Opinion
CIV-20-226-G
01-08-2021
JAMES EZELL, Petitioner, v. JAMES NALL, Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SUZANNE MITCHELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, a prisoner appearing pro se, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging a disciplinary proceeding that he claims deprived him of due process. Doc. 16, at 2-5. Petitioner alleges Respondent provided him no notice and forged a guilty plea on his behalf-the guilty plea denied him a hearing and waived his right to appeal the disciplinary action. Respondent moved to dismiss the petition arguing Petitioner was afforded all the necessary due process, and Petitioner responded. Docs. 19, 26. After review, the undersigned recommends the Court grant summary judgment to Respondent.
United States District Judge Charles Goodwin has referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4.
Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless otherwise indicated.
I. Background.
On May 3, 2018, a prison official reported Petitioner for an incident at the James Crabtree Correctional Center. The offense report, dated May 3, 2018, charged Petitioner with a X-13 offense for “thr[owing] a cup of urine and feces” at the reporting official while he tried to handcuff Petitioner. Doc. 19, at 17-18. The offense report shows checkmarks next to statements that Petitioner received a copy of the written charge and that he pleaded guilty and waived his right to appeal. Id. The offense report also contains Petitioner's signature at the bottom of the page. The disciplinary disposition report also dated May 3, 2018, states that Petitioner “admitted to throwing feces at officer, ” lists the disciplinary sanctions (“a $2000 fine, canteen restriction of 180 days and loss of 30 earned credits”), and includes Petitioner's signature at the top and bottom of the page. Id. at 19; Doc. 16, at 2.
Petitioner asserts the disciplinary action also resulted in “transfer from medium security placement to super maximum security placement” at a different Oklahoma Department of Correction facility. Doc. 16, at 2. The undersigned takes judicial notice of the electronic records of the Oklahoma Department of Corrections. See Fed. R. Evid. 201; see also United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting the court's “discretion to take judicial notice of publicly-filed records in our court and certain other courts concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand”). Petitioner is currently housed at the Davis Correctional Facility, which is a medium-security facility. See https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (last visited December 23, 2020); Davis Correctional Facility, CoreCivic, https://www.corecivic.com/facilities/davis-correctional-facility (last visited December 23, 2020).
On August 1, 2018, Petitioner appealed the disciplinary action to the warden, who denied it based on Petitioner's guilty plea since it makes him ineligible to appeal. Doc. 19, at 20-22. Petitioner then appealed to the Administrative Review Authority, which denied the appeal on the same grounds, on September 18, 2020. Id. at 14-16; Doc. 1, Ex. 6, at 36. Petitioner timely appealed to the state district court, but the court denied relief on the same basis in an order issued on January 13, 2020. Doc. 1, Ex. 9. The court noted that “Petitioners' allegations of forgery and destruction of official records are factual disputes that are not reviewable in an appeal of a prison disciplinary proceeding.” Id. Ex. 9, at 2. Petitioner then appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, and the OCCA affirmed the denial on February 14, 2020, concluding Petitioner was not denied due process in the matter. Id. Exs. 1-2. Petitioner filed the instant petition in this Court on March 11, 2020. See Docs. 1, 16.
Respondent curiously argues that “Petitioner failed to exhaust state judicial remedies” because he failed to properly follow the OCCA's rules in appealing the district court's decision, instead filing a Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the OCCA. Doc. 19, at 3-6. However, as Respondent concedes, the OCCA clearly construed the petition as a properly filed appeal and considered Petitioner's due process claim. See Id. at 5, 40.
II. Petitioner's claims.
Petitioner argues Respondent did not afford him due process in the X-13 disciplinary proceeding, contrary to ODOC policy and constitutional due process requirements. Doc. 16, at 2, 4 (citing ODOC Policy OP-060125, Section III.B.2 and Wolff v. McDonnell ). He claims he “never received or was ever provided with [the] Offense Report” or “received notice of the written charges.” Id. at 2, 5. He also asserts Respondent “forged” the disciplinary disposition report that required Petitioner to initial a plea of guilty. Id. at 3. He maintains no disciplinary hearing took place and Respondent was improperly “involved in the investigation and prosecution” of the matter. Id. at 3-5. Petitioner asks for “restoration of good time credit, ” “immediate placement back at medium security and expungement of any and all misconduct received after May 3, 2018, ” “a new plan . . . to ensure prison official will be held accountable of violations . . . [of] due process, ” damages for civil rights violations of “unconstitutional procedures, ” and legal costs. Id. at 6.
418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974).
Damages are not available as habeas relief, but a claimant may pursue them on a civil action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U.S. 637, 648 (2004).
Respondent asks the Court to dismiss the petition, arguing that Petitioner received the required due process: he received the offense report, his guilty plea “waive[d] his right to a hearing, ” and he received the disciplinary disposition report with the hearing officer's findings. Doc. 19, at 8. Respondent maintains the “findings were based on Petitioner's [guilty plea]” and were “sufficient evidence in the record to support the Hearing Officer's determination.” Id. at 9. He asserts that “[a]lthough [P]etitioner claims he did not plead guilty, he has offered no evidence to rebut the record or the factual determinations.” Id.
III. The Court treats Respondent's motion as a motion for summary judgment.
Respondent's motion to dismiss relies on evidence outside of the habeas petition, i.e., Respondent's affidavit. See Doc. 19, at 43-44. A court must convert a motion to dismiss “to a motion for summary judgment if ‘matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court.'” GFF Corp. v. Assoc. Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)). So the Court will treat Respondent's motion as a motion for summary judgment. When the Court “intends to convert the motion, the court should give the parties notice of the changed status of the motion” to provide the opposing party “the opportunity to present to the court all material made pertinent to such motion by Rule 56.” Nichols v. United States, 796 F.2d 361, 364 (10th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). But notice is excusable “if a party does not attempt to exclude the supporting documents, but files its own sworn affidavits in response. Where a party has responded in kind to the movant's attempt to convert the motion, that party cannot later claim unfair surprise.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Here, Petitioner addressed Respondent's affidavit in his response to the motion, see Doc. 26, at 5, and included his own affidavit, id. at 10-12. No further notice is necessary.
IV. Standard for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is necessary “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). “A dispute is genuine ‘if there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way,' and it is material ‘if under the substantive law it is essential to the proper disposition of the claim.'” Fields v. City of Tulsa, 753 F.3d 1000, 1009 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). “The court views the record and draws all favorable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005). Once the movant meets his burden, “its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts . . . . Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.'” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citations omitted). “The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (alterations and citation omitted).
Because federal statutory law does not address the standard for summary judgment in habeas proceedings, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern Respondent's motion treated as a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 81(a)(4); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.
V. Analysis.
A. What constitutes due process for disciplinary proceedings.
“[A]n inmate's liberty interest in his earned good time credits cannot be denied without the minimal safeguards afforded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 811 (10th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Due process in disciplinary proceedings that may result in the loss of good time credits requires:
(1) advance written notice of the disciplinary charges; (2) an opportunity, when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals, to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense; and (3) a written statement by the factfinder of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action.Id. at 812 (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985)). And the “decision to revoke such credits must be supported by some evidence.” Hill, 472 U.S. at 447.
But since “the full panoply of rights due a defendant” in criminal prosecution does not apply in disciplinary proceedings, due process requires no more. Wolff, 418 U.S. at 556; Hill, 472 U.S. at 447. So if the disciplinary proceeding afforded those protections, “the reviewing court must only be able to ascertain ‘some evidence' in the proceedings below in order to uphold the disciplinary action.” Whitmore v. Parker, 484 Fed.Appx. 227, 233 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Howard, 487 F.3d at 812); Bird v. Pacheco, 729 Fed.Appx. 627, 631 (10th Cir. 2018) (explaining “review is limited to whether there was ‘some evidence' to support the [disciplinary] decision”) (citations omitted). Determining “some evidence supports the [disciplinary] decision” only requires the existence of “any evidence in the record that could support” the decision. Hill, 472 U.S. at 455-56. “[T]he relevant inquiry is what process [the prisoner] received, not whether the State decided his case correctly.” Whitmore, 484 Fed.Appx. at 233 (quoting Swarthout v. Cooke, 131 S.Ct. 859, 863 (2011)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see also Hill, 472 U.S. at 456 (“The fundamental fairness guaranteed by the Due Process Clause does not require courts to set aside decisions of prison administrators that have some basis in fact.”).
B. The disciplinary proceeding met the constitutional due process requirements.
Although not in a linear manner, Petitioner raises several aspects of the disciplinary proceeding as failing to provide due process, including not receiving proper notice or a hearing. At bottom, he challenges the validity of the X-13 offense and disposition reports that he claims he never received and the guilty plea he claims he did not voluntarily enter. Doc. 26, at 2.
This Court construes a pro se litigant's pleadings liberally and holds them “to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The Court, however, may not serve as Plaintiff's advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
Petitioner also claims that Respondent was improperly “involved in the investigation and prosecution” of the matter. Doc. 16, at 3-5. Due process does not prohibit this. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454.
He alleges Respondent only provided him with a disposition report for a different charge, “Class A-22, ” also dated May 3, 2018, but that he received no offense report for either of the two charges before that. Id.; see Doc. 1, Ex. 6, at 27. Still referring to the Class A-22 disposition report, Petitioner claims he pleaded “not guilty” and “requested video” when Respondent asked him to sign the report. Doc. 26, at 2. According to Petitioner, Respondent “said okay just sign here indicating guilty, ” but when Petitioner “tried to mark initial not guilty” Respondent “pull[ed] the papers away.” He claims he “never marked Section II of X-13 disciplinary disposition report, ” which has check marks next to the statements that he received a copy of the written charges and that he pleads guilty and waives his right to appeal. Id. Instead, Petitioner asserts that Respondent “forged a guilty plea and [his] signature” on the disposition report. Id. at 10.
Petitioner confusingly intertwines his allegations about not receiving and forgery of the offense and disposition reports for both his Class A-22 and Class X-13 charges, all dated May 3, 2018. This matter relates only to the disciplinary proceeding for the Class X-13 charge, and the Court disregards any claim related to his Class A-22 offense disciplinary proceeding.
Respondent affirms that he “witnessed [Petitioner] enter a voluntary plea of guilty to the X-13 offense as evidenced by his signature on the offense report and disciplinary disposition report” “after being made aware of the consequences of entering a guilty plea.” Doc. 19, at 43.
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. And contrary to Petitioner's allegations of forgery and not receiving the reports, all the reports show the same (or substantially similar) signature to that attached to various of Petitioner's other signed documents. Compare Doc. 1, Ex. 7, at 8, 10 (offense and disposition reports), with Doc. 1, at 9 (habeas petition), and Id. Ex. 7, at 6, 11 (prison and ARA appeals). So the Court cannot adopt Petitioner's version of the facts alleging he did not receive the reports or sign them, when his signature is clearly on them. See Scott, 550 U.S. at 381 n.8 (noting that at the summary judgment stage, we draw “all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party to the extent supportable by the record” and refusing to adopt a version of facts “so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed [it]”).
Petitioner's signature on both disciplinary reports contradicts Petitioner's claim of receiving no notice, and the guilty plea waived the possibility of a hearing. The disposition report states Respondent relied on Petitioner's admittance of guilt to find him guilty, so “some evidence” supported the decision. Thus, Petitioner received all the due process constitutionally required for the disciplinary proceeding.
Petitioner's claims about noncompliance with ODOC policy form no basis for federal habeas relief since it is available only when a state official has violated the federal constitution, a federal statute, or a federal treaty. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see, e.g., Harrison v. Williams, No. CIV-09-1145-R, 2009 WL 4016104, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 18, 2009) (finding that “failure to adhere to . . . prison policy does not amount to a constitutional violation because the prison policy neither creates a liberty interest nor defines the process due before a liberty interest can be impacted or deprived”); Henderson v. Workman, No. CIV-05-1486-T, 2006 WL 2545815, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 31, 2006) (concluding that the habeas “fail[ed] to state a federal constitutional violation” for a due process claim that was based on noncompliance with DOC regulations for disciplinary hearings).
VI. Recommendation and notice of right to object.
For these reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court grant Respondent's motion, Doc. 19, and dismiss the petition. This recommendation, if adopted, will moot Petitioner's pending motions. Docs. 27-30.
The undersigned advises Petitioner of his right to file an objection to this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of Court on or before January 29, 2021, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). The undersigned further advises Petitioner that the failure to file a timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both the factual and legal issues contained herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned in the captioned matter.