Faden v. Robbins

5 Citing cases

  1. Wilschinsky v. Medina

    108 N.M. 511 (N.M. 1989)   Cited 58 times
    Holding that the duty owed by a physician to the general public for injuries caused by a medicated individual upon release would be discharged by a warning

    Other jurisdictions, faced with questions about the coverage of malpractice procedures to third-party actions have required those actions to proceed through malpractice. See Faden v. Robbins, 88 A.D.2d 631, 450 N.Y.S.2d 238 (1982) (chiropractor's third-party complaint against physicians for alleged malpractice on chiropractor's patient); Gobble v. Baton Rouge Hosp., 415 So.2d 425 (La.Ct.App. 1982) (loss of consortium claim to proceed through malpractice where alleged malpractice caused death); Davis v. Acton, 373 So.2d 952 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979) (third-party complaint against consulting physician). While both New York and Florida have different statutory language than New Mexico, the Louisiana court interpreted language almost identical to that found in the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act.

  2. Leger v. Leger

    444 P.3d 1036 (N.M. Ct. App. 2018)   Cited 2 times
    Stating that, while the text may be read as establishing equivalence between malpractice claim and patient's claim , the statute is ambiguous

    -123, ¶ 14, 90 N.M. 764, 568 P.2d 600 (mentioning cross-claim against doctor and hospital), aff'd in part, rev'd in part , 1977-NMSC-071, 90 N.M. 753, 568 P.2d 589. In simple terms, such claims involve causes of action between or among health care providers based on acts of malpractice that resulted in injury to a patient—that is, they are "malpractice claims" within the meaning of the MMA.See Dessauer , 1981-NMCA-051, ¶¶ 26-29, 96 N.M. 92, 628 P.2d 337 (stating that in order to hold doctor liable for contribution, doctor must be determined negligent and to hold doctor liable for indemnity, doctor must be vicariously liable for nurse’s negligence); see also Caglioti v. Dist. Hosp. Partners, Lp , 933 A.2d 800, 816 (D.C. 2007) (equating equitable indemnity claim to malpractice claim and providing that, to recover, indemnitee "would have the burden of proving the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard and a causal relationship between the deviation and the injury"); Faden v. Robbins , 88 A.D.2d 631, 450 N.Y.S.2d 238, 239 (1982) ("To be entitled to contribution from the third-party defendants, [the doctor] will have to establish that what the third-party defendants did or failed to do in their treatment of [the] plaintiff constituted a departure from the applicable standards of medical skill and care." (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted) ).

  3. Perez v. Fitzgerald

    115 A.D.3d 177 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)   Cited 8 times

    Further demonstrating the restrictive approach to the application of CPLR 214–a, the Second Department has held that the practice of optometry does not constitute the practice of medicine ( Boothe v. Weiss, 107 A.D.2d 730, 730, 484 N.Y.S.2d 598 [2d Dept. 1985]; see also Robinson v. Meca, 214 A.D.2d 246, 248–249, 632 N.Y.S.2d 728 [2d Dept. 1995] ).Prior to Bleiler, the few cases that addressed the issue of whether chiropractic malpractice falls within the ambit of medical malpractice found that it did not ( see Faden v. Robbins 88 A.D.2d 631, 450 N.Y.S.2d 238 [2d Dept. 1982] [holding that an action predicated on chiropractic malpractice is not a “medical malpractice action” for purposes of convening a medical malpractice panel]; Vidra v. Shoman, 59 A.D.2d 714, 715, 398 N.Y.S.2d 377 [2d Dept. 1977] [“chiropractic treatment is a service distinct from medicine, and that chiropractors do not practice medicine”]; Rivera v. City of New York, 150 Misc.2d 566, 569 N.Y.S.2d 870 [Sup. Ct., N.Y. County 1991] [chiropractic expert's name need not be disclosed, since “[a]n action predicated on chiropractic malpractice is not a medical malpractice action”). Post Bleiler, the one case addressing chiropractic services found that, on the facts of that case, the issue “as to whether defendant's services constituted medical treatment” was a question of fact for the jury ( Foote v. Picinich, 118 A.D.2d 156, 157, 503 N.Y.S.2d 926 [3d Dept. 1986] ). Foote was premised on the Bleiler court's statement that health care providers other than physicians may be liabl

  4. Psakis v. Jacobs

    88 A.D.2d 637 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)

    In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., predicated upon a theory of chiropractic malpractice, the defendant third-party plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Widlitz, J.), dated June 5, 1981, which denied his motion for an order directing that no medical malpractice panel be held with respect to the third-party action, and referred the third-party action to the medical malpractice panel. Leave to appeal is hereby granted to the appellant by Justice Gulotta. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements (see Faden v. Robbins, 88 A.D.2d 631). Damiani, J.P., Lazer, Gulotta and Brown, JJ., concur.

  5. Rivera v. City of New York

    150 Misc. 2d 566 (N.Y. Misc. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Defendant LoBrutto argues in this cross motion that since plaintiff's cause of action against defendant LoBrutto is grounded upon chiropractic negligence and that CPLR 3101 (d) (1) (i) only exempts the names of medical, dental and podiatric experts, he is entitled to such disclosure. An action predicated on chiropractic malpractice is not a medical malpractice action (Faden v Robbins, 88 A.D.2d 631). Plaintiff's cause of action against defendant LoBrutto is based on the allegation of chiropractic negligence while her claims against the other defendants are grounded upon medical malpractice.