Opinion
G056799
10-31-2019
NABIL FAHEL, Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent, v. MING-KAI LIN et al., Defendants, Cross-complainants, and Appellants.
Law Firm of David Dunlap Jones and David D. Jones for Defendants, Cross-complainants, and Appellants. Law Office of Foroozandeh and Majid Foroozandeh for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2016-00859875) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Robert J. Moss, Judge. Affirmed. Law Firm of David Dunlap Jones and David D. Jones for Defendants, Cross-complainants, and Appellants. Law Office of Foroozandeh and Majid Foroozandeh for Plaintiff, Cross-defendant, and Respondent.
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After a bench trial, plaintiff, cross-defendant, and respondent Nabil Fahel (plaintiff) obtained a judgment against defendants, cross-complainants and appellants Ming-Kai Lin (Lin) and ESTR International, Inc. (ESTR; collectively defendants). Plaintiff, owner of a 2001 Porsche 911, had sued to recover possession of the car from defendants, who operated a garage and sought to recover on a quantum meruit theory for repairs allegedly made to the car. The court awarded possession of the car to plaintiff and approximately $40,000 for loss of use damages and also found in favor of plaintiff on defendants' cross-complaint.
Defendants did not appeal the award requiring them to return possession of the car but argue the court erred in awarding loss of use damages and denying them quantum meruit recovery. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Lin has been a mechanic for more than 20 years. He does business under the name ES Technical Roadsports. He also owns two corporations, ESTR and ES Technical Roadsports, Inc.
In August 2015 John Nguyen brought plaintiff's car into defendant's shop for repairs. Defendants claimed they performed various repairs and generated an invoice under the names ES Roadsports Technical and ES Sports to Nguyen for just under $23,000. Nguyen never paid for the repairs. Defendants maintained they did not know Nguyen did not own or have lawful possession of the car.
In June 2016 ES Technical Roadsports applied for a lien sale. In connection with the application defendants learned plaintiff was the registered owner of the car. In July 2016 plaintiff went to defendants' shop and demanded return of the car. Defendants agreed to return it if plaintiff paid for the repairs, which plaintiff refused to do. No one purchased the car at the subsequent lien sale and the certificate of lien sale showed Lin as the new owner.
Plaintiff filed suit against Nguyen for breach of contract and conversion. He alleged the parties agreed Nguyen would rent the car from him and Nguyen failed to make rental payments. Plaintiff sought $15,400 in damages plus interest and punitive damages. Defendants were subsequently added as Doe defendants, although copies of the amendments are not in the record.
Defendants filed a cross-complaint against plaintiff for declaratory relief and quantum meruit, seeking a declaration "cross-complainant" was the lawful owner of the car and recovery of almost $23,000 for work performed on the car plus $9,000 storage fees.
After a bench trial, the court ruled in favor of plaintiff. It found the car belonged to plaintiff and ordered defendants to return it to him. The court found the lien sale by ES Technical Roadsports was invalid. E.S. Technical Roadsports was the lienholder and it did not hold a license with the Bureau of Automotive repair. Business and Professions Code section 9884.16 requires a valid registration as a condition of obtaining a lien. The court noted that although ESTR was licensed at the time the repairs were performed, ES Technical Roadsports held the lien.
The court also found plaintiff did not authorize any work to be done to the car. In addition, the court awarded damages to plaintiff for loss of use at the reasonable rental value of $55 per day, from July 2016 when plaintiff demanded return of the car until the car is returned to plaintiff, because defendants had possession of the car for that period. The court also found in favor of plaintiff on defendants' cross-complaint.
According to defendants this amount totaled $40,150.
DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review
"[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.)
Generally, we review a trial court's factual findings for substantial evidence. (Ash v. North American Title Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1258, 1268.) "'[T]he evidence [is viewed] in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference.'" (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 957-958.) If "'"there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted," to support the findings,"'" we "must uphold that finding." (Ibid.) We may not reweigh or resolve conflicts in the evidence or redetermine the credibility of witnesses. (Citizens Business Bank v. Gevorgian (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 602, 613.) Thus, contrary facts do not affect our conclusion.
The parties did not request and the court did not issue a statement of decision. In the absence of a statement of decision, we apply the doctrine of implied findings, that is, "we presume the trial court 'made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment for which substantial evidence exists in the record. In other words, the necessary findings of ultimate facts will be implied and the only issue on appeal is whether the implied findings are supported by substantial evidence.'" (LSREF2 Clover Property 4, LLC v. Festival Retail Fund 1, LP (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1067, 1076.) Without a statement of decision the judgment is "effectively insulated from review by the substantial evidence rule." (Gordon v. Wolfe (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 162, 168.)
Further, "'where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the appellant's evidence was (1) "uncontradicted and unimpeached" and (2) "of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding." [Citation.]' [Citation.] The appellate court cannot substitute its factual determinations for those of the trial court; it must view all factual matters most favorably to the prevailing party and in support of the judgment. [Citation.] '"All conflicts, therefore, must be resolved in favor of the respondent."'" (Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) 2. Conversion
Defendants argue the "only plausible explanation" for the $40,150 award is that the court found they converted the car. They contend they did not convert the car and thus are not liable for any damages to plaintiff. We disagree.
Plaintiff makes an undeveloped argument the loss of use damages were not based on conversion. We do not know the basis for the court's award, although the complaint did include a cause of action for conversion. However, loss of use damages must be based on some wrongful conduct. They are not awarded in a vacuum. (See Harris v. Dixon Cadillac Co. (1982) 132 Cal.App.3d 485, 491 [loss of use damages recoverable for wrongful detention of car].)
Most of defendants' arguments on this issue revolve around their claim Nguyen was in lawful possession of the car when he delivered it to them. But the court ordered loss of use damages to begin accruing on the date plaintiff demanded defendants return the car, after any alleged work had been performed.
Defendants' brief argument as to their right to possession from the date plaintiff demanded possession does not persuade. Without record references, they claim they performed repairs to the car; Nguyen was in lawful possession of the car, and if he was not, they had no knowledge; and they had the right to demand payment for services before releasing the car to plaintiff.
California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) requires a party to "[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears." This applies to all matters referred to in any portion of the brief, not just the statement of facts. (Villanueva v. Fidelity National Title Co. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1092, 1110, fn. 8.) We may disregard any facts or arguments not supported by adequate citations to the record. (Ibid.)
The court must have determined defendants had no right to possess the car once plaintiff demanded its return. But without a statement of decision we do not know the basis for such a determination. It might have been because the lien was not perfected—the party claiming to have done the work was not the party who claimed the lien. It also could have been because the court believed no work had been done, as plaintiff testified. It could have been for some other reason.
But as noted above, we presume the court made every factual finding and reasonable inference necessary to support the judgment. Those presumed findings and inferences are sufficient to uphold the judgment on the record presented to us. Defendants have not met their burden to show to the contrary. 3. Quantum Meruit
Defendants argue the court erred when it failed to award them judgment on their quantum meruit cross-complaint for repair costs. Defendants rely on the fact they performed work and defendants received an unfair benefit when the repaired car was returned to him. We are not persuaded.
By ruling in favor of plaintiff on this claim, the court implicitly found defendants did not carry the burden of proving quantum meruit. In order to obtain reversal on appeal, defendants must show their evidence was neither contradicted nor impeached and of such a character we must find it was sufficient. "'[I]t is almost impossible for [defendants] to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in [their] favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial court found [that party's] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof." (Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.)
Again, because there was no statement of decision here, we must presume defendants' evidence was insufficient. The record supports that presumption. For example, plaintiff testified that when he first went to defendants' shop he spoke to a mechanic who told him the car had been brought in and then was "sitting here. No one touched it." This evidence defendants did not perform work on the car defeats the quantum meruit claim.
Defendants failed to include all of the evidence introduced on the issues of the repairs and their value in their brief. California Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(2)(C) required defendants to "[p]rovide a summary of the significant facts." Additionally, because defendants' arguments deal with the sufficiency of the evidence, they were required but failed to "'summarize the evidence on that point, favorable and unfavorable, and show how and why it is insufficient.'" (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409, italics omitted.) It is not our responsibility to independently examine the record. (Ibid.) We could consider the claim forfeited on this basis. (Clark v. Superior Court (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 37, 53.)
Finally, defendants argue plaintiff stipulated to the $23,000 value of the services. The record does not substantiate this argument. Plaintiff's counsel merely accepted defendants' offer of proof, i.e., that Lin would testify he valued the work done on the car in that amount. This is not a stipulation to the value of the services or even that services were provided.
DISPOSTION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff is entitled to costs on appeal.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: MOORE, ACTING P. J. GOETHALS, J.