In such a case, there is no room for construction." F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510, 289 A.2d 905 (1971). Application of this legal principle to the present circumstance, however, presupposes that the triangular parcel in dispute is in fact bounded on its north side by Upper Shop Pond. This may or may not be the case.
Powers v. Olson, 252 Conn. 98, 108, 742 A.2d 799 (2000). In determining the location of a boundary line expressed in a deed, if the description is clear and unambiguous, it governs and the actual intent of the parties is irrelevant. Koennicke v. Maiorano, supra, 43 Conn. App. 10; see also F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510, 289 A.2d 905 (1971). The deed in the present case begins with the words "at the Northwest corner of land herein at its intersection of land now or formerly of Katherine Link Knapp . . . .
Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the trial court reformed the boundary to a location that was explicitly claimed by the plaintiffs. The trial court's decision, therefore, accorded with our case law, which states that in resolving a boundary dispute, a trial court must identify the boundary line along a course for which there is a supporting basis in its findings and in the prayers for relief. See F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 512, 289 A.2d 905 (1971). In the present case, there were both.
The description of the easement in the deed is not ambiguous on its face. It makes clear reference to a map entitled, "Mar. 1, 1986 Revised July 11, 1986 which map is on file in the office of the Town Clerk." Ambiguity arises, however, because the only map on file at the time the deed was recorded bears the date "Mar. 1, 1986," (map one) instead of "Mar. 1, 1986 Revised July 11, 1986" (map two). See, e.g., F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510-11, 289 A.2d 905 (1971) (finding deeds contained a latent ambiguity where, although certain on the face, they were rendered uncertain when compared to the land that they purported to describe). In this case, as the deed gives only a general description of the easement, a map is controlling as to the location and boundaries of the easement.
Judge Healey stated in Koennicke v. Maiorano, 43 Conn.App. 1, 10 (1996), "Where the deed is ambiguous, however, the intention of the parties is a decisive question of fact. Lake Garde Improvement Ass'n. v. Battistoni, supra; Staff v. Hawkins, 135 Conn. 316, 319, 64 A.2d 176; Giola v. Annunziata, 102 Conn. 52, 56, 127 A. 921; Raymond v. Nash, 57 Conn. 447, 452, 18 A. 714." F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510 289 A.2d 905 (1971); see Apostles of the Sacred Heart v. Curott, 187 Conn. 591, 595, 448 A.2d 157 (1982); Faiola v. Faiola, supra, 18. In ascertaining the intention of the parties, it was proper for the trial court to consider the surrounding circumstances.
Latent ambiguity exists where, although language in a deed appears to be certain on its face, it is rendered uncertain when compared to the land that it is purported to describe. See, e.g., F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510-11, 289 A.2d 905 (1971). "Hence, [a] trial court correctly [may conclude] that [a deed is] rendered uncertain by comparing [it] with the land which [it] purported to describe.
Since we have concluded that the 1867 deed clearly expressed an intention to convey a fee simple interest in the roadway, reference to the surrounding circumstances is unnecessary. Moreover, the intent of the parties is a question of fact for the trial court; F AK Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 511, 289 A.2d 905 (1971); Lake Garda Improvement Assn. v. Battistoni, supra, 511; Christen v. Ruppe, 131 Conn. 149, 152, 38 A.2d 439 (1944); and the trial court could reasonably have found that the plaintiffs allegations concerning the surrounding circumstances were speculative and therefore deserving of little weight. We are equally unpersuaded by the plaintiff's arguments concerning the alleged deed and map discrepancies.
The cases upon which the state relies for this novel proposition are, however, distinguishable because they involve the use of parol evidence not to establish missing property descriptions but to interpret ambiguous property descriptions in the context of boundary disputes. F. AK, Inc. v. Siveper, 161 Conn. 505, 510-11, 289 A.2d 905 (1971); Fogg v. Wakelee, 40 Conn. Sup. 272, 283, 492 A.2d 843 (1983), aff'd, 196 Conn. 287, 492 A.2d 511 (1985). These cases do not persuade us that a mortgage deed that lacks a property description can properly be characterized as a "complete written instrument."
Such conclusions must be upheld unless they are legally or logically inconsistent with the facts found or unless they involve application of an erroneous rule of law material to the case. Velsmid v. Nelson, 175 Conn. 221, 225, 397 A.2d 113 (1978); McLaughlin v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 164 Conn. 317, 323-24, 321 A.2d 456 (1973); F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510, 289 A.2d 905 (1971). In this case, the trial court found specifically that the owner permitted the police to search her house, including the plaintiff's bedroom, and concluded, concomitantly, that she had given the requisite legal consent to the search, both on her own behalf and on behalf of Dotson.
The trial court's conclusion is tested by the finding. F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510, 289 A.2d 905. Although the finding is not detailed, it supports the conclusion that August 20 to September 22 was a commercially reasonable period within which to place the risk of loss on the defendant. As already stated, the trial court found that the defendant repeatedly agreed to transmit delivery instructions and that the pellets were specially made to fill thou defendant's order.