Opinion
Civil Action 23-cv-01727-PAB-STV
10-02-2023
CHUKWUEMEKA A. EZEDINMA, Plaintiff, v. DOUGLAS COUNTY DISTRICT COURT - DIVISION 7, Defendant
RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
SCOTT T. VARHOLAK, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the Douglas County District Court's Motion to Dismiss (the “Motion to Dismiss”) [#8] and Plaintiff's Motion to Vacate Magistrate Donna Michelle Stewart's Ruling on July 7, 2023 and Emergently Recognize and Execute Colorado State Law for Parenting Time (the “Motion to Vacate”) [#16] (collectively, the “Motions”). The Motions have been referred to this Court. [#29] The Court has carefully considered the Motions and related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable case law, and has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in the disposition of the Motions. For the following reasons, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss be GRANTED and the Motion to Vacate be DENIED.
The facts are drawn from the allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint. [#1]
This case arises out of Plaintiff's participation as the respondent in Douglas County District Court Case No. 2011DR1564, a dissolution of marriage proceeding that was filed on November 10, 2011 (the “Divorce Matter”). [#8-1] In July 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion in the Divorce Matter for modification of parenting time. [#1, ¶ 1] On October 20, 2022, Plaintiff modified that motion seeking sole parenting time. [Id.; see also #8-1 at 8] On May 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed a motion in the Divorce Matter seeking a change of venue. [#1, ¶ 1; see also #8-1 at 4] Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Douglas County District Court (the “Divorce Court”) has refused to rule on these motions and “has continued to deny [Plaintiff] the right to a trial on [his] motions.” [#1, ¶ 1] Plaintiff alleges that the Divorce Court has expeditiously ruled on all of the motions filed by Plaintiff's opponent in the Divorce Matter. [Id. at ¶ 2] Plaintiff thus alleges that Defendant has not treated Plaintiff equally and has instead “shown extreme bias towards” Plaintiff. [Id.]
On a motion to dismiss, the Court may consider outside documents subject to judicial notice, including court documents and matters of public record. Radtke v. JP Morgan Chase and Co., No. 15-cv-02178-LTB-KLM, 2016 WL 8578098, at 2 n.5 (D. Colo. July 21, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 8578099 (D. Colo. Aug. 5, 2016); see also Hodgson v. Farmington City, 675 Fed.Appx. 838, 841 (10th Cir. 2017) (Documents subject to judicial notice “include[] another court's publicly filed records ‘concerning matters that bear directly upon the disposition of the case at hand.'” (quoting United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184, 1192 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007)). Moreover, Plaintiffs' Complaint extensively references the related state court proceedings. [ See generally #1 ]; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 55i U.S. 308, 322 (2007) (holding a court “must consider the complaint in its entirety . . . [and] documents incorporated into the complaint by reference”).
The exact date of this filing is not obvious from the Divorce Matter's register of actions. [#8-1 at 8-10]
It appears from the Divorce Matter's register of actions that the Divorce Court has entered an order on Plaintiff's motion requesting a change of venue. [#8-1 at 1] The Court need not resolve this apparent inconsistency to issue a Recommendation on the instant Motions.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant “has repressed [Plaintiff] and has subjugated [Plaintiff] to extreme sufferings by putting out a warrant for [his] arrest and arresting and jailing [Plaintiff] because [he] missed a divorce court date.” [Id. at ¶ 3] He further alleges that Defendant has “caused [Plaintiff] financial strain by placing the maximum cash bond that [Douglas County] can impose for missing a divorce court date.” [Id. at ¶ 3] Plaintiff maintains that Defendant has acted in a “heavy-handed[]” manner and has used the Divorce Court to deny Plaintiff equal access to justice. [Id. at ¶ 4]
On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff initiated the instant action. [#1] Through the Complaint, Plaintiff seeks: (1) an Order compelling Defendant to move Plaintiff's case to Denver County; (2) a finding that Defendant is guilty of discrimination and has violated Plaintiff's civil rights; and (3) an Order compelling Defendant to establish 50/50 parenting time. [Id. at 5] On August 15, 2023, Defendant filed the instant Motion seeking to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. [#8] Plaintiff has responded to the Motion [##15; 17] and Defendant has replied [#26].
On September 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed the Motion to Vacate. [#16] The Motion to Vacate asks this Court to vacate the Divorce Court's July 7, 2023 Order that restricted Plaintiff's parenting time, and to “with immediate effect grant [Plaintiff] parenting rights according to Colorado State Law.” [Id. at 1] The Motion to Vacate also seeks an Order transferring the Divorce Matter to either Denver or Arapahoe County. [Id.] Finally, the Motion to Vacate asks this Court for “federal protection against [Defendant] for harassment, warrants of arrest, intimidation and policing.” [Id.]
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) empowers a court to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is not a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case, but only a determination that the court lacks authority to adjudicate the matter. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) (recognizing federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do so). A court lacking jurisdiction “must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974).
Rule 12(b)(1) challenges are generally presented in one of two forms: “[t]he moving party may (1) facially attack the complaint's allegations as to the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, or (2) go beyond allegations contained in the complaint by presenting evidence to challenge the factual basis upon which subject matter jurisdiction rests.” Merrill Lynch Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nudell, 363 F.3d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Maestas v. Lujan, 351 F.3d 1001, 1013 (10th Cir. 2003)). When reviewing a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, the Court “presume[s] all of the allegations contained in the amended complaint to be true.” Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002).
“A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). “The Haines rule applies to all proceedings involving a pro se litigant.” Id. at 1110 n.3. The Court, however, cannot be a pro se litigant's advocate. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008). Moreover, pro se parties must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Nielsen v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Green v. Dorrell, 969 F.2d 915, 917 (10th Cir. 1992)).
III. ANALYSIS
“A federal court must in every case, and at every stage of the proceeding, satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, and the court is not bound by the acts or pleadings of the parties.” Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & Cty. of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1301 (10th Cir. 1980). Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, the Court must “presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction.” United States ex rel. Hafter v. Spectrum Emergency Care, Inc., 190 F.3d 1156, 1160 (10th Cir.1999). Plaintiff, as the party initiating this action in federal court, thus bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013).
In the Complaint, Plaintiff contends that this Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. [#1 at 2] Under Section 1331, “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” In his Complaint, Plaintiff cites to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. § 2000a). [#1 at 3] Though the Court recognizes that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 can give rise to federal jurisdiction, the Court nonetheless concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims due to the domestic relations exception to federal question jurisdiction.
“[F]ederal courts lack jurisdiction over domestic-relations cases.” Alfaro v. Cnty. of Arapahoe, 766 Fed.Appx. 657, 659 (10th Cir. 2019) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)). “The domestic relations exception divests federal courts of the power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.” Leathers v. Leathers, 856 F.3d 729, 756 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703). This exception to federal jurisdiction applies in matters based on a court's federal question jurisdiction. Winters v. Kansas Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., No. 10-2181-JAR, 2011 WL 166708, at *5 (D. Kan. Jan. 19, 2011) (collecting cases), aff'd, 441 Fed.Appx. 611 (10th Cir. 2011).
Here, Plaintiff's Complaint specifically asks this Court to “compel [Defendant] to establish the 50/50 parenting time as required by State law.” [#1 at 5] The Motion to Vacate asks this Court to “immediate[ly] . . . grant [Plaintiff] parenting rights according to Colorado State Law so that [Plaintiff] can reunite with his minor children.” [#16 at 1] But “[t]he domestic relations exception divests federal courts of the power to issue . . . child custody decrees.” Leathers, 856 F.3d at 756 (citing Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703). And courts have applied the domestic relations exceptions to requests to transfer custody determinations to a different court, the alternative relief Plaintiff seeks. Taylor v. Sedgwick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, No. 18-2674-DDC-JPO, 2019 WL 4752044, at *8 (D. Kan. Sept. 30, 2019). Finally, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks some form of injunctive or declaratory relief for any alleged civil rights violation arising from the Divorce Court's rulings in the Divorce Matter, “for [Plaintiff] to prevail, a federal court would have to review and reject orders issued by a state judge in state domestic relations proceedings. Federal courts, however, lack the power to do any of this.” Landrith v. Gariglietti, 505 Fed.Appx. 701, 702 (10th Cir. 2012); see id. at 703 (“[A]ttempts to disguise the true nature of a domestic relations action in order to secure a federal forum sufficient to preclude application of [the domestic relations exception]” are not allowed. (quotation omitted)); Vaughan v. Smithson, 883 F.2d 63, 65 (10th Cir. 1989) (“The proper [application of the domestic relations exception] focuses on the type of determination the federal court must make in order to resolve the claim. If the federal court is called upon to decide those issues regularly decided in state court domestic relations actions such as divorce, alimony, child custody, or the support obligations of a spouse or parent, then the domestic relations exception is applicable.”); Winters, 2011 WL 166708, at *5 (applying the domestic relations exception to claims that were “articulated as civil rights claims” but nevertheless required a determination of whether a state court's child custody decision was contrary to state law).
Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to enter the relief Plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss [#8] be GRANTED and that the Motion to Vacate [#16] be DENIED and that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Lambeth v. Miller, 363 Fed.Appx. 565, 566, 569 (10th Cir. 2010) (finding that dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction must be “without prejudice”); Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A longstanding line of cases from this circuit holds that where the district court dismisses an action for lack of jurisdiction, as it did here, the dismissal must be without prejudice.”).
IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion to Dismiss [#8] be GRANTED and that the Motion to Vacate [#16] be DENIED and that this case be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
Within fourteen days after service of a copy of this Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections to the magistrate judge's proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations with the Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Griego v. Padilla (In re Griego), 64 F.3d 580, 583 (10th Cir. 1995). A general objection that does not put the district court on notice of the basis for the objection will not preserve the objection for de novo review. “[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. 2121 East 30th Street, 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Failure to make timely objections may bar de novo review by the district judge of the magistrate judge's proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations and will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the district court based on the proposed findings of fact, legal conclusions, and recommendations of the magistrate judge. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 57980 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that the district court's decision to review magistrate judge's recommendation de novo despite lack of an objection does not preclude application of “firm waiver rule”); Int'l Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Wyo. Coal Refining Sys., Inc., 52 F.3d 901, 904 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that cross-claimant waived right to appeal certain portions of magistrate judge's order by failing to object to those portions); Ayala v. United States, 980 F.2d 1342, 1352 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding that plaintiffs waived their right to appeal the magistrate judge's ruling by failing to file objections). But see, Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1122 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that firm waiver rule does not apply when the interests of justice require review).