9, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162; Emery v. Emery (1956), 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. (1959), 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526; Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964), 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796; Kuchinic v. McCrory (1966), 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897; Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205; Reich v. Purcell (1967), Cal., 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (and citations).        The American Law Institute which annunciated the rule of lex loci delicti in the Original Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 378, 384, abandoned it for the rule of 'most significant relationships' in Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, Tenative Draft No. 9, § 379. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 274--275, 132 N.W.2d 410, 414. This rule is not without its critics.

Numerous decisions of this court have recognized and applied this issue-oriented "most significant relationship" doctrine. Goetz v. Wells Ford Mercury, Inc., 405 N.W.2d 842, 843 (Iowa 1987); Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346, 348-49 (Iowa 1973); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965).Cameron, 407 N.W.2d at 597.

Choice of law must not be rendered a matter of happenstance, in which the respective interests of the parties and the concerned jurisdictions receive only coincidental consideration. Numerous jurisdictions have declined to apply the law of the place of injury in similar circumstances. See Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Thomas v. Hanmer, 109 App. Div.2d 80, 489 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1985); Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra. Applying the same rationale, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has refused to adhere to the lex loci doctrine in a case where the plaintiffs, Connecticut residents, were killed in an airplane crash in West Virginia.

Nineteen jurisdictions have abandoned the lex loci rule in whole or in part. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (admiralty); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 357 F.2d 581 (1965); Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana); Merchants Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967); Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D.Conn. 1961), aff'd, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963); Casey v. Manson Constr. Eng'ring Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).

s no suggestion in Babcock that its approach and principle were inapplicable to actions for wrongful death, and indeed, in a number of cases in which the question has been considered, the courts — including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 7, 203 A.2d 796 . . .) — have indicated that the law to be applied is the law not necessarily of the place where the fatal accident occurred but rather of the place having the most significant relationship with, and the greatest interest in, the issue presented. (See, e.g., Fornaro v. Jill Bros., 22 A.D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771, affd. 15 N.Y.2d 819, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938, 205 N.E.2d 862; Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, [121 U.S.App.D.C. 338] 350 F. F.2d 468, 471; Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv., 7 Cir., 342 F.2d 621; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 7 Cir., 342 F.2d 617; Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 2 Cir., 341 F.2d 851, 858, cert. den. 382 U.S. 816, 86 S.Ct. 38, 15 L.Ed.2d 64; Fabricius v. Horgen, [ 257 Iowa 268] 132 N.W.2d 410). It would be highly incongruous and unreal to have the flexible principle of Babcock apply in a case where the victim of the tort is injured but not where he is killed.

While it is true that the "center of gravity" approach has not yet been applied by the Wisconsin court in a wrongful death action, this approach is not without precedent in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). DISTRIBUTION TO BENEFICIARIES

where the incident giving rise to a cause of action occurs in a foreign state, the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined by the foreign state's laws in whatever court the action is brought, but that procedural matters and matters pertaining to the remedy to be applied must be determined by the law of the forum.Brooks v. Engel, 207 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa 1973); see also Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). In this case, the incident which gave rise to defendant's alleged liability occurred in Tennessee, and the parties agree that the substantive law of Tennessee would therefore apply.

The doctrine relied on by defendant permits a court to apply to any issue in litigation the law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the parties and the principal interest in the issue, instead of resorting routinely to the law of the place where the accident occurred — lex loci delicti. We have recognized and adopted this principle in several cases, although never under the circumstances existing here. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 277, 132 N.W.2d 410, 415-416; Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 549, 133 N.W.2d 907, 908-910; and Fuerste v. Bemis, (Iowa), 156 N.W.2d 831, 834. Before discussing this assignment, we consider plaintiff's assertion we should not review it at all because no proof was offered to support the contention Minnesota law is different from ours. It is true, of course, we do not judicially notice the law of other states.

Since 1965, these cases reflect a review of the doctrine of lex loci delicti by appellate courts, all of which have examined the rule and rejected its continued automatic use. Armstrong v. Armstrong (Alaska 1968), 441 P.2d 699; Schwartz v. Schwartz (1968), 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254; Reich v. Purcell (1967), 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727; Myers v. Gaither (D.C.App. 1967), 232 A.2d 577; Wartell v. Formusa (1966), 34 III. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co. (C.A. 7, 1965), 342 F.2d 617; Fabricius v. Horgen (1965), 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410; Wessling v. Paris (Ky.App. 1967), 417 S.W.2d 259; Beaulieu v. Beaulieu (Me. 1970), 265 A.2d 610; Schneider v. Nichols (1968), 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254; Mitchell v. Craft (Miss. 1968), 211 So.2d 509; Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205; Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co. (1970), 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129; Tooker v. Lopez (1969), 24 N.Y. 2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394; Casey v. Manson Constr. Eng. Co. (1967), 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898; Cipolla v. Shaposka (Pa. 1970), 267 A.2d 854; Woodward v. Stewart (R.I. 1968), 243 A.2d 917; Conklin v. Horner (1968), 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579. With full appreciation of the extent of the disturbance of the placidness of choice of laws under a mechanical rule of lex loci delicti, the facts of the case at bar classically demonstrate the injustice of the automatic application of the law of the place of the injury.

Under these circumstances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to injured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of Missouri. (Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 595 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, the Missouri limitation does not apply. (Accord: Gianni v. FortWayne Air Service, Inc. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617; Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1962) 309 F.2d 553, 92 A.L.R.2d 1162; Fabricius v. Horgen (1965) 257 Iowa 268 [ 132 N.W.2d 410]; Farber v. Smolack (N.Y. 1967) 36 U.S.L. Week 2075; Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1965) 16 N.Y.2d 337 [ 213 N.E.2d 796]; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 [ 172 N.E.2d 526]; Griffith v. United AirLines, Inc., supra, 416 Pa. 1.