Opinion
1:16-cv-09527-MKV
11-17-2022
EXXONMOBIL OIL CORPORATION Petitioner, v. TIG INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent.
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY KAY VYSKOCIL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded this case for the sole purpose of calculating “the interest accrued [post-Award] through the date of judgment.” ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 44 F.4th 163, 180 (2d Cir. 2022). On August 15, 2022, the Court ordered the parties to submit a proposed amended judgment according with this directive. Order [ECF No. 70]. The parties were unable to agree on a proposed judgment, however, because they dispute the date that “judgment” was meaningfully ascertained-determining when prejudgment interest stops accruing and post-judgment interest begins. See Consent Letter Motion [ECF No. 73]; TIG Letter [ECF No. 75]; ExxonMobil Letter [ECF No. 76]. On September 21, 2022, the Court referred this dispute to Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. See Order Referring Case to Magistrate Judge [ECF No. 78].
Magistrate Judge Netburn issued a thorough and carefully reasoned Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) on November 2, 2022, recommending that this Court calculate post Award prejudgment interest from August 17, 2019 until May 26, 2020, for a total prejudgment interest award of $1,744,519.50. R&R 1 [ECF No. 79]. The parties had fourteen days to file objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); R&R 6. None were filed. When there are no objections, the Court reviews an R & R for clear error. See, e.g., Andrews v. LeClaire, 709 F.Supp.2d 269, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Batson v. RIM San Antonio Acquisition, LLC, No. 15-CV-07576 (ALC), 2022 WL 767071, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2022); Harrell v. Chappius, No. 17CIV758LAPSN, 2020 WL 10226736, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2020).
The Court has reviewed the R&R for clear error. The Court finds none and agrees with the R&R that judgment was “ascertained in a meaningful way and supported by the evidence” on May 26, 2020, when Judge Ramos confirmed the arbitral award and entered judgment for ExxonMobil. Andrulonis v. United States, 26 F.3d 1224, 1233 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836 (1990)); see also NML Cap. v. Republic of Argentina, 435 Fed.Appx. 41, 43 (2d Cir. 2011) (“In general, pre-judgment interest ceases to accrue, and postjudgment interest begins to accrue, as of the date that judgment first ‘is ascertained in a meaningful way and supported by the evidence.'” (quoting Adrian v. Town of Yorktown, 620 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2010))). That judgment has never been disturbed by this Court, nor was it set aside after a separate review on appeal.
The Court finds ExxonMobil's suggestion that this Court should be guided by Ninth Circuit authority-rather than “certain decisions in the Second Circuit”-unpersuasive. See ExxonMobil Letter 3. Moreover, contrary to ExxonMobil's argument, the Second Circuit has expressly rejected the consideration of equities in determining what date “trigger[s] the running of interest.” See, e.g., Andrulonis, 26 F.3d at 1233.
The Court therefore adopts the R&R in its entirety as the opinion of the Court.
SO ORDERED.