The Trial Court's determination that the wooden stakes which were intended to be replaced by iron pins as called for by the deeds constituted monuments which controlled the location of the boundaries of the lots was warranted by the evidence. Harmon v. Kennett Co., 103 N.H. 219; Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18. The evidence also supported the funding that the original wooden stake which marked the westerly end of the disputed boundary was located 7.5 feet southerly of the iron pin installed by Collard. Mr. Smith testified that when he built the cottage now owned by Murray, the original wooden stakes were in place at the road and that he ran a string between the one at the shore and the one at the street along the now disputed boundary and that he then measured five feet northerly to establish the corner of the cottage.

This is a question of fact and if there was any evidence to support the findings and recommendations of the master the Trial Court's action in approving his report and issuing a decree in accordance therewith must be sustained. Harris v. Crocker, 97 N.H. 311, 312; Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 22. Plaintiff owns the DeWitt hotel situated at the corner of Chestnut and Porter Streets.

In other cases in which we have held that monuments controlled, either the deeds mentioned the monuments or the parties agreed to the existence of the monuments upon the conveyance of the property. See Seely v. Hand, 119 N.H. 303, 305, 402 A.2d 162 (1979) (where the deed specifically described stone posts delineating corners of the property but the posts were gone, their locations could still be determined from external evidence); Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 1-8, 19-20, 131 A.2d 441 (1957) (determining the deed addressed the controlling monument, extrinsic evidence supported the existence of that monument, and a surveyor placed a new monument in the same location at a later date); Cunningham v. Curtis, 57 N.H. 157, 159 (1876) (concluding that a fence known to the parties at time of conveyance was deemed a monument). Here, neither the deeds nor the plans by the original developer mention any monuments when describing the properties.

Because the plaintiff purchased his property in April 2012, and filed his petition to quiet title in February 2020, he could not establish twenty years of continuously adverse use without tacking his period of possession to that of his predecessors-in-title, the Buckmires. See Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 20-21 (1957) ("The doctrine of 'tacking,' . . . is one which permits an adverse possessor to add his period of possession to that of a prior adverse possessor, in order to establish continuous adverse possession for the prescriptive period."). Thus, to prevail on his adverse possession claim, the plaintiff had to prove, among other things, that the Buckmires used the disputed parcel adversely.

See Alukonis v. Kashulines, 96 N.H. 107, 108-09, 70 A.2d 202, 203 (1950) (upholding a finding of title through adverse possession on the basis of tacking of successive adverse possessions); 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession 160, 163, at 879, 884 (1972). One of the requirements of adverse possession, however, is exclusivity, see Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 21, 131 A.2d 441, 443 (1957); Little v. Downing, 37 N.H. 355, 367 (1858), which the Sewards and other property owners might have undermined if they used the Smalley-filled parcel in common with the Smalleys and subsequent owners of the southern portion of lot 9. See 2 C.J.S. Adverse Possession 56, at 729 (use or occupation in common with neighbors, third persons, or the public is not exclusive possession).

The law is clear in New Hampshire that monuments on the ground control over measurements in a deed. Judge v. Field, 112 N.H. 337, 340, 295 A.2d 459, 461 (1972); Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 21, 131 A.2d 441, 444 (1957). "[T]he bank of the creek" is a natural monument, and natural monuments control over artificial monuments (the "iron pin") as well as courses and distances ("about 256 feet").

The defendants claim that the northwest and southwest corner monuments referred to in the deed cannot be located, and that the boundary runs from a drill hole exactly 275 feet along the lake shore from the northeast corner stone to a point exactly 250 feet along the road from the southeast corner stone. In construing an ambiguous boundary description, monuments, especially marked corners, prevail over courses and distances. Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 21, 131 A.2d 441, 444 (1957). "If the monuments themselves have disappeared, the positions where they were placed may be shown, and, when established with reasonable certainty by evidence, they govern, just as the monuments . . . would."

It is well settled that bounds once established will govern over courses. Fagen v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 131 A.2d 441 (1957); Douglass v. Company, 76 N.H. 254, 81 A. 1086 (1911); Bartlett v. LaRochelle, 68 N.H. 211, 44 A. 302 (1894). We hold that the boundary line between the land of the parties is along a straight line running between points A and B.

It is also uncontradicted that the same description was used in both the Lancaster deed to the Johnsons and the deed from the latter to the plaintiffs Judges and described the conveyed land as being within four bounds marking its four corners. It has long been the law in this State that monuments upon the ground are controlling over measurements in the deed and that in case of a discrepancy between them the monuments upon the ground are controlling. Smith v. Dodge, 2 N.H. 303, 304 (1820); Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 131 A.2d 441 (1957); Harmon v. Kennett Company, 103 N.H. 219, 225, 168 A.2d 482, 486 (1961). The fact that all these monuments can no longer be found does not alter this rule when as in this case their existence and location at the time of the conveyance to the plaintiffs has been established.

The evidence in disputed boundary cases is seldom all one way and it is for the Trial Judge to determine as questions of fact the location on the ground of boundaries described in the deeds. Fagan v. Grady, 101 N.H. 18, 21; Goodwin v. Johnson, 105 N.H. 294. The measurements of distances in the deed to Flanders are to the tenth of a foot and the quantity is stated as 2.41 acres more or less. From this it could be inferred that the land had been carefully surveyed even though the courses are stated generally. While boundaries if known control over estimates of quantity (Harmon v. Kennett Company, 103 N.H. 219, 225; Rollins v. Varney, 22 N.H. 99, 101), yet when area is stated in such precise terms as here it may be given weight in determining which of two disputed bounds is the correct one. Goodwin v. Johnson supra; 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Boundaries, s. 75; C.J.S., Boundaries, s. 57. There was evidence that if the disputed bound were at D the defendants would have only two acres instead of 2.4 acres which they would have if it were at K. There was testimony that if the bound were at D the line would be described as running easterly instead of southeasterly as called for in the deed and that point K would make th