Opinion
C.A. NO. 99A-05-004-NAB.
Submitted: February 22, 2000.
Decided: February 24, 2000.
Appeal of a Decision of the Industrial Accident Board. Decision Affirmed.
Jessica L. Welch, Esquire, Doroshow Pasquale, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Claimant.
William D. Rimmer, Esquire, Heckler Cattie, Wilmington, Delaware, for the Employer.
ORDER
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, as well as the record below, the Court finds and concludes as follows:
1. This is Claimant Marianne Fague's appeal from a decision of the Industrial Accident Board (Board) denying her motion for reargument of a decision terminating her total disability benefits. Delaware Park Racing Association (Employer) filed a motion to affirm the Board's decision, which this Court denied. Briefing has now been completed, and the issues are ripe for decision.
Fague v. Delaware Park Racing Assoc., Del. Super., C.A. No. 99A-05-004, Barron, J. (Oct. 13, 1999) (ORDER).
Claimant did not timely file a Reply Brief.
2. In November 1998, Claimant injured her right arm during the scope of her employment at Delaware Park and received temporary total disability benefits pursuant to an Agreement as to Compensation. In January 1999, Employer's evaluating physician, Dr. Ger, released Claimant to full-time work, with the restriction that she avoid lifting her right arm. Employer offered Claimant a position as a cashier at no wage loss, but Claimant rejected the offer.
3. On January 6, 1999, Claimant began working as a part-time cashier at Shellhorn and Hill. She worked between 16 and 32 hours per week, typically earning approximately $320 every two weeks. In addition, she continued to receive total disability benefits. Her first several disability checks were for approximately $400 every two weeks. At some point, the checks increased to $560 every two weeks. When Claimant started her new job, her combined income was greater than her income had been in her full-time job at Delaware Park prior to injuring her arm.
4. On January 21, 1999, Employer filed a petition to terminate total disability benefits and to assert the forfeiture provisions of 19 Del. C. § 2353 because Claimant was physically capable of working and had rejected Employer's offer to work full-time as a cashier at no wage loss.
5. On February 23, 1999, a pretrial conference was held with the parties and the Board's Workers' Compensation Specialist. At that time, Claimant acknowledged that she had been working for Shellhorn and Hill since January 6, 1999, and that she continued to receive total disability benefits. Employer subsequently amended its petition to assert a credit for benefits paid to Claimant from the date she returned to work (January 6, 1999) through the date of filing the petition for termination (January 20, 1999).
6. Following the pretrial conference, two hearings were scheduled. A legal hearing on Employer's motion for a rule to show cause regarding production was scheduled for March 18, 1999. A hearing on the merits was scheduled for June 24, 1999. Despite having returned to work, Claimant did not file a petition for partial disability benefits.
7. Claimant failed to appear at the legal hearing on March 18, 1999, although the record showed that the Board had sent her a certified notice letter at her usual address. Because of Claimant's failure to appear and also because of her return to the workforce, the Board terminated Claimant's total disability benefits at the conclusion of the hearing.
8. On Claimant's motion for reargument, the Board held another hearing on April 1, 1999. Claimant again acknowledged that she had a part-time job and that she continued to receive total disability benefits. She also acknowledged that her combined income from her new job and the disability benefits exceeded the income she had earned prior to her work-related accident. Claimant stated that she had informed the insurance carrier of her return to work but continued to receive disability checks. She stated her belief that the people who sent the checks knew what they were doing.
9. After hearing testimony and argument from the parties, the Board made an oral ruling that its previous termination order should stand. The Board informed Claimant that she could file a petition for partial disability and that her reasonable and necessary medical expenses related to the work-related accident would be covered.
10. In its written decision upholding the termination, the Board found that notice was properly made to Claimant at the address where she had received other regular and certified mail from the Board, and that Claimant had failed to claim the certified notice letter. The Board also found that "Claimant admits to returning to work; hence, there is no question that total disability has ceased." For these reasons, the Board affirmed its prior termination of Claimant's total disability benefits.
11. On appeal, Claimant argues that the Board's decision violated Claimant's rights to due process and that its factual findings are not based on substantial evidence. Employer responds that because substantial evidence exists on the record to support the Board's finding that Claimant had returned to work, the Board did not err in terminating Claimant's total disability benefits.
12. The function of this Court on appeal of a decision of an administrative body such as the Industrial Accident Board is to determine whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. This Court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility or make its own factual findings. It merely determines whether the decision is supported by the evidence and is free from legal error.
General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686, 688 (1960).
Oceanport Indus., Inc. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Inc., Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994).
Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965).
Title 19 Del. C. § 10142 [ 29 Del. C. § 10142](d).
13. The dual purposes of workers' compensation law are to provide prompt payment of benefits without regard to fault and to relieve employers and employees of the burden of civil litigation. In light of these purposes, the workers' compensation statutes should be construed with a reasonable liberality. In the case at bar, Claimant promptly received benefits for her disability. Not until Claimant was released to work by Dr. Ger did Employer seek to terminate the total disability benefits. Employer then offered Claimant a position as a cashier at the same rate of pay that she had earned prior to her injury. Claimant rejected this offer. She acknowledged that she was employed elsewhere. She acknowledged that she still received total disability benefits. She acknowledged that she was no longer totally disabled. She acknowledged that she might qualify for partial disability benefits but had not filed for them. At the hearing on April 1, 1999, the following exchange took place between Claimant and Employer's attorney:
New Castle County v. Goodman, Del. Supr., 461 A.2d 1012 (1983).
Children's Bureau v. Nissen, Del. Super., 29 A.2d 603 (1942).
Counsel: It's clear, from the facts right now, that you're, you're not totally disabled. You're working.
Claimant: That's right. And that's [why] I called the insurance company to tell them I wanted to apply for partial disability.
Transcript of the Proceedings, 4/1/99, at 11-12. The Court notes that almost immediately after the second hearing, Claimant filed a petition for partial disability benefits and that a hearing on the merits was scheduled for October 12, 1999. After obtaining representation, Claimant withdrew the petition for partial disability. These facts suggest that Claimant decided to see the total disability petition through to its conclusion before pursuing partial disability benefits.
14. The clear import of Claimant's statement is that she consented to the termination of total disability benefits. She in fact consented to the salient facts that she was no longer totally disabled, that she had returned to work, and that she wanted to pursue partial disability benefits. The Board has statutory authority to so terminate benefits when a claimant consents to the termination.
Title 19 Del. C. § 2347 provides in pertinent part as follows:
Compensation shall be paid by the Department to the employee after the filing of the employer's petition to review from the Workers' Compensation Fund until the parties to an award or agreement consent to the termination or until the Board enters an order upon the employer's petition to review.
15. Despite the clarity of the relevant facts, Claimant at least temporarily abandons her pursuit of partial disability benefits and seeks instead a fact-finding hearing regarding total disability. Under ordinary circumstances, following a so-called legal hearing, the Board would be required to proceed to a fact-finding hearing on the merits of Claimant's eligibility for total disability benefits. In this case, where Claimant has rejected Employer's offer of a full-time job at the same rate of pay and has taken another job, the salient facts have already been established.
16. The Board correctly concluded that, as a matter of law, Claimant was ineligible for total disability benefits as of the date she started working at her new job: "Claimant admits to returning to work; hence, there is no question that total disability has ceased." Even the most "reasonable liberality" could not lead to any other conclusion, and a full-fledged fact-finding hearing could not change this outcome. Any other result would constitute a windfall for the Claimant not envisioned or sanctioned by Delaware's workers' compensation law.
Children's Bureau v. Nissen, supra.
For all these reasons, the Board's decision terminating Claimant's total disability benefits must be and hereby is Affirmed .
It Is So ORDERED .