Fabricius v. Horgen

48 Citing cases

  1. Fuerste v. Bemis

    156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968)   Cited 50 times
    In Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d 831 (Iowa 1968), the Supreme Court of Iowa explicitly adopted the "most significant relationship" test of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws (1971).See also Berghammer v. Smith, 185 N.W.2d 226, 231 (Iowa 1971); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965).

    9, 264 P.2d 944, 42 A.L.R.2d 1162; Emery v. Emery (1956), 45 Cal.2d 421, 289 P.2d 218; Haumschild v. Continental Casualty Co. (1959), 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (1961), 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526; Babcock v. Jackson (1963), 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747, 191 N.E.2d 279, 95 A.L.R.2d 1; Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc. (1964), 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796; Kuchinic v. McCrory (1966), 422 Pa. 620, 222 A.2d 897; Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205; Reich v. Purcell (1967), Cal., 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (and citations).        The American Law Institute which annunciated the rule of lex loci delicti in the Original Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 378, 384, abandoned it for the rule of 'most significant relationships' in Restatement of Conflict of Laws, Second, Tenative Draft No. 9, § 379. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 274--275, 132 N.W.2d 410, 414. This rule is not without its critics.

  2. Harlan Feeders v. Grand Laboratories

    881 F. Supp. 1400 (N.D. Iowa 1995)   Cited 35 times
    Noting that there must be a “true conflict” between the laws of the possible jurisdictions on the pertinent issue before any choice of law need be made

    Numerous decisions of this court have recognized and applied this issue-oriented "most significant relationship" doctrine. Goetz v. Wells Ford Mercury, Inc., 405 N.W.2d 842, 843 (Iowa 1987); Zeman v. Canton State Bank, 211 N.W.2d 346, 348-49 (Iowa 1973); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965).Cameron, 407 N.W.2d at 597.

  3. O'Connor v. O'Connor

    201 Conn. 632 (Conn. 1986)   Cited 240 times
    Adopting the most significant relationship approach of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws

    Choice of law must not be rendered a matter of happenstance, in which the respective interests of the parties and the concerned jurisdictions receive only coincidental consideration. Numerous jurisdictions have declined to apply the law of the place of injury in similar circumstances. See Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Thomas v. Hanmer, 109 App. Div.2d 80, 489 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1985); Wilcox v. Wilcox, supra. Applying the same rationale, the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut has refused to adhere to the lex loci doctrine in a case where the plaintiffs, Connecticut residents, were killed in an airplane crash in West Virginia.

  4. Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Company

    408 F.2d 116 (4th Cir. 1969)   Cited 28 times
    In Brendle v. General Tire and Rubber Co., 408 F.2d 116 (1969), we were asked to apply the reasoning in Lowe's to a wrongful death action against an Ohio tire manufacturer.

    Nineteen jurisdictions have abandoned the lex loci rule in whole or in part. Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (admiralty); Williams v. Rawlings Truck Line, Inc., 123 U.S.App.D.C. 121, 357 F.2d 581 (1965); Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 342 F.2d 617 (7th Cir. 1965) (Indiana); Merchants Nat'l Bank Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967); Zucker v. Vogt, 200 F. Supp. 340 (D.Conn. 1961), aff'd, 329 F.2d 426 (2d Cir. 1964); Armstrong v. Armstrong, 441 P.2d 699 (Alaska 1968); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727 (1967); Wartell v. Formusa, 34 Ill.2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544 (1966); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965); Wessling v. Paris, 417 S.W.2d 259 (Ky. 1967); Kopp v. Rechtzigel, 273 Minn. 441, 141 N.W.2d 526 (1966); Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509 (Miss. 1968); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966); Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 229 A.2d 625 (1967); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 95 A.L.R.2d 1 (1963); Casey v. Manson Constr. Eng'ring Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967); Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Woodward v. Stewart, 243 A.2d 917 (R.I. 1968); Wilcox v. Wilcox, 26 Wis.2d 617, 133 N.W.2d 408 (1965).

  5. O'Keefe v. Boeing Company

    335 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)   Cited 9 times

    s no suggestion in Babcock that its approach and principle were inapplicable to actions for wrongful death, and indeed, in a number of cases in which the question has been considered, the courts — including the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 7, 203 A.2d 796 . . .) — have indicated that the law to be applied is the law not necessarily of the place where the fatal accident occurred but rather of the place having the most significant relationship with, and the greatest interest in, the issue presented. (See, e.g., Fornaro v. Jill Bros., 22 A.D.2d 695, 253 N.Y.S.2d 771, affd. 15 N.Y.2d 819, 257 N.Y.S.2d 938, 205 N.E.2d 862; Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, [121 U.S.App.D.C. 338] 350 F. F.2d 468, 471; Gianni v. Fort Wayne Air Serv., 7 Cir., 342 F.2d 621; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co., 7 Cir., 342 F.2d 617; Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 2 Cir., 341 F.2d 851, 858, cert. den. 382 U.S. 816, 86 S.Ct. 38, 15 L.Ed.2d 64; Fabricius v. Horgen, [ 257 Iowa 268] 132 N.W.2d 410). It would be highly incongruous and unreal to have the flexible principle of Babcock apply in a case where the victim of the tort is injured but not where he is killed.

  6. Satchwill v. Vollrath Company

    293 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Wis. 1968)   Cited 12 times
    Following the Restatement approach in an action for wrongful death, lex fori governed as to liability and damages but law of beneficiaries' domicile controlled distribution of proceeds

    While it is true that the "center of gravity" approach has not yet been applied by the Wisconsin court in a wrongful death action, this approach is not without precedent in other jurisdictions. See e.g., Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 16 N.Y.2d 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965); Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). DISTRIBUTION TO BENEFICIARIES

  7. Harris v. Clinton Corn Processing Co.

    360 N.W.2d 812 (Iowa 1985)   Cited 17 times
    Determining that Tenn. Code Ann. § 28-3-202 is substantive

    where the incident giving rise to a cause of action occurs in a foreign state, the rights and liabilities of the parties must be determined by the foreign state's laws in whatever court the action is brought, but that procedural matters and matters pertaining to the remedy to be applied must be determined by the law of the forum.Brooks v. Engel, 207 N.W.2d 110, 113 (Iowa 1973); see also Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410 (1965). In this case, the incident which gave rise to defendant's alleged liability occurred in Tennessee, and the parties agree that the substantive law of Tennessee would therefore apply.

  8. Berghammer v. Smith

    185 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1971)   Cited 56 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Applying Minnesota law to a loss of consortium claim arising out of an auto accident that occurred in Iowa between a Minnesota driver/plaintiff and an Illinois driver/defendant

    The doctrine relied on by defendant permits a court to apply to any issue in litigation the law of the state which has the most significant relationship with the parties and the principal interest in the issue, instead of resorting routinely to the law of the place where the accident occurred — lex loci delicti. We have recognized and adopted this principle in several cases, although never under the circumstances existing here. Fabricius v. Horgen, 257 Iowa 268, 277, 132 N.W.2d 410, 415-416; Flogel v. Flogel, 257 Iowa 547, 549, 133 N.W.2d 907, 908-910; and Fuerste v. Bemis, (Iowa), 156 N.W.2d 831, 834. Before discussing this assignment, we consider plaintiff's assertion we should not review it at all because no proof was offered to support the contention Minnesota law is different from ours. It is true, of course, we do not judicially notice the law of other states.

  9. Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight

    25 Ohio St. 2d 193 (Ohio 1971)   Cited 43 times
    In Fox v. Morrison Motor Freight, Inc., 25 Ohio St.2d 193, 267 N.E.2d 405, cert. denied, 403 U.S. 931, 91 S.Ct. 2254, 29 L.Ed.2d 710 (1971), the Ohio Supreme Court rejected a strict lex loci delicti approach and adopted a governmental interest analysis for determining what state's law is applicable in a wrongful death case. Under this approach, the court must search for the state which has the most "substantial governmental interest" by weighing any conflicting interests of the competing states.

    Since 1965, these cases reflect a review of the doctrine of lex loci delicti by appellate courts, all of which have examined the rule and rejected its continued automatic use. Armstrong v. Armstrong (Alaska 1968), 441 P.2d 699; Schwartz v. Schwartz (1968), 103 Ariz. 562, 447 P.2d 254; Reich v. Purcell (1967), 67 Cal.2d 551, 432 P.2d 727; Myers v. Gaither (D.C.App. 1967), 232 A.2d 577; Wartell v. Formusa (1966), 34 III. 2d 57, 213 N.E.2d 544; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co. (C.A. 7, 1965), 342 F.2d 617; Fabricius v. Horgen (1965), 257 Iowa 268, 132 N.W.2d 410; Wessling v. Paris (Ky.App. 1967), 417 S.W.2d 259; Beaulieu v. Beaulieu (Me. 1970), 265 A.2d 610; Schneider v. Nichols (1968), 280 Minn. 139, 158 N.W.2d 254; Mitchell v. Craft (Miss. 1968), 211 So.2d 509; Clark v. Clark (1966), 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205; Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co. (1970), 55 N.J. 511, 263 A.2d 129; Tooker v. Lopez (1969), 24 N.Y. 2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394; Casey v. Manson Constr. Eng. Co. (1967), 247 Ore. 274, 428 P.2d 898; Cipolla v. Shaposka (Pa. 1970), 267 A.2d 854; Woodward v. Stewart (R.I. 1968), 243 A.2d 917; Conklin v. Horner (1968), 38 Wis.2d 468, 157 N.W.2d 579. With full appreciation of the extent of the disturbance of the placidness of choice of laws under a mechanical rule of lex loci delicti, the facts of the case at bar classically demonstrate the injustice of the automatic application of the law of the place of the injury.

  10. Reich v. Purcell

    67 Cal.2d 551 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 262 times
    Holding Missouri did not have a real interest in applying its law regarding damages limitation with respect to an accident that occurred in Missouri, because the defendant was a resident of Ohio and Missouri's interest was to shield Missouri residents from liability

    Under these circumstances giving effect to Ohio's interests in affording full recovery to injured parties does not conflict with any substantial interest of Missouri. (Cf. Bernkrant v. Fowler, 55 Cal.2d 588, 595 [ 12 Cal.Rptr. 266, 360 P.2d 906].) Accordingly, the Missouri limitation does not apply. (Accord: Gianni v. FortWayne Air Service, Inc. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 621; Watts v. Pioneer Corn Co. (7th Cir. 1965) 342 F.2d 617; Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc. (2d Cir. 1962) 309 F.2d 553, 92 A.L.R.2d 1162; Fabricius v. Horgen (1965) 257 Iowa 268 [ 132 N.W.2d 410]; Farber v. Smolack (N.Y. 1967) 36 U.S.L. Week 2075; Long v. Pan American World Airways, Inc. (1965) 16 N.Y.2d 337 [ 213 N.E.2d 796]; Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines,Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34 [ 172 N.E.2d 526]; Griffith v. United AirLines, Inc., supra, 416 Pa. 1.