered as a ground of error in this appeal. Practice Book 226; State v. Ralls, 167 Conn. 408, 426, 356 A.2d 147; State v. Avila, 166 Conn. 569, 577, 353 A.2d 776.

As a general rule, the extent of a cross-examination is much in the discretion of the judge, yet it should be liberally allowed. See Papa v. Youngstrom, 146 Conn. 37, 40, 147 A.2d 494; Fahey v. Clark, 125 Conn. 44, 46, 47, 3 A.2d 313. The cross-questioning must be relevant and its limitation is within the discretion of the court, especially if the subject is remote to the main issue. Conley v. Board of Education, 143 Conn. 488, 495, 123 A.2d 747; Jennings v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 675, 103 A.2d 535. Even had it been shown through cross-examination that the plaintiff maintained her association with the decedent merely for tax purposes, such a bare showing has no relevancy in discrediting her claim that the delivery of the bankbooks constituted gifts, absent proof that the decedent knew of this and considered the relationship to be primarily a business dealing.